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Abstract 
Since 1978, China has gradually reformed its economic system from the traditional 
planning economy to a more competitive market-oriented economy. After an effort of 
three decades, China has now become the world's fourth-largest economy behind the 
US, Japan and Germany. Nevertheless, the continuous national economic reform and 
entrance of foreign companies have significantly changed China's business status quo, 
and resulted in increasingly drastic market competition in the domestic market. Faced 
with this competitive environment and economic pressure, thousands of Chinese 
companies have implemented Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems in order to 
improve operational efficiency and enhance core competencies. 
Nevertheless, as identified from the literature review, successful implementation of the 
ERP system is not the end of the ERP journey. In order to maximize potential Return 
on Investment (ROI) of ERP, user companies must be ready for the long-term fight in 
the system post-implementation stage. However, when actually using, maintaining and 
enhancing the ERP system in the post-implementation stage, user companies may often 
encounter a wide range of barriers and risks that can prevent them from achieving long-
term ERP and business success. Therefore this research project aimed at identifying, 
assessing and investigating potential ERP barriers and risks associated with the post-
implementation of ERP systems in the context of Chinese companies. 
However, as identified at the initial stage of this study, undertaking a national study of 
the whole of China would not be possible and feasible, due to the fact that the current 
economic situation and context in China are complicated and fluid. As a consequence, 
the research design of this study included a Political, Economic, Social and 
Technological (PEST) analysis, which was conducted at the initial stage of this project. 
The use of PEST enabled the researcher to narrow the scope of the study and identify an 
appropriate and feasible set of Chinese companies to base this study on, namely State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the Electronic and Telecommunication Manufacturing 
Sector in the Guangdong province in China. 
In order to answer the research questions and achieve theory building, testing and 
extension, this research adopted a QUAN and qual mixed-method research design, 
which consisted of a cross-sectional questionnaire survey at the first stage and a follow-
up multi-case study component at the second stage. The questionnaire design was 
based on a theoretical ontology of barriers and risks drawn from a systematic literature 
review process. The questionnaire was sent to the operational managers and the 
information technology (IT) managers of 118 SOEs in China. A total of 42 SOEs (2 * 
42 SOEs = 84 respondents) completed and returned the questionnaire, which 
represented a response rate of 35.6%. After the data derived from the questionnaire was 
analysed, a follow-up case study was conducted to further explore, validate and 
strengthen the quantitative findings. 2 of the 42 respondent SOEs were identified to 
participate in the case study. A total of 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with the CEOs, IT managers, departmental managers and users of the case companies. 
The findings identified a comprehensive set of 31 barriers and 43 risks associated with 
ERP post-implementation in the context of Chinese SOEs studied. These ERP 
exploitation barriers and risks were found around cultural, organizational and technical 
aspects. The study also explored and identified a large number of correlations and 
relationships between these ERP barriers and risks. By analysing these correlations, it 
was identified that the complicated network of ERP barriers and risks identified in 
SOEs was centred around four critical organisation-oriented barriers, namely Power 
centralisation of top management, Short-term behaviour of top management, Lack of in-
house IT experts, and Low-skilled and ill-trained system users. Consequently, this 
study concluded that potential failure of ERP cannot be conveniently attributed to 
system problems, but more importantly should be attributed to organisational barriers 
and problems, in particular human problems that are related to top managers, IT experts 
and system users in the context of Chinese SOEs. 
Keywords: 
Information Systems, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, risks, ERP post-
implementation, ERP exploitation, Chinese State-owned Enterprises (SOE). 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background and problem statement 
China's population (1.3 billion) accounts for one-fifth of the world's total (6.5 billion), 
and its geographical area (9.6 million square kilometres) comprises about 6.5 percent of 
the world's total land area. China therefore possesses a huge market which contains 
highly promising potential business opportunities. However, as a result of continuous 
political and economic disasters between 1958 and 1976 (Perkins, 1997:32), China was 
among the world's poorest countries in the 1970s (Yusuf et al., 2006:3). In order to 
restore the national economy, the Chinese Communist Party initiated the nationwide 
economic reform in 1978. As a result, during the last 30 years, China has gradually 
reformed its economic system from the traditional planning economy to the more 
competitive market-oriented one, and become increasingly open to foreign investors and 
competitors. After this effort of almost three decades, China has now become the 
world's third-largest economy behind the US and Japan, the world's third-largest 
trading nation (Yusuf et al., 2006:3), and the world's second-largest recipient of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (Yusuf et al., 2006:3). The revived China, which is widely 
considered as a new economic superpower (The Independent, 2008), has attracted 
substantial attention from the western world. In the academic environment in particular, 
there is a global and increasing research interest in China (Peng and Nunes, 2008a). 
Consequently, continuous national economic reform and participation of foreign 
companies have significantly changed China's business environment, and resulted in 
increasingly drastic market competition in the domestic market. Faced with this 
competitive environment and economic pressure, thousands of Chinese companies have 
implemented Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems in order to improve 
operational efficiency and enhance core competencies. 
An ERP system is defined in this thesis as a configurable information system package 
that consists of a set of software modules and can integrate information and 
information-based processes within and across functional areas (including finance, 
human resource, manufacturing, sales and purchase sectors etc) in an organization by 
using a single comprehensive database. ERP systems originally aim to help companies 
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achieve seamless data and business process integration in their back offices. 
Contemporary ERP systems even contain modules, such as Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) and Supply Chain Management (SCM), to integrate the company's 
back office with its front office. Thus, the ERP research community (e.g. Davenport, 
2000; Gupta et al, 2004; Oliver et al., 2005; Sia et al., 2002) has illustrated that, 
successfully implementing ERP systems can bring companies a wide range of tangible 
and intangible benefits in operational, managerial, strategic and organizational level. 
These attractive potential benefits associated with the system and ever-increasing 
market competition resulted in very high demand for implementing ERP in Chinese 
companies. China's ERP market size has therefore been increased rapidly in recent 
years. Data provided by a prominent Chinese consultancy firm (CCID Consulting), 
quoted by Xue et al (2005), shows that the ERP market size in Mainland China was 
around US$70 million in 2000 and grew to US$289.96 million in 2004. CCID 
Consulting (cited by Zhang et al, 2005) reports that China's ERP sales will grow at an 
estimated rate of23.5% and reach US$652.8 million in 2008. 
Despite this apparent success in ERP adoption, there are a number of risks associated 
with the fact that these systems are "large and complex, expensive, take over a year or 
more to install, use new technology, and impact significantly on the organizational 
culture and existing business processes" (Willcocks and Sykes, 2000). In fact, the 
adoption of ERP is never an easy task and can always result in significant impact to all 
business divisions in operational, managerial and strategic level of the company. As a 
result, the use of ERP often represents a business dilemma to user companies. 
Specifically, Liu Chuanzhi, former chairman and president of Lenovo, famously stated 
that in China: 
"Not implementing ERP means inevitable failure, while implementation could possibly contribute 
to one's demise." (SAP, 2005) 
Actually, a review of previous literature identifies that implementation of ERP is often 
fraught with risks, difficulties and problems (Loh and Koh, 2004). However, as more 
and more companies have successfully implemented ERP, practitioners and researchers 
start recognizing that, the 'go-live' point of the system is not the end of the ERP journey. 
Very often the system post-implementation stage is where the real challenges begin 
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(Willis and Willis-Brown, 2002). In order to maximize potential benefits that can be 
received from the installed system and ensure long-term ERP success, user companies 
must pay substantial attention to ERP post-implementation and be ready for the long-
term fight (Willis and Willis-Brown, 2002; Yu, 2005). 
Nevertheless, it is expected that a wide range of barriers embedded in the local business 
context and the system itself can often prevent user companies from successfully using, 
maintaining and enhancing their ERP systems (Peng and Nunes, 2008b ). Moreover, 
these barriers can also lead to the occurrence of a wide range of risk events during ERP 
post-implementation (Peng and Nunes, 2008c). Overall, the existence of these barriers 
and the occurrence of undesirable risk events may turn initial ERP success into a failure 
and may lead to system and business collapses (Peng and Nunes, 2007a; 2008b; 2008c). 
Many researchers recognize the importance of ERP post-implementation and even state 
it is the direction of the second wave ERP research (Yu, 2005). Nevertheless, despite 
the imperative need for research in this area, there is a scarcity of studies focusing on 
ERP post-implementation, in contrast with an over abundance of studies focusing on 
implementation aspects. In truth, no study in ERP post-implementation barrier and risk 
in general, or in China in particular, was identified in the literature reviewed during the 
period of this research project. This obviously presents to be a crucial research gap in 
the ERP field. This study aimed at contributing to this increasingly significant research 
gap by identifying and investigating the barriers and risks to successful exploitation of 
ERP systems in the context of Chinese firms. 
This chapter provides an outline for the thesis. After introducing the background for 
this study, the remainder sections of this chapter provide a brief description and 
discussion on the research questions and objectives, research focus, research 
motivations and audiences, research methodology, and research constraints of this 
project. Finally, this chapter concludes by presenting an overview of the structure of 
this thesis. 
1.2 Definitions of key terms 
Several key terms were crucial to this research project, namely ERP implementation, 
ERP post-implementation, Risk and Barrier. It is important to define and distinguish 
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these key terms at this point in order to clearly formulate the research question in the 
next section. 
1.2.1 ERP implementation and post-implementation 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, a prominent global consulting firm, identifies that the ERP 
transformation journey consists of two distinct phases (Deloitte, 1999). 
The first phase, which is also referred to as the implementation phase, can be described 
as the effort necessary to reach the 'go live' point of the ERP system (Willis and Willis-
Brown, 2002). This includes the typical implementation tasks (e.g. system vendor 
selection, system requirements identification and the execution of the implementation 
project, etc ), and is finalised when the ERP goes lived. 
After the company successfully passes the 'go live' milestone of their ERP, they reach 
the second phase of the ERP journey, namely the system post-implementation or 
exploitation phase (Willis and Willis-Brown, 2002). Please note that, in this thesis, the 
researcher will use the terms 'ERP exploitation' and 'ERP post-implementation' 
interchangeably. When engaging in ERP exploitation, user companies need to properly 
and continuously use, maintain and enhance the installed ERP, in order to maximise 
potential benefits and value return of the system and ensure long-term ERP success. 
A review of literature indicates that, there is an over abundance of studies focusing on 
ERP implementation and project management aspects, whereas there has been 
surprisingly little research that systematically investigates issues associated with ERP 
post-implementation. Therefore, instead of targeting on ERP implementation, this 
research study focused on ERP post-implementation, which was considered as a 
research area in need of addressing. 
1.2.2 Risk 
A risk can be defined as "the occurrence of an event that has consequences for, or 
impacts on" a particular business process (Kleim and Ludin, 2000:3). This definition 
actually implies a fundamental characteristic of a risk: uncertainty. Specifically, there 
is a probability that the risk event may occur and an impact on the business processes 
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that may imply substantial losses. For the purpose of this research, the researcher 
slightly modified the above definition given by Kleim and Ludin, and defined a risk as: 
"The occurrence of any event that has consequences or impacts on the use, maintenance, review 
and enhancement of the implemented ERP systems." 
Kleim and Ludin (2000:4-6) provide a thorough classification of risks in terms of 
probability of occurrence, frequency of occurrence, impact on the business processes, 
relative importance to other risks, and business exposure resulting from the occurrence 
of the risk. This research study contextualises these general principles of risk 
identification within the context of ERP use and exploitation. 
1.2.3 Barrier 
The concept of barrier is defined differently m the literature as shown in the two 
examples below: 
"In relation to accidents, a barrier is an obstacle, an obstruction, or a hindrance that may ... prevent 
an action from being carried out or an event from taking place ... " (Hollnagel, 2000). 
"[From the business perspective,] barrier is an obstacle within the business context that prevents 
business objectives from being realized" (Polikoff et al., 2005). 
These two definitions point out that a barrier is an obstacle that prevents an action or 
event from being carried out successfully. For the purpose of this research, a barrier to 
ERP exploitation is defined as follows: 
"Any obstacle or factor that is inherent to the Chinese context or the ERP system itself; and can 
prevent companies from efficiently using, maintaining, reviewing and improving the implemented 
ERP system." 
Additionally, the researcher identified, through a review of literature, that the terms 
'barrier' and 'risk' were often misused by authors. In particular, some non-scientists 
(e.g. The Alaska Department of Natural Resources, 2003:11) and less careful 
researchers (e.g. Soderlind and Kidby, 2005:16) may use these two terms 
interchangeably. Nevertheless, these two concepts are in reality substantially different. 
Specifically, a barrier, unlike a risk, has no uncertainty associated to it. That is, a 
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barrier is a factor that is inherent to a given context and thus has 100% probability of 
occurrence. Due to this characteristic, a barrier is fundamentally different from a risk. 
These two terms must therefore be clearly distinguished and should not be used 
interchangeably. Nevertheless, it is obvious that an existing barrier may lead to the 
occurrence of a set of potential risk events. As a consequence, an ERP barrier can be 
the cause of a number of ERP risks. 
1.3 Research questions and objectives 
The research aim of this study was to identify, assess and explore potential barriers and 
risks that Chinese companies may experience during ERP exploitation. It also aimed to 
identify and investigate the causes and consequences of the identified ERP barriers and 
risks by exploring potential correlations between them. 
A central research question is the question which the research needs to answer, and is 
used to guide the entire research study (Creswell, 2003). In order to address the 
research aims presented above, a central research question was formulated at the 
beginning of this research project: 
What ERP post-implementation barriers and risks will be encountered by 
Chinese companies? 
However, it soon proved that undertake a national study of all companies in China 
would be virtually impossible and unrealistic, due to the fact that the current economic 
situation and context in the country are complicated and fluid. Specifically, there are 
important changes occurring in coastal regions, whereas other parts of the country are 
still very traditionally led by the central government. There are also significant 
variances in uptake of technology and IS and specifically of ERP in diverse industry 
sectors and diverse types of companies in China. Moreover, due to geographical and 
political reasons, it is extremely difficult to identify a valid sample to represent all 
Chinese companies (Manion, 1994). Therefore, a nationwide study in China is not only 
unrealistic and potentially unfeasible, but may result in findings that are neither 
significant nor meaningful (Peng and Nunes, 2007b ). 
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Faced with the necessity of focusing the research and the need of identifying an 
appropriate set of companies to carry out the study, the researcher adopted a Political, 
Economic, Social and Technological (PEST) analysis to narrow the scope of the study, 
as well as to identify an appropriate type of company, an industry sector and a region in 
China to base the study on. The results of the PEST analysis are presented in chapter 
four of this thesis. This rigorous approach was also illustrated and discussed 
extensively at the European Conference on Research Methodology for Business and 
Management Studies (ECRM) in 2007 (Peng and Nunes, 2007b ). As a result of the 
PEST analysis, the researcher refined the research context and identified a reasonable 
and feasible set of Chinese firms for carrying out the research, namely Stated-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) in the Electronic and Telecommunication Equipment Manufacturing 
sector in the Guangdong province in China. Subsequently, the original research 
question was also refined as follows: 
What ERP post-implementation barriers and risks may be encountered by SOEs 
in the electronic and telecommunication manufacturing sector in the 
Guangdong province in China? 
In order to generate more specific directions to guide the research project, the central 
research question was divided into a set of sub-questions: 
- What are the barriers associated with ERP post-implementation in Chinese SOEs? 
- What are the causes and consequences of these barriers, and how these barriers 
correlated? 
- What are the risks associated with ERP post-implementation in Chinese SOEs? 
- What are the causes and consequences of these risks, and how these risks correlated? 
- What are the causal relationships between the identified ERP barriers and risks? 
In response to the research questions and research aims, a set of specific research 
objectives was established: 
- Identify ERP exploitation barriers faced by Chinese SOEs; 
- Investigate the causes and impacts of these barriers; 
- Explore causal relationships between the identified ERP barriers; 
- Identify ERP exploitation risks faced by Chinese SOEs; 
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- Investigate the causes and impacts of these risks; 
- Explore causal relationships between the identified ERP risks; 
- Identify which ERP barriers and risks are the most critical to SOEs; 
- Explore causal relationships between the ERP barriers and ERP risks identified; 
1.4 Research focus 
The focus of this research is limited to barriers and risks associated with ERP post-
implementation. In other words, and as discussed above, this project did not cover 
general ERP implementation and project management aspects. Moreover, it is apparent 
that ERP post-implementation is concerned with three general aspects, namely ERP 
usage, maintenance and enhancement (Willis and Willis-Brown, 2002). As such, the 
barriers and risks investigated and explored in this study were those that would prevent 
user companies from successfully using, maintaining or enhancing the installed ERP 
system. In other words, general barriers and risks, which are irrelevant to ERP 
exploitation, will not be considered in this study. For instance, business barriers and 
risks shown as examples below were not covered in this project: 
- General barriers to market expansion, business globalisation, product transportation, 
equality of staff opportunity, etc. 
- General risks associated with property damage, business acquisition, owner's ability 
to continue the business, staff safety, employee compensation, etc. 
1.5 Research motivations and audiences 
As more and more companies engaged with the exploitation of ERP, they will be 
confronted with a wide range of barriers and risks when actually using and enhancing 
the installed ERP system. User companies however may often not fully understand and 
recognise the existence and impacts of these barriers and risks, due to the present 
scarcity of research studies and guidance in these issues. This study aimed at 
contributing to a research topic that is becoming increasingly attractive and important, 
namely ERP post-implementation within China's context. This project represented a 
first attempt in producing a comprehensive study in its research area. The process of 
literature search could not return any other such studies. 
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The following incentives motivated the researcher to initiate, conduct and complete this 
research project: 
- To contribute to a research field (i.e. ERP post-implementation) that is becoming 
increasingly important but lacks sufficient and significant study; 
- To provide foreign and Chinese IS researchers with a comprehensive study on ERP 
exploitation in the Chinese context, especially the context of Chinese SOEs; 
- To help Chinese practitioners, specially those in SOEs, to gain better understanding 
on current and potential ERP problems, and thus help them to utilize the 
implemented ERP systems; 
- To enable foreign and Chinese ERP vendors and consultants to better understand the 
ERP problems faced by user companies and thus provide better post-implementation 
guidance and support to their clients. 
The results and findings of this study are important contributions for researchers, 
practitioners and system vendors and consultants, who are therefore potential audiences 
of this research study: 
- Chinese and Foreign ERP researchers. Findings of this research project are of 
interest to Chinese as well as foreign researchers, who are interested in ERP 
exploitation issues in the context of Chinese companies in general and in Chinese 
SOEs in particular. The ERP barrier and risk ontology, which was developed as the 
main output of this project, can be used as a starting point for fellow IS researchers 
to carry out further studies in ERP exploitation. Researchers can reuse and extend 
this ontology through their studies, and test the suitability of this ontology within 
their interested research contexts. 
Chinese practitioners and user companies. Chinese practitioners and user 
companies should be interested in the findings of this project. Results and 
recommendations derived from this study may provide useful guidelines for helping 
practitioners to identify, prevent and manage possible barriers and risks in ERP 
post-implementation. As a consequence, it may help to increase the possibility of 
user companies to better utilise and optimise their ERP systems in the long-term. 
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- Chinese and Foreign ERP vendors and system consultants. This project highlighted 
a comprehensive list of barriers and risks that Chinese companies are currently 
facing when using ERP. System vendors and consultants targeting on the Chinese 
ERP market should be aware of these ERP issues, in order to tailor better after-sales 
services to provide local user companies with necessary help and support to address 
these problems. 
1.6 Research methodology 
The research design for this project is explained in details in chapter five. This section 
provides a brief explanation of research methodologies in order to explain the structure 
of this thesis. 
At the initial stage of the research, the first temptation of the researcher was to 
undertake a national study of the whole of China. As discussed earlier, this soon proved 
to be virtually impossible, due to the fact that the current economic situation and context 
in China are complicated and fluid. As a consequence, the research design of this 
project included a PEST analysis aiming at narrowing the scope of the study, as well as 
to identify an appropriate industry sector, a type of company and a region in China to 
base the study on. As a result of the PEST analysis, the researcher selected SOEs in the 
electronic and telecommunication manufacturing sector in the Guangdong province in 
China, as ideal contexts for carrying out this research project. 
After a feasible set of companies was selected, the next step of the project was to 
establish explicit IS lens, in order to frame the study and generate meaningful and 
significant findings. Consequently, a critical literature review, which focused on IS and 
business research studies, case studies and theoretical papers, was conducted by the 
researcher. As a result of this critical literature review, the researcher established 29 
ERP barriers and 40 ERP risks that Chinese companies might encounter in ERP 
exploitation. A barrier and risk ontology was subsequently developed to highlight these 
ERP barriers and risks. 
In order to examine and explore the barrier and risk items identified from the critical 
literature review in the context of selected SOEs, the project adopted a mixed-method 
research design. This research design consisted of a cross-sectional questionnaire 
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survey at the first stage, and a follow-up multi-case study component at the second stage. 
It is apparent that this research design follows a typical Quan and qual approach 
(Creswell, 2003:213). That is, at the first phase a quantitative study (i.e. questionnaire 
survey) was conducted and took the predominant position of the entire study. A 
supplementary qualitative component (i.e. follow-up case study) was carried out at the 
second phase to further explore and validate the findings derived from the quantitative 
study, and therefore achieved triangulation and theory extension. It is obvious that, as 
the questionnaire survey held the principal role in this study, this research was driven by 
a deductive approach. 
The questionnaire was designed based on the theoretical barrier and risk ontology, and 
aimed at examining this ontology in the selected context (i.e. SOEs in the electronic and 
telecommunication sector in Guangdong in China). Of these ERP barriers and risks, 
some were related with core business aspects, while the remainder focused on technical 
issues. This clearly indicated that two different questionnaires needed to be designed to 
obtain perspectives from both business managers and ICT experts. According to 
statistical data provided by the local statistical bureau, there are 118 SOEs operating in 
the electronic and telecommunication manufacturing sector in Guangdong. A complete 
list of these companies was obtained from the Guangdong Statistical Bureau. The 
questionnaires were then posted to the operation managers and the IT managers of these 
SOEs. A total of 42 SOEs (2 * 42 SOEs = 84 respondents) completed and returned the 
questionnaire, which represented a response rate of 35.6%. 
In addition, in the final section of the questionnaire, respondents were asked whether 
they would like to participate in the second stage of the study. 2 of the 42 respondent 
SOEs were thus identified to participate in the follow-up case study. The purpose for 
conducting this complementary case study was to further explore and validate the 
quantitative findings derived from the survey. A total of 25 semi-structured interviews 
were carried out with the CEOs, IT managers, and departmental managers and system 
users in diverse departments (i.e. sales, financial, production, and purchasing 
department) of these two case companies. 
By analysing, triangulating and synthesising the quantitative findings derived from the 
questionnaire and the qualitative anecdotal evidence obtained from the multi-case study, 
the researcher revised and extended the theoretical barrier and risk ontology established 
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from the critical literature review. Consequently, the researcher identified respectively 
a set of 31 ERP barriers and a set of 43 ERP risks that proved to be crucial to SOEs in 
ERP exploitation. In addition, the researcher also identified a comprehensive set of 
causal relationships between the identified barriers and risks. 
1. 7 Research constraints 
The researcher experienced two major types of research constraints when conducting 
this study, namely general academic constraints and contextual constraints. 
1. 7.1 General academic constraints 
General academic constraints refer to research limitations that are prevalent in PhD 
projects. In particular, these constraints relate to the facts that PhD students: 
- Are new researchers, who have limited experience in doing research; 
- Are required to work individually in an isolated environment; 
- Are limited by resources and a period of time for completion. 
1. 7.2 Contextual constraints 
Contextual, cultural and political differences between China and the West determine 
that research difficulties, that may not generally be experienced and reported in the 
West, can arise when doing participative research in China. Contextual constraints, in 
this thesis, refer to specific research limitations that are inherent in the Chinese research 
context. Three contextual constraints were experienced in this study: 
- Sampling constraint 
Identifying a representative and reasonable sample in China presented to be a real 
challenge to this study. This difficulty does not only follow from China's large size and 
number of potential respondents (Roy et al, 2001 ), but is also attributed to the fact that 
China is by no means a homogeneous country. As stated by Liu (2004) since China 
started the transition to a market economy in the early 1980s, "ordinary Chinese people 
experience increased material comfort, greater freedoms and more diverse lifestyles", 
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while the country itself is in the midst of socio-political transitions characterised by the 
co-existence of rival cultural, ideological, political and economic systems of 
Confucianism, Marxism and Capitalism. These may be found across provinces or even 
within the same province. Consequently, Manion (1994) states that "for most 
researchers, obtaining a nation-wide probability sample [representative ... ofJ the 
Chinese population [as a whole] is both impossible and impractical". 
Faced with this sampling constraint, the researcher adopted a PEST analysis to narrow 
the scope of the study, as well as to identify a type of Chinese company, an appropriate 
industry sector and a region on which to base the study. As presented earlier, through 
the PEST analysis, the researcher selected SOE in the electronic and telecommunication 
manufacturing sector in the Guangdong province in China, as target companies for 
conducting the research. 
However, it should be stressed that the very effort of narrowing and focusing the 
research, means that generalisation of findings is now only possible for similar regions, 
company types and sectors as the ones studied. Nevertheless, this was deemed 
particularly appropriate due to the complexity that currently characterises Chinese 
economy. A study that focuses on producing generalisable statements about a specific 
regional context is more likely to result in meaningful and significant findings than one 
that focuses on China as a whole. In truth, findings derived from a regional sample 
cannot be applied to the entire country, but can often be used as the basis for social 
scientists to carry out further research on contemporary China (Manion, 1994 ). 
- Language constraint 
The questionnaire and interview instruments used in this research study were originally 
developed in English and then translated into Chinese, in order for data collection to be 
conducted with prospective respondents in the Chinese language. On the other hand, 
after the study, selected quotations and the conclusions were translated back into 
English in order for them to be reported in this thesis. Nevertheless, due to lack of 
financial resources, all translations were done by the PhD candidate individually, who 
after 8 years in the UK considers himself to be bilingual. As a consequence, some 
deviation may occur in both validity and reliability due to the accuracy of the Chinese 
and English language translation. 
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- Constraint in getting sufficient response 
A further significant constraint embedded in the Chinese research environment relates 
to non-response to research studies (Peng and Nunes, 2008a). Specifically, due to a 
long history of bureaucratic intervention and control, Chinese people are often reluctant 
to offer their views on questions that may be sensitive (Roy et al, 2001 ). Although 
researchers will often provide assurances about confidentiality at the beginning of data 
collection, Chinese respondents may not believe their anonymity can be protected 
(Manion, 1994). They thus may often decline to participate in the study in order to 
avoid potential personal risks under the bureaucratic environment. This contextual 
constraint presented to be a substantial challenge to this research. In particular, one 
month after the original questionnaire a reminder was sent out. Two months after this 
reminder only three replies were returned and one of these replies was inadequately 
completed (i.e. most questions were left blank and a big 'DON'T KNOW' was written 
by hand over many of the remaining questions). 
Faced with this contextual constraint, the old system of guanxi (literally, personal 
relationships) was used (as explained in detail in section 5.6.5.3 in chapter five) in the 
data collection processes of this study. The purposes for using personal guanxi here 
were to get access to and gain trust from the prospective respondents, and thus increase 
the response rate, as well as ensure that the data obtained was of better quality and more 
earnest. Nevertheless, the use of personal relationships to get access to companies in 
China may be associates with a set of ethical problems. That is, it could be argued that 
the respondents may be put under pressure to respond, by the very relationships network 
that was used to reach them, and that such pressure may influence responses. However, 
the choices that had to be made were between no responses or understand the business 
environment and play by its rules. This issue is discussed thoroughly in chapter five. 
These contextual research constraints, along with a set of elaborated processes 
conducted in this study to address them, were presented for discussion at the ECRM 
conference in 2008 (Peng and Nunes, 2008a). The reflection on these issues proved to 
be an unexpected contribution derived from this study to the research field. Moreover, 
more discussions on these constraints and associated solutions are provided in 
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appropriate chapters of this thesis, e.g. Chapter four for PEST analysis and Chapter five 
for the issue of translation and using personal relationships, etc. 
1.8 Thesis structure 
The remainder of this thesis contains another ten chapters, as briefly introduced below: 
- Chapter Two: Information Systems in Organisations 
- Chapter Three: An Overview ofERP Systems 
- Chapter Four: PEST Analysis of China 
- Chapter Five: Research methodology 
- Chapter Six: Initial Identification of ERP Exploitation Barriers and Risks 
- Chapter Seven: Results and Findings of the Questionnaire Survey 
- Chapter Eight: Results and Findings of the Follow-up Case Study 
- Chapter Nine: Global Discussion of Findings 
- Chapter Ten: Conclusions and Future Research 
Chapter Two: Information Systems in Organisations 
In order to generate sufficient background knowledge on information systems (IS) in 
general, a literature review was conducted at the initial stage of this study. Chapter two 
focuses on the results derived from this literature review. The chapter discusses 
extensively the concept of IS, as well as discussing the value for using IS in 
organisations. It subsequently highlights the integration issue existed in traditional 
isolated ISs, and points out the emergence of ERP as a fundamental solution towards 
traditional IS integration issues, and therefore leads readers to the discussion of the next 
chapter which focuses on ERP systems. 
Chapter Three: An Overview of ERP Systems 
In order to generate sufficient background knowledge on ERP systems, a literature 
review was carried out at the early stage of this project. This chapter reports the results 
derived from this literature review. It provides an extensive discussion on the concept, 
background of emergence, evolution history, functionality, benefits and issues 
associated with ERP systems. 
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Chapter Four: PEST Analysis ofChina 
Because a national study of China as a whole was identified to be both infeasible and 
unrealistic, a PEST analysis was conducted in this project in order to refine the research 
context, as well as to identify a geographical region and a type of company to base this 
study on. This PEST analysis was essentially a desktop study which was based on the 
process of a systematic literature review. A large amount of English and Chinese 
literature (including journal articles, books, official statistical reports, market research 
reports, news and online articles) were reviewed, compared and synthesised and then 
used as raw materials to construct arguments and standpoints for the PEST analysis. 
Chapter four presents and discusses the results of this PEST analysis. The chapter starts 
by reviewing the political and economic issues existed in China in the 1950s when the 
People's Republic of China was just established. It then draws a large amount of 
statistical data and evidence to demonstrate how the political and economic 
environments of China have been changed over time. The chapter also highlights the 
political, economic, social and technological issues existing in contemporary China and 
their impacts to IT and ERP adoption in the country. As concluded from the PEST 
analysis, the researcher selected SOEs in the electronic and telecommunication sector in 
the Guangdong province as the ideal context for carrying out the study. 
This rigorous approach was actually presented for discussion m the 61h ECRM 
conference in Portugal (Peng and Nunes, 2007b ). 
Chapter Five: Research Methodology 
Chapter five focuses on the research methodology and design adopted for this project. 
In particular, the reasons for adopting a mixed-method research design, which consisted 
of a cross-sectional survey and a follow-up case study, are discussed and justified. Data 
collection methods (i.e. questionnaire and semi-structured interview) and instruments 
employed by this research is also identified and discussed. A number of difficulties (e.g. 
getting sufficient and earnest responses) were experienced when carrying out the data 
collection in China. These difficulties and associated solutions to address them are 
presented and discussed in this chapter. Moreover, the methods and procedures used to 
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analyse the data collected from the questionnaire and the interviews are also described 
and discussed. 
Chapter Six: Initial Identification of ERP Exploitation Barriers and Risks 
After a feasible set of companies were selected to conduct this study, the next step of 
the project was to establish explicit IS lens in order to frame the study and generate 
meaningful and significant findings. As a consequence, an extensive systematic review, 
which focused on current business and information systems studies, case-studies and 
theoretical propositions, was conducted by the researcher. 
As a result of the systematic review, the researcher established 29 ERP barriers and 40 
ERP risks that Chinese firms might encounter in ERP exploitation. These 29 ERP 
barriers consisted of 7 Cultural Barriers, 9 Organisational Barriers, 4 External Barriers 
and 9 System Barriers. On the other hand, the 40 identified risks contained 9 
Operational Risks, 8 Analytical Risks, 16 Organisation-Wide Risks and 7 Technical 
Risks. These established ERP barriers and risks were then used as the theoretical basis 
to construct the questionnaire conducted in this research. 
Chapter six presents and discusses extensively these identified ERP barriers and risks. 
A barrier ontology and a risk ontology, which were respectively developed to highlight 
these ERP barriers and risks, are also presented in chapter six. 
In addition, the risk ontology and the 40 established ERP risks were presented for 
discussion in the 2"d South East European Doctoral Student Conference in 2007 (Peng 
and Nunes, 2007a). 
Chapter Seven: Results and Findings of the Questionnaire Survey 
A cross-sectional questionnaire survey was carried out to test the theoretical barrier and 
risk ontology in the context of selected SOEs. This chapter reports and discusses the 
results and findings derived from this questionnaire survey. It firstly provides a 
descriptive analysis on the characteristics of SOEs that participated in the questionnaire 
survey. The main findings reported in this chapter were generated from two types of 
analyses, namely univariate analysis and bivariate analysis. Univariate analysis 
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includes the use of frequency tables, percentages and bar charts, and focuses on a single 
variable associated with one ERP barrier or risk. On the other hand, bivariate analysis, 
which includes the use of Spearman's rho and one-tailed test, aims at exploring the 
correlations between two variables, i.e. between two barriers, between two risks, and 
between a barrier and a risk. Finally, this chapter identifies a set of ERP barriers and 
risks to be further explored and validated in the follow-up case study. 
In addition, these questionnaire findings resulted in the publication of two full referred 
papers, respectively in the International Association for Development of the Information 
Society (lAD IS) Information Systems conference in Portugal (Peng and Nunes, 2008b ), 
and the European and Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems (EMCIS) in 
Dubai (Peng and Nunes, 2008c ). 
Chapter Eight: Results and Findings of the Follow-up Case Study 
The complementary case study aimed at further exploring a number of ERP barriers and 
risks extracted from the questionnaire findings, as well as validating a set of causal 
relationships between them. 
The data collected from the interviews were analysed by using the approach of thematic 
analysis. As a result of the data analysis, eight individual concept maps were produced 
to highlight the main themes and concepts identified. Chapter eight presents the 
findings of the multi-case study by using these concept maps as the infrastructure and 
relevant quotes from the interviews as anecdotal evidence to support the argumentation. 
In addition, when reporting the case study results, the chapter also compares them with 
the findings of the questionnaire and the literature reviewed wherever appropriate. It 
was considered that this approach would enable triangulation to take place and therefore 
result in more in-depth and comprehensive discussion. The theoretical barrier and risk 
ontology derived from the literature review was revised after the comparison and 
synthesis of the questionnaire and interview findings. The revised ERP barrier and risk 
ontology is also presented in this chapter. Moreover, by analysing and synthesising the 
quantitative and qualitative findings, this chapter also presents a comprehensive set of 
correlations between the ERP barriers and risks identified. 
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Chapter Nine: Global Discussion of Findings 
Chapter nine provides a global and interpretive discussion and analysis on the identified 
ERP barriers and risks by drawing on the evidence derived from the questionnaire, case 
study and literature review. 
Chapter ten: Conclusions and Future Research 
In response to the research questions, chapter ten provides readers with the general 
conclusions reached by this research project, as well as highlighting the contributions of 
this study to the research field. This chapter also makes recommendations and possible 
directions for further research emerging from this study. 
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Chapter Two: Information Systems in Organisations 
2.1 Introduction 
ERPs are usually perceived in both academic and business as information systems (IS). 
Nowadays, !Ss are widely used in different levels and functions within diverse types of 
organisations with any sizes (Laudon and Laudon, 2004:4). Organizations need to use 
ISs to achieve higher levels of operational efficiency, competitiveness and profitability. 
Managers need ISs to process, retrieve and store valuable information to support their 
daily activities and decision making. It is widely acknowledged that information 
systems have become crucial for modem companies to survive and prosper in the highly 
competitive market of the new century (Laudon and Laudon, 2006:5; Hicks, 1993:2). 
This chapter presents and discusses the results derived from a literature review on IS in 
general, since in order to understand the specific phenomenon of ERP it is important to 
understand firstly more general aspects of IS. The chapter presents and discusses 
extensively the theories and concepts related to IS, as well as discussing various types 
of IS applications in organisations. 
2.2 An Overview of Information Systems 
2.2.1 Human activity system, IS and IT 
"All the problem situations being addressed, whether in the public or in the private sector, 
whether in small fmns or giant corporations, had one characteristic in common [ ... that is,] they 
all featured human beings in social roles trying to take purposeful actions [ ... in order to] make a 
situation seen as problematical somehow better" (Checkland, 1990:24). 
Checkland (1990:24) thus uses the phrase 'human activity system' (HAS) to describe 
systems that involve "a set of [human] activities connected together in such a way that 
the connected set makes a purposeful whole" to solve human problems. A substantial 
characteristic of an HAS is that it engages human beings. It is therefore apparent that a 
HAS is a social system in nature. The definition of HAS has thus evolved to reflect this 
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social nature. In particular, Beynon-Davies (2002:66) and Bocij et al (2003:410) define 
human activity systems as 
"Social systems that consist of people engaging in coordinated and collaborative activities [ ... ] 
to achieve specific purposes". 
Based on this definition, it is apparent that any organisations, including companies, 
government agencies, hospitals, universities, etc, which involve people to work 
collaboratively to achieve common goals, are actually human activity systems. 
Additionally, as clearly identified by Checkland (1990:24), a further characteristic of a 
HAS is that a HAS may often consist of a number of subsystems and itself may be part 
of a larger system. As exemplified by Checkland (1990:24), a district nursing service 
may contain a number of purposeful subsystems (e.g. from nurse recruitment to service 
delivery). In turn, the district nursing service may be part of the total health care 
provision for a defined geographical area. 
People generate large amount of data in the daily operations within the human activity 
system. A set of logical processes are required to record and store data and transform 
raw data to useful information (Bocij et al, 2003:5) to support daily activities and 
decision making of human beings. Information systems are thus developed for this 
purpose (a detailed definition of information system is provided in section 2.2.2.4). In 
fact, "Information systems are forms of human activity systems" since "they involve 
people in ... collecting, storing and disseminating [data and] information" (Beynon-
Davies, 2002:66). On the other hand, as further pointed out by Beynon-Davies 
(2002:84), information systems aim to support the human activity system(s) which they 
concerned by providing useful information to improve the performance of human 
beings inside the human activity system(s). 
Most information systems in modem organisations are computer-based information 
systems which utilise information technologies (IT) to achieve higher speed, accuracy 
and reliability for data processing (Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003:4; Bocij et al, 2003:44-
45). IT refers to "hardware, software, networks, data resource management and many 
Intemet-based technologies" (O'Brien, 2004:6). However, the distinction between the 
terms 'information system' and 'information technology' is still controversial. Turban et 
al (2002:22) states that "information technology, in its narrow definition, refers to the 
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technological side of an information system ... or it may even be used in a board way to 
describe a collection of several information systems, users, and management [of these 
information systems] ... [therefore] the term[s] information technology [and] information 
system [is interchangeable]". Bocij et al (2003:44) argues that "the terms 'information 
system' (IS) and 'information technology' (IT) are often used interchangeably [but] this 
is an error, because the scope of [these two] terms is different". Both Bocij et al 
(2003:44) and Beynon-Davies (2002:66) argue that, the stress in 'IT' is on the 
technologies used to support information systems, whereas the term 'IS' does not only 
refer to the technology but focuses on human activities, such as how the data could be 
entered to the system, how the information produced by the system can be used to 
improve human performance, and how the system is maintained and managed, etc. This 
thesis supports the arguments and adopts these views of Bocij et al and Beynon-Davies. 
2.2.2 Information system 
Information system is a specific type of system for processing data and information. It 
therefore inherits the characteristics of normal systems. Before we move to the 
definitions of data, information and information system, it is useful for us to review the 
theories of general systems and the concept of work systems existing in organisation. 
2.2.2.1 System theory 
Systems are surrounding in our every day life. "Our bodies are made up of various 
systems, such as a digestive system and a central nervous system. We live on a planet 
that is a part of the solar system. We engage with people in groups that form social, 
political and economic systems" (Beynon-Davies, 2002:45). 
Definition of a system 
From the definitions of authors in the field (e.g. Beynon-Davies, 2002:46; Hicks, 
1993:27; Bocij et al, 2003:37; 0' Brien, 2004:8, etc), a system could be defined as 
A set of interrelated and interacting components that work together within a 
boundary towards some collective goals. 
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It should be noted that, as pointed out by Bocij et al (2003:37), natural systems such as 
the solar system may not have an obvious goal, whereas systems which involve the 
participation of human beings will normally have multiple goals, such as the goals of a 
business system could be to create profit or improve product quality. 
Functions of a system 
The fundamental purpose of a system is to convert inputs into outputs through a defined 
transformation process. 
Input 1----l••l Transformation Process 
.___ __ _. 
1----1..,.,.1 Output 
Figure 2. I: Basic functions of a transformation process 
(source: Bocij et al, 2003:37) 
Systems thus have three basic functions (Bocij et al, 2003:37; 0' Brien, 2004:9): 
Input refers to capture and assemble elements that will be entered to the system 
for processing (e.g. raw material, data and energy etc ). 
Inputs are converted into outputs through the transformation process of the 
system (e.g. manufacturing processes, mathematical calculations, etc). 
Output involves transmitting elements that have been produced by a 
transformation process to the ultimate destination (e.g. product, information and 
service, etc, must be transferred to their human users). 
Additionally, systems may also contain two further functions, namely feedback and 
control functions (O'Brien and Marakas, 2007:27; Bocij et al, 2003:37): 
Feedback is data about the system's performance in terms of the suitability of 
input, processes and output of the system (e.g. data about the speed and 
direction of an aircraft is feedback to the pilot). 
Control involves monitoring and evaluating feedback to determine whether a 
system is moving towards the achievement of its goal, and if not then make the 
necessary adjustments to a system's input and transformation process to ensure 
that it produces proper outputs (e.g. the aircraft's pilot makes adjustments after 
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evaluating the feedback from the instruments to ensure the plane is exactly 
where the pilot wants it to be). 
From an IS perspective, information systems contain all of these five general system 
functions (O'Brien and Marakas, 2007:28), as further discussed in section 2.2.2.4. 
Other system characteristics 
Apart from the functions mentioned above, systems will also share the following 
characteristics: 
A system does not exist in vacuum. Instead, it exists and functions in an 
environment (O'Brien and Marakas, 2007:27). A system will interact with and 
be continuously influenced by its environment (Hicks, 1993:29). 
A system can be made up of a number of smaller systems. These smaller 
systems are known as subsystems. Systems composed of one or more 
subsystems are referred to as suprasystems. The objectives of the subsystems 
are to support the larger objective of their suprasystem (Bocij et al, 2003:39). 
Since a system can be made up of a set of subsystems while it can actually be a 
subsystem of a larger system, systems are hierarchical and are dependant on one 
another in some way. A change to one system might lead to or result from 
changes to one or more other systems (Bocij et al, 2003:39). 
Systems interact with each other by exchanging inputs and outputs (Hick, 
1993:30; Bocij et al, 2003:39). A system's outputs can be used as the inputs of 
another system, such as the output of a manufacturing process can be the input 
of the following assembling process. 
It is apparent that these general system characteristics also apply to ISs in general and 
ERP in particular. Specifically, ISs and ERPs are operated within the organisational 
context, which can significantly affect the adoption and use of these systems. An 
IS/ERP will often contain a number of subsystems/modules, and may also interact with 
other ISs used in the organisation by exchanging inputs and outputs. For instance, the 
output of a Transaction Processing System could be a daily sales statement, which can 
be used as the input of a Management Information System to generate monthly and 
quarterly sales reports. 
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2.2.2.2 Work Systems in organisation 
An organisation is a work system that consists of numerous smaller work systems. Alter 
(2002:45) defines a work system as 
"A system in which human participants and/or machines perform [one or 
several] business process[es] using information, technology, and other 
resources to produce products and/or services for internal and external 
customers". 
Typical commercial organisations have work systems for purchasing materials from 
suppliers, processing customer orders, producing and delivering end products/services 
to customers, managing financial and human resources, etc. An IS is a particular type of 
work system "whose business process is devoted to capturing, transmitting, sorting, 
retrieving, manipulating, and displaying information, thereby supporting other work 
systems [of the organisation]" (Alter, 2002:6). It is obvious that this general aspect of 
IS can also apply to ERP, which consists of a wide range of processes to transform data 
into meaningful information. Therefore, an ERP system is also a work system. 
In addition, the example of Amazon.com provided by Alter (2002:42-43) proves that, 
with the support of e-commerce technologies, a customer can also be involved in an 
organisation's work system to perform a part of the system's business process. As 
discussed by O'Brien (2004:50-52), a customer can fill in electronic order forms from a 
company's website and submit them to the company's database through Internet. These 
activities are actually the first few processes of a company's order processing system. In 
addition, the people who use and receive benefits from the products and services 
produced by the work system may be external customers or internal customers (e.g. 
employees, managers etc) of the organisation (Alter, 2002:46). 
2.2.2.3 Data, information and data transformation process 
The value of an information system relies on its ability to transform data to useful 
information through a set of data transformation processes. 
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Data are raw facts which "have little or no value until they have been processed and 
transformed into information" (Bocij et al, 2003:4). The basic data, which can be 
processed by a modem information system, include: 
Predefined data items (include numerical or alphabetical items whose meaning 
and format are specified, such as credit card number, customer name etc); 
- Text (a series of letters, numbers and other characters which do not have a 
predefined meaning and formats); 
Images (such as pictures, photos, graphs etc); 
- Audio (data which is in the form of sounds, such as voice messages); 
- Video (data which combines pictures and sounds displayed over time). 
(Alter, 2002:135-137) 
Information is data that have been transformed to some form of meaningful context for 
a specific purpose by using a defined process so that they are able to serve information 
needs of human beings and help to reduce uncertainty for decision making (Bocij et al, 
2003:5-6). 
The processes used to convert raw data to information were called data transformation 
process. Some examples of data transformation process include (Bocij et al, 2003 :6; 
Hicks, 1993:36-37): 
Rearranging/sorting (this involves organising/grouping data together according 
to particular orders, such as sorting records of personnel file into alphabetical 
sequence by using employee names); 
- Aggregating (this involves summarising data into totals or condensations that 
are more meaningful than the unsummarised data, such as a sales report will 
summarise the data of sales, material cost and profits for a given period); 
Performing calculation (this involves all standard arithmetic operations, such as 
addition, subtraction, multiplication and division); 
Selection (this involves choosing or discarding items of data based on a set of 
selection criteria). 
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It is obvious that the fundamental goal of ERP systems is also to convert raw data into 
meaningful information. The data transformation processes exemplified here actually 
form the basic functionality ofERPs. 
2.2.2.4 Definition of information system 
An information system, as defined by Bocij et al (2003:43), is: 
"A group of interrelated components that work collectively to carry out 
input, processing, output, storage and control actions in order to convert 
data into information products that can be used to support forecasting, 
planning, control, coordination, decision making and operational activities 
in an organisation." 
This definition identifies five basic activities associated with ISs (O'Brien, 2004:14-15; 
O'Brien and Marakas, 2007:27-28): 
Inputting data resources (e.g. capture, type or record data to the system by using 
PC keyboard or scanning devices); 
- Processing data into information (e.g. typical data processing activities include 
sorting, summarising, calculating, comparing and selecting, etc ); 
- Generating information products as outputs (common information products 
provided by information systems include messages, reports, forms and graphic 
images, etc); 
Storing data and information in the database for later use; 
And controlling system performance based on feedback. Specifically, an IS 
would produce feedback (e.g. error messages, dialog boxes, etc) about its inputs, 
processing, output and storage activities. This feedback will be returned to 
appropriate members of the organisation to help them evaluate whether the 
system is performing properly. If no, pertinent adjustments will be made to the 
system's input, as well as to the system and even the business processes, to 
ensure proper information products are produced to end-users. 
In order to conduct these activities, information systems consist of and rely on five 
interrelated components/resources (Bocij et al, 2003:44; O'Brien, 2004:11-14): 
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People resources - end-users who use the information system or the information 
products it produces; IS specialists who develop, operate, maintain, monitor and 
control the system. 
Hardware resources- machines, such as computer, monitor, disk drives, printers 
and scanners, etc; media, such as floppy disk, tapes and memory stick etc. 
Software resources - computer programs, such as spreadsheet program, word 
processing program, etc; procedures used by people, such as data entry 
procedures, error correction procedures, etc. 
Data resources - data that was generated m the daily operation of the 
organisation, e.g. product descriptions, customer records, employee file and 
inventory records etc. 
Network resources - telecommunication technologies and networks, such as 
internet, intranets and extranets which link different systems together and allow 
them to transfer data. 
It should be noted that, many IS definitions (e.g. Hicks, 1993:2; O'Brien, 2004:7) 
specify information systems are computer-based systems. However, since the essential 
task of an information system is to covert data into information, any systems that can 
perform this task can be considered as an IS regardless it is in a manual or computerized 
form. This viewpoint is supported by Bocij et al (2003:43) who state that "information 
system does not necessarily involve the use of information technology. A simple 
example of a 'manual' information system is a set of [paper-based] accounting ledgers". 
Nevertheless since the importance and impacts of computer-based information systems 
to modern organisations are far more significant than manual information systems, the 
term 'information system' used in literature and in this thesis actually refers to 
computer-based information system. 
More importantly, an ERP is often perceived as an IS in literature. It is however 
obvious that while an IS consists of five components as discussed above, an ERP 
system contains only two of these components, namely software program and data. In 
other words, the other three essential components of an IS, namely people, hardware 
and network, are not constituents of an ERP. It therefore becomes clear that, an ERP 
system itself does not represent the entire IS; rather, an ERP is only a part of an IS, and 
needs to work together with people, hardware and network to achieve its intended goals. 
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This actually explains that, even when the ERP system itself is well-designed, the 
adoption and use of ERP may still be possible to fail, due to the occurrence and 
existence of potential people, hardware and network problems in the user company. 
It is obvious that, while hardware and network problems are 'hard' problems that may 
often be addressed explicitly, human problems that are always ill-defined 'soft' 
problems may often be difficult to deal with (Checkland, 1990: 17-18). In fact, Alter 
(2002:281) states that the skills, knowledge, involvement and commitment of users and 
IT people can significantly affect the success and efficiency of I Ss. Additionally, the 
adoption and use of ERP can create opportunities to change an organisation's culture, 
structure and processes, as well as to change the distributions of power, autonomy, 
rights and obligations of people inside the organisation (O'Brien, 2004:52-53; Laudon 
and Laudon, 2004:146; Alter, 2002:275). These kinds of changes may cause a set of 
ethical, moral and political problems in user companies (Laudon and Laudon, 2004: 146-
150). Overall, it can be expected that human and organisational problems may be more 
crucial than technical ones to potential ERP failure. 
2.2.2.5 Characteristics of information systems 
In contrast with manual information systems, computer-based information systems 
manifest the following characteristics: 
- Speedily. "Computers can process millions of instructions each second, allowing 
them to complete a given task in a very short time" (Bocij et al, 2003:44). 
- Accurately. "The result of a calculation carried out by a computer is likely to be 
completely accurate" (Bocij et al, 2003 :45). Many computer-based information 
systems can automatically check and correct data errors made by human beings, 
such as spelling errors, data values that are obviously too high or too low, and 
data in the wrong format etc (Alter, 2002: 199). 
- Storage. The database of a computer-based information system can store huge 
amount of data and information in a highly structured and logical way (Beynon-
Davies, 2002:135). 
Easy to access. Data and information stored in a computerized information 
system can be easily retrieved by suitable users. With the support of intemet 
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technologies, users can access to pertinent data and information of the system 
from anywhere and at anytime. 
Security. Specific data and information of the system can only be accessed by 
restricted users. Modern information systems adopt various technologies (e.g. 
setting password and firewall) to increase the level of information security. 
These general IS characteristics also present to be relevant to ERP systems, because 
ERPs are computerised IS applications that are required to operate in advanced PC 
platforms. As a consequence, ERP system would enable processing, accessing and 
storing data and information speedily, accurately, and securely. 
2.3 Information Systems in Organisations 
ISs are used widely in different functions and levels of organisations. This section 
describes the concept of an organisation and the levels of management and decisions 
making in organisations, and then discusses various types of IS applications using in 
organisations. 
2.3.1 What is an organisation 
Information systems, as subsystems of an organisation, inevitably interact with the 
organisation as a whole. Information systems significantly affect an organisation's 
culture, structure and processes and thereby influence the working behaviours and 
performance of people within the organisation (Hicks, 1993; O'Brien, 2004:52-53). On 
the other hand, since "organisations form the immediate context for information 
systems" (Beynon-Davies, 2002:219), issues embedded in the organisational context 
can influence the performance and efficiency of information systems. Therefore, as 
stated by Beynon-Davies (2002:219), an understanding on the concept of organisation is 
fundamental for any IS researchers. 
The definitions of organisation vary somehow in previous literature. For instance, Katz 
and Kahn ( 1966) define organizations as "open systems exist in ever changing 
environments. Each change in the environment implies a demand for change within the 
organization". Some recent definitions, as cited by Beynon-Davies (2002:221-225), 
consider organisation as structures that are divided into parts or functional departments, 
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as systems that take resources from its environment and process them to 
products/services which will be given back to the environment, or as networks of 
human beings who work together and interact with each other. 
Mullins (2002:96-97) states that different types of organisations (e.g. food/car 
manufacturer, hotel, school, hospital, bank etc) are set up for different purposes, but 
they share four common factors: 
People. Organisations involve interaction and coordination of human beings. 
Objectives. Organisations exist in order to achieve predefined objectives. 
Structure. Some form of structure (e.g. division of functions, authorities and 
responsibilities, etc) is needed by which human's interactions and efforts can be 
channelled and coordinated. 
Management. Some process of management is used to control and direct human 
activities and the performance of organisations. 
Combining the definitions mentioned above, the viewpoints provided by Mullins and 
the discussion of system theory and work system in early sections, this thesis defines an 
organization as: 
An open system that can be significantly affected by its environment, as 
well as a work system that involves a number of human participants with 
hierarchical authorities and responsibilities to convert resources, that are 
received from external environment, to some kinds of products/services 
through a set of business processes under the control of its management 
team to achieve the predefined organisational goals. 
2.3.2 Levels of management and decisions in organisation 
As shown in Figure 2.2, a typical commercial organisation has three management levels 
which are distinguished on the dimensions of decision time scale, decision types, 
decision frequency and data needs (Beynon-Davies, 2002:91-92; Bocij et al, 2003: 17): 
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Decision Decision type 
time scale (Unstructured 
(Long-term) decisions) 
/ Tactical Management 
Operational 
Management 
Decision Data needs 
frequency (Summarised 
(Infrequent) data) 
Decision Decision type Operational Sta ffs Decision Data needs • 
li"l~ ~~aJEl. __ _lS)_ry~.!J!El.t! _________________________ jr_!3g !,!~Qcy ___ (Qe.lf!II~!L _______ ___ ~ ' _ ·--_ 
-- -------- - - - (Short.-term) decisions) (Frequent) data) 
Figure 2.2: Levels of management 
(modified from Figure 6.4 in Beynon-Davies, 2002:92) 
At the operational level, managers are concerned with short-term planning and 
control of the organisation's day-to-day activities. Operational managers need 
detailed data to make decisions on an hour-by-hour or day-to-day basis. 
Decisions in this level are highly structured (rules, constraints and procedures 
for making these decisions are known) and aim to direct the organisation to 
meet the medium-term goals. 
Middle managers at the tactical level deal with medium-term planning and 
controlling on budgets and resources, and monitoring the performance of the 
organisation. Decisions taken in this level tend to set medium-term goals to 
achieve the organisation's long-term strategy. 
Executives and senior managers at the strategic level are concerned with long-
term planning and strategy making. Decisions made in this level are highly 
unstructured (rules, constraints and procedures for making these decisions are 
complicated or unknown) and have a long-term and significant impact to the 
organisation. Executives and senior managers require summarised data on 
internal performance and external environments to make such long-term 
decisions. 
2.3.3 Traditional IS applications in organisation 
An organisation can be vertically divided into operational, tactical and strategic level 
and then can be further divided horizontally into functional areas such as sales, 
32 
Chapter Two Information Systems in Organisations 
manufacturing, purchasing, finance and human resources etc (Laudon and Laudon, 
2006:40). 
Organisational Level People Involved 
St at . 1 ~vel A ~enior Maganers/ 
r eglc ~xec!Aives 
Tactlcallti/ \ ~doManag"' 
I I \ \ ~Operational Managers/ Operational le/v-el....,-.,..---'-----'------'-----"---~ Supervisors/ Operational staffs 
Functional Area Sales Purchasing Manufacturing Accounting Human 
Resources 
Figure 2.3: Division of organisational levels and functional areas 
(modified from Figure 2.1 in Laudon and Laudon, 2006:41) 
As discussed in section 2.3.2, managers in different organisational levels focus on 
different organisational objectives and make different types of decisions (i.e. structured 
semi-structured or unstructured decisions). Hicks ( 1993 :48) points out that the 
objectives, which managers aim to achieve, determine the types of decisions they must 
make, which in turn determine the various types of information that managers need to 
use. It is also obviously that managers and staff in different functional divisions are 
responsible for and control specific business processes of the division and hence have 
different information needs. Consequentially, various types of information systems are 
developed to support the information needs of managers and staff in different levels and 
functional divisions. Major types of information systems used in the three 
organisational levels include: 
Transaction Processing Systems (JPS). In its daily operation, an organisation 
performs so many transaction processing activities related with its customers 
(e.g. customer orders and payments), suppliers (e.g. purchase orders and 
payments) and employees (e.g. wages). A large amount of operational data can 
thus be generated during the organisation's daily operation, such as customer 
details, supplier details, sales order records, stock records and employee files etc . 
These data are essential to support the day-to-day operations of the company 
(Beynon-Davies, 2002:69). TPSs, which serve the organisation's operational 
level , are systems that perform, process and record daily routine transactions 
that are necessary to conduct business (Laud on and Laudon, 2004:41 ). 
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- Management Information Systems (M/S). MISs, which serve the tactical level of 
the organisation, extract, compress and summarize data from TPSs to provide 
middle managers with summary and exception reports which contain results of 
the company's weekly, monthly or yearly performance to support their medium-
term planning, control and decision making (Laudon and Laudon, 2004:43-44; 
Alter, 2002:200-201). However, as pointed out by Laudon and Laudon (2004:45) 
and Alter (2002:202), MISs can only provide reports with predefined formats 
and contents to allow managers to make comparisons and measurements on the 
company's performance. They are generally not flexible and have little 
analytical capability to support sophisticated analysis and decision making. 
- Decision Support Systems (DSS). DSSs are interactive systems that provide 
information, analytical models and data manipulation tools to help managers 
make decisions for semi-structured and unstructured situations where the 
procedures for arriving at a solution may not be fully defined in advance (Alter, 
2002:205; Laudon and Laudon, 2004:45; Turban, 2004:550, Hicks, 1993:147). 
DSSs have more analytical power than the other systems, such as MISs and 
EISs. DSSs are often built with a variety of models to analyse data, or they can 
compress large amount of data from internal TPSs and MISs and information 
from external sources into highly logical forms in which they can be analysed 
by decision makers (Laudon and Laudon, 2004:45). 
- Executive Information Systems (EIS). EISs, which serve the strategic level of 
the organisation, are highly interactive systems that allow executives and senior 
managers flexibly access to information for monitoring internal performance 
and external environment of the organisation (Alter, 2002:202). EISs are 
designed with easy-to-use interfaces which can be used by executives with little 
computer-related knowledge (O'Brien, 2004:25). EIS are not designed 
primarily to solve specific problems or provide specific reports (Laudon and 
Laudon, 2004:46). Instead, they draw and filter summarised and critical 
information from internal sources, such as MISs and DSSs, and external 
information sources (Laudon and Laudon, 2004:45-46) to "help executives find 
[and locate] the information they need whenever they need it and in whatever 
form is most useful, and therefore help executives make unstructured decisions" 
(Alter, 2002:202). 
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Some further examples of applications of TPSs, MISs, OS Ss and !Ss in different 
functional areas are shown in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: Applications ofTPSs, MISs, DSSs and EISs in different functional areas 
(modified from Figure 2.2 in Laudon and Laudon, 2004:40) 
2.3.4 Emerging view of integrated and enterprise systems 
The various types of ISs presented above represent the traditional IS view that had been 
prevalent until the 1990s. These traditional ISs, which focus on a single business 
function or organisational level, is actually embedded with a significant issue, that is, 
the IS integration issue. Specifically, Alter (2002:31) explains that since 1 used for 
different business functions are usually developed by using different hardware, software 
and data resources, these systems are not able to communicate or share data and 
information with each other. McKenney and McFarlan (1982, quoted by Loonam and 
McDonagh, 2005:3), describe this phenomenon as "islands of automation" which means 
isolated information systems running separately from each other. Figure 2.5 illustrates 
this traditional view of isolated information systems. 
Using such isolated systems, managers have to spend large amount of time to assemble 
data they need to generate a comprehensive picture on the organisation' s operation, the 
organisation' s efficiency and productivity will be significantly decreased (Laudon and 
Laudon, 2004:53). Kalakota and Robinson (2000:245) reinforce that the maintenance 
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cost of these isolated information systems could be very high, but companies receive 
little benefits from their use. Therefore Laudon and Laudon (2006:54) conclude that 




































Figure 2.5: Traditional view of isolated information systems 
(source: Laudon and Laudon, 2006:57) 
Consequently, cross-functional enterprise systems emerged in the 1990s as a solution 
towards the traditional IS integration issue (Laudon and Laudon, 2006:56; Alter, 
2002:31; Turban et al, 2004:343). Enterprise systems "cross the boundaries of 
traditional business functions in order to reengineer and improve vital business 
processes all across the enterprise" (O'Brien and Marakas, 2007:234). Instead of 
focusing on information requirements of business functions, such enterprise systems (as 
shown in Figure 2.6) focus on "supporting integrated clusters of business processes 
involved in the operations of a business" (O'Brien and Marakas, 2007:234). 
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Figure 2.6: A model of enterprise systems 
(source: Laudon and Laudon, 2006:57) 
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The major feature and benefit of enterprise systems is that, such cross-functional 
applications can help organisations integrate and coordinate their major business 
processes, and thus enhance efficiency and effectiveness of these business processes and 
improve data integration and sharing across the firm (O'Brien and Marakas, 2007:234; 
Laudon and Laudon, 2004:7). Three types of enterprise systems are currently prevalent 
in the industry, namely ERP systems, Customer Relationship Management (CRM) 
systems, and Supply Chain Management (SCM) systems: 
ERP systems consist of a set of independent software modules to collect "data 
from various key [internal] business processes in manufacturing and production, 
finance and accounting, sales and marketing, and human resources, etc, and 
store the data in a single and comprehensive data repository where they can be 
used by other parts of the business" (Laudon and Laudon, 2006:56). ERPs 
therefore allow internal "information that was previously fragmented in 
different systems [to] seamlessly flow throughout the [whole organisation]", and 
also facilitate the company to integrate its discrete internal business processes 
from different functions into enterprise-wide business processes which will 
"flow across organisational levels and functions" (Laudon and Laudon, 2006:56; 
O'Brien and Marakas, 2007:243). 
CRM systems are cross-functional enterprise systems that integrate and 
automate "many of the customer-serving processes in sales, marketing, and 
customer services that interact with a company's customers" (O'Brien and 
Marakas, 2007:238). CRM systems may often be integrated with ERPs in 
modem companies, and thus linking the firm's front office with its back office 
(Kalakota and Robinson, 2000; Jaiswal and Kaushik, 2005). 
SCM systems are cross-functional inter-enterprise systems that "help support 
and manage the links between some of a company's key business processes and 
those of its suppliers, customers, and business partners" (O'Brien and Marakas, 
2007:248). The goal of SCM is to create a fast, efficient, and low-cost network 
between the firm and its business partners across the supply chain (O'Brien and 
Marakas, 2007:248; Laudon and Laudon, 2004:55). A SCM system can also be 
integrated with ERP to link together the company's front office and back office 
(Davenport, 2000). 
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More specific phenomena about ERPs are presented and discussed intensively in the 
next chapter. On the other hand, since CRMs and SCMs are not the main focuses of 
this study, they are not addressed extensively in this thesis. 
2.4 Conclusions 
This chapter presents and discusses the concept and theory of IS in general. 
It is identified in this chapter that an IS consists of five fundamental components, 
namely people, hardware, software program, data and network. It is however obvious 
that, an ERP system contains only two of these components, namely software program 
and data. It therefore clearly emerged that, an ERP system should not be conveniently 
considered as an IS. Instead, an ERP should be considered as part of an IS, and needs to 
work together with other IS components (i.e. people, hardware and network) to achieve 
its intended goals. It can thus be concluded that, the success of ERP will not only rely 
on the design of the system itself, but more importantly also depends on the other IS 
resources namely people, hardware and network resources. It is apparent that problems 
associated with the ERP system itself or with the hardware and network resources are 
'hard' issues that can often be explicitly identified and resolved. In contrast, problems 
related to human and organisational aspects are 'soft' problems that are always ill-
defined, complicated and thus difficult to identify and manage. It is therefore expected 
that the most critical and dangerous barriers and risks that can lead to potential ERP 
failure may be related to human and organisational aspects rather than system ones. 
This expectation, derived from the results of the literature review presented in this 
chapter, was proved to be true in the context of Chinese SOEs, as further discussed in 
the finding sections of this thesis. 
After obtaining a comprehensive understanding on IS in general, the next chapter takes 
a detailed look on more specific phenomena about ERPs. 
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Chapter Three: An Overview of ERP Systems 
3.1 Introduction 
After presented and discussed the general concept and theories of IS in the previous 
chapter, this chapter focuses intensively on the specific phenomena related to ERP 
systems. As briefly introduced in chapter two, ERP systems are cross-functional 
enterprise systems that aim at addressing an organisation's internal operations. Since its 
emergence, ERP systems have continuously evolved according to new market 
requirements and the development of new technologies. Contemporary ERPs do not 
merely improve an organisation's performance, by integrating its internal value chain, 
but may also provide companies with opportunities to build up stronger and closer 
business networks with their customers, suppliers and partners. Hence, it is widely 
recognised and acknowledged that ERP systems are now one of the essential tools for 
companies to survive and maintain competitive advantages under the global competitive 
environment in the new century. This chapter provides a comprehensive review of ERP 
systems by presenting and discussing the history, definition, functions, benefits and 
challenges related to ERP, as well as discussing the implementation and post-
implementation stages of ERPs. 
3.2 Introduction of ERP Systems 
3.2.1 Emergence ofERP systems 
In the 1970s, !Ss, that were designed to support single functional areas of the firm, were 
prevalent in the industry (Loonam and McDonagh, 2005:3). In that period of time, 
different functional units of organisations often pursued their own objectives and had 
very clear boundaries between each other (Lambert and Peppard, 2003 :430). Under this 
organisational context, ISs developed and used at that moment mainly aimed at 
supporting a single business function (Laudon and Laudon, 2006:57). However, 
because these ISs were developed by using different hardware, software and data 
resources, they were not able to communicate or share data and information with each 
other (Alter, 2002:31 ). These I Ss resembled a set of separate instruments played by 
musicians in an orchestra. McKenney and McFarlan (1982, quoted by Loonam and 
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McDonagh, 2005:3) describe this phenomenon as "islands of automation", which means 
that information systems were isolated and running separately from each other. It is 
apparent that such isolated ISs would not bring sufficient strategic and competitive 
advantages to user companies. Specifically, managers had to spend a large amount of 
time to assemble data they needed from the isolated ISs, which led to significant 
reduction in efficiency and productivity (Laudon and Laudon, 2006:56). Maintenance 
cost of these isolated systems could be very high, but companies received little benefits 
from their use (Kalakota and Robinson, 2000:245). More importantly, as organisations 
gradually recognised the ineffectiveness of their traditional functional-based structure 
and cross-functional cooperation became increasingly important in the 1980s, 
organisations tended to break down the traditional boundaries between functional 
divisions and integrate business processes across traditional functions (Lambert and 
Peppard, 2003:430-442). It is apparent that the traditional isolated ISs could not support 
these organisational changes. Laudon and Laudon (2006:54) thus conclude that 
integration issues of ISs were the major challenge faced by many user companies in that 
period of time. Consequently, in the 1990s, ERP emerged as a fundamental solution 
towards resolving these integration issues, by using a single and enterprise-wide system 
to break down traditional boundaries between function units and replace the hitherto 
isolated ISs (Laudon and Laudon, 2006:56; Alter, 2002:31; Turban et al, 2004:343). 
3.2.2 Evolution of ERP systems 
The emergence of ERP systems is not occasional. In fact, the concept of ERP systems 
"has evolved over almost 50 years driven by the changing business requirements, new 
technologies and software vendors' development capabilities" (M0ller, 2005). This 
section provides a detailed look at the evolution of ERP systems. 
3.2.3.1 The past ofERP systems 
The origin of ERP can be tracked back to the 1950s when inventory control systems 
(ICSs) and bill of material processors (BOMPs) were developed and used in Western 
companies (M0ller, 2005; Shehab et al, 2004; Kapp et al, 2001:18). The early ICSs and 
BOMPs gradually turned into Material Requirements Planning (MRP) systems in the 
1960s (M0ller, 2005). MRP systems used bill of materials (BOM), inventory records 
and master production schedules (MPS) as inputs to calculate the net requirement plan 
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of materials as output, and therefore create production and purchase orders for lower-
level components (Koh et al, 2000). The adoption of MRP systems helps companies 
improve their production processes by enhancing the efficiency of material scheduling 
and inventory control. During the 1970s and 1980s, Manufacturing Resource Planning 
(MRP 11) systems emerged to extend MRP's traditional focus on production processes 
into other business functions related with manufacturing (Chen, 2001). MRP II 
integrates "primary functions (e.g. production) and other functions such as personnel, 
engineering and purchasing into the planning process to improve the efficiency of the 
manufacturing enterprise" (Chen, 2001). However, the main focus ofMRP 11 is still on 
the manufacturing side of the company. 
3.2.3.2 Generation and extensions ofERP systems 
In the early 1990s, MRP 11 further evolved to ERP which does not just focus on the 
manufacturing side, but also on other aspects, especially sales, human resource and 
financial side, of the company. ERP systems were traditionally applied in capital-
intensive industries such as manufacturing, construction, aerospace and defence 
(Shehab et al, 2004). During the 1990s, ERP systems continually evolved and were 
extended to integrate all functions (e.g. sales, production, distribution, human resources, 
finance and accounting function) of an organisation's 'back office' (Shehab et al, 2004). 
In the late 1990s, ERP systems have been expanded beyond the manufacturing sector 
and been introduced into other commercial (e.g. finance, insurance, retail and 
telecommunication) and non-commercial (e.g. government, health care, education) 
sectors (Shehab et al, 2004). However, ERP systems developed and used in the 1990s 
had a set of limitations: 
- Limited functionality. Although ERP systems traditionally strived to automate 
and integrate all business processes and functions to allow data to seamlessly 
flow throughout the whole organization, many ERP adopters found that the 
actual implementation cases rendered a different story. Specifically, many 
organizations found that their ERP systems did not contain all necessary 
functions they expected and did not support any specific or unusual business 
processes they used to gain better competitive advantages, while customizing the 
system or changing the business processes is not always possible (Markus et al, 
2000; Soh et al, 2000). UN\VERS\TY 
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- Lack of decision support capability. Since ERP systems were originally 
designed to integrate the company's transaction processing systems, they were 
not designed to fulfil all the needs for business reporting, decision making and 
longer-term planning (Markus et al, 2000; Chou et al, 2005; Sammon and Adam, 
2005). 
- Inability to support a company's 'front office'. Traditional ERP systems mainly 
focused on integrating the company's 'back office', but they provide little 
functions to support the company's 'front office' which deals with people, 
suppliers and customers (Exact Software, 2005; Markus et al, 2000) 
- Inability to link the company with its external supply chain. Traditional ERP 
systems were focused on the internal operation of companies, but they were not 
designed to address the external supply chain of the companies. In other words, 
they are incapable to link the company with its suppliers and customers in the 
supply chain (Davenport and Brooks, 2004; M0ller, 2005). 
Therefore, since 2000, ERP vendors have made a substantial effort in strengthening and 
developing their ERP packages. Consequently, contemporary ERP systems do not just 
contain broader and deeper functionalities, but also are able to integrate with other 
enterprise applications, such as supply chain management (SCM) and customer 
relationship management (CRM) - which address the company's front-office issues; 
and business intelligence (BI) - which provide the system with stronger forecasting and 
decision support functions. ERP vendors have also added web capabilities to their ERP 
packages to allow the systems to link directly with each other over the Internet 
(Davenport and Brooks, 2004). With such web-enabled ERP systems, companies can 
easily share information and knowledge, exchange transaction data (e.g. purchase/sales 
orders, production/delivery schedules and payments) and conduct collaborative 
processes/tasks with their partners, suppliers and even customers through the Internet 
(Jaiswal and Kaushik, 2005; Btl.rca et al, 2005). As a result, companies in the supply 
chain will be able to build up strong business networks with each other and even 
achieve inter-enterprise integration (Davenport, 2000; Kalakota and Robinson, 2000; 
Jaiswal and Kaushik, 2005). 
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3 .2.3 Definition of ERP 
Nowadays, researchers in the field draw slightly different definitions of ERP systems. 
For example, Kumar and Hillegersberg (2000) define ERP systems as "configurable 
information system packages that integrate information and information-based 
processes within and across functional areas in an organization". Gable (1998) defines 
ERP systems as comprehensive package software solutions that seek to integrate the 
complete range of business processes and functions in order to present a holistic view of 
the business from a single information and IT architecture. Shehab et al (2004) consider 
ERP systems as "business management system[s] that comprise integrated sets of 
comprehensive software, which can be used, when successfully implemented, to 
manage and integrate all the business functions within an organization". MeJller (2005) 
defines an ERP system as "a standardized software package designed to integrate the 
internal value chain of an enterprise ... [It] is based on an integrated database and 
consists of several modules aimed at specific business functions". 
By analysing and comparing these four definitions, a comprehensive set of essential 
characteristics of ERP systems can be identified. In particular, ERP systems: 
can be reconfigured or customised; 
are standard information system packages that consist of a set of independent 
software modules; 
has a single IT architecture/data repository; 
can facilitate the integration of information-based processes within and across all 
functional areas of the organization. 
By combining this comprehensive set of features of ERPs, this thesis defines an ERP 
system as: 
A configurable information system package that consists of a set of independent 
software modules, and can integrate information and information-based 
processes within and across functional areas, including finance, human resource, 
manufacturing, sales and purchasing areas, etc, in an organization by using a 
single comprehensive database. 
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The definition of ERP clearly shows that ERP systems are essentially software packages 
that facilitate data integration across the firm. As identified in the previous chapter, a 
company's IS does not only involves software and data, but also contains another three 
essential components, namely people, hardware, and network. The definition of ERP 
therefore supports the conclusion made in the previous chapter that ERP is not a 
company's IS but a part of the IS. ERPs need to work together with other IS 
components (i.e. people, hardware, and network) in order to achieve its intended goals. 
3.2.4 Major modules ofERP systems 
As emerged in the above definition, ERP systems consist of a set of interrelated 
modules that perform specific business processes and support different functional areas. 
The modules contained in actual ERP packages may often vary due to the differences on 
software capabilities of ERP vendors. With rapid technology development, companies 
are now also able to select, implement and integrate the most suitable modules from 
different ERP vendors to form their own ERP systems which best suit their needs. 
Nevertheless, four basic modules are typically involved in ERPs: sales and distribution, 
manufacturing and production, finance and accounting, and human resources. 
Contemporary ERP systems also act as platforms to integrate a number of new 
enterprise applications such as supply chain management (SCM), customer relationship 
management (CRM) and business intelligence (BI). This section discusses these ERP 
modules in detail. 
Sales and Distribution 
The sales and distribution module of ERP aims to handle processes such as order entry, 
order processing, product availability checking, sales forecasting, shipping scheduling, 
distribution management, etc (Shehab et al, 2004). In general cases, sales orders will be 
entered into ERP by sales clerks (Laudon and Laudon, 2006:380). However, if the ERP 
system also has an e-commerce application, customers can fill in their sales orders 
online, which will then be processed and stored in ERP (Alter, 2002:42-43; O'Brien, 
2004:50-52). 
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Manufacturing and production 
As mentioned earlier, MRP, which focuses mainly on production and manufacturing 
processes, is the former generation of ERP (Klaus et al, 2000). The core of 
manufacturing and production module of ERP is thus developed based on the MRP 
logic (Klaus et al, 2000). This module aims at generating production schedules, 
calculating net requirement plans of materials, releasing purchase orders, and 
automating capacity planning and inventory control (Shehab et al, 2004). 
Finance and accounting 
The finance and accounting module is usually the backbone of the ERP system 
(Marnewick and Labuschagne, 2005). It includes functions to handle the company's 
general ledger, accounts receivable, accounts payable, fixed assets, treasury 
management, cost control, profitability analysis and capital budgeting etc (Marnewick 
and Labuschagne, 2005; Yen et al, 2002; Shehab et al, 2004). 
Human resources 
The human resources module can automate the personnel management processes such 
as recruitment, workforce planning, training and development, business travel 
arrangement, vacation allotment and payroll (Yen et al, 2002; Mamewick and 
Labuschagne, 2005; Shehab et al, 2004). The payroll is usually integrated with the 
finance and accounting module and handles all the accounting issues and preparation of 
cheques related to employee salaries, wages and bonuses (Yen et al, 2002; Marnewick 
and Labuschagne, 2005). 
Supply chain management 
Supply chain management is the coordination of material/product flows, information 
flows, and financial flows between and among all participants in the supply chain, from 
suppliers to manufacturers to distributors to retailers and finally to consumers (Kalakota 
and Robinson, 2000; Marnewick and Labuschagne, 2005). It is usually seen as an 
independent IS, but is also possible to be integrated in most modem ERPs. The goal of 
SCM is to "allow everyone involved in the flow of goods to make decisions based on 
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the latest and best information from everyone else, both upstream and downstream. The 
company that manages its supply chain best gets its product from points of origin to 
points of consumption in the least amount of time at the lowest cost" (Davenport and 
Brooks, 2004). There are two groups of applications involved in a typical SCM 
system/module: supply chain planning (SCP) applications which integrate a set of 
planning functions, such as demand, distribution, transportation and manufacturing 
planning and scheduling; and supply chain execution (SCE) applications which help 
companies to automate the order planning, production, replenishment, distribution and 
delivery functions to ensure the right products are delivered to the right customer at the 
right time (Kalakota and Robinson, 2000:283-288). 
Customer relationship management 
Greenberg (200 1, quoted by Loonam and McDonagh, 2005: ), defines customer 
relationship management as "a comprehensive set of processes and technologies for 
managing the relationships with potential and current customers [ ... ] across marketing, 
sales, and service regardless of the communication channel. The goal of CRM is to 
optimise customer [ ... ] satisfaction by building the strongest possible relationships at an 
organisational level". CRM aims to collect, organise and maintain all customer-related 
information (including customer details, customer shopping history and behaviour, and 
any records of interactions between the company and its customers) in a structural way 
(O'Brien and Marakas, 2007:238). Companies can use such information to match 
customer needs with new product plans and offers, handle specific customer issues and 
provide suitable customer services. 
Business intelligence 
Traditional ERP systems are often criticised for having insufficient decision support and 
environmental scanning capabilities (Markus et al, 2000; Chou et al, 2005; Holsapple 
and Sena, 2005; Sammon and Adam, 2005). In order to address these weaknesses, 
many ERP vendors nowadays integrate BI applications in their ERP packages. BI 
applications are decision support tools that enable real-time and interactive access, 
analysis and manipulation of mission-critical corporate information (Marnewick and 
Labuschagne, 2005). The main purpose of BI is to accumulate the data and process it 
into useful information (Mamewick and Labuschagne, 2005). Data stored in the 
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integrated database of ERP system can be loaded into a data warehouse, and then linked 
to BI tools (such as OLAP, data mining, query and reporting) which can perform 
various data analysis and produce analytical reports (Chou et al, 2005). 
3.2.5 Potential benefits for using ERP systems 
The review of literature identified a wide range of potential benefits that ERP systems 
may bring to user companies in operational, managerial, strategic and organisational 
levels. This section provides a summary of the key benefits associated with the 
adoption of ERPs. 
Operational benefits: 
- Improve, standardise and automate key business processes. The adoption of 
ERP will not only automate all key business processes, but can also facilitate 
user companies to standardise and improve their current business processes 
(Oliver et al, 2005; Bergstrom and Stehn, 2005; Markus and Tanis, 2000). 
- Improve inventory management. ERP systems enable better inventory control, 
higher inventory turnover and lower inventory cost (Bergstrom and Stehn, 2005; 
Gupta et al, 2004; Spathis and Constantinides, 2003). 
- Increase productivity and operational efficiency. Operational data, such as 
customer orders, production capabilities, procurement plans and financial status, 
etc, can be shared among business functions in real time through ERP systems 
(Shang and Seddon, 2002). This can lead to significant increase in productivity 
and operational efficiency (Gupta et al, 2004; Bergstrom and Stehn, 2005; 
Shang and Seddon, 2002). 
- Reduce operational cost. Automation of business processes and increase in 
operational efficiency can help user companies to reduce operational cost 
significantly (Oliver et al, 2005; Gupta et al, 2004; Spathis and Constantinides, 
2003; Markus and Tanis, 2000). 
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Increase customer satisfaction. ERP systems enable companies to become 
more flexible to respond to customer needs within the shortest time possible, 
and thus increase customer satisfaction (Oliver et al, 2005; Bergstrom and Stehn, 
2005; Gupta et al, 2004; Shang and Seddon, 2002; Markus and Tanis, 2000). 
Managerial benefits: 
Improve forecasting, planning, controlling and decision making. Substantial 
improvements in operational efficiency and data processing can in turn 
essentially increase management efficiency in terms of better forecasting, 
planning, controlling and decision making (Oliver et al, 2005; Bergstrom and 
Stehn, 2005; Spathis and Constantinides, 2003; Shang and Seddon, 2002; 
Markus and Tanis, 2000). 
Improve resource management. As managers can now access and retrieve 
needed data associated with any aspects of the firm more easily, they can 
arrange, control and allocate the firm's (e.g. human and finance) resources more 
efficiently (Shang and Seddon, 2002). 
Strategic benefits: 
- Support business growth and goal achievement. Substantial improvements in 
operational and management efficient can certainly render a positive impact on 
the business growth and goals achievement in the long-term (Bergstrom and 
Stehn, 2005; Shang and Seddon, 2002). 
Increase global operation power. Integrated cross-functional ERP systems 
present new opportunities for enhancing core competitive competencies, and 
thus increase global operation power of the firm (Bergstrom and Stehn, 2005; 
Shang and Seddon, 2002). 
Organisational benefits: 
Facilitate data and business process integration across the firm. ERP systems 
use a single database to integrate all data and information collected from various 
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business processes across the firm, and thus enable these data and information 
to searnlessly flow throughout the whole organisation (Kumar and Hillegersberg, 
2000; Gable, 1998; Shehab et al, 2004). Data integration also helps to break 
down traditional boundaries of business functions and facilitates cross-
functional integration within user companies (Oliver et al, 2005; Spathis and 
Constantinides, 2003). 
Increase organisational flexibility. ERPs enable user companies to be more 
flexible in responding to customer needs and controlling inventory, human and 
capital resources (Oliver et al, 2005; Bergstrom and Stehn, 2005; Spathis and 
Constantinides, 2003). 
Reduce the requirement ofmanpower. Since most of the business functions get 
automated as a result of ERP adoption, manual output is greatly reduced. 
Consequently, requirements of manpower will be correspondingly reduced 
(Bergstrom and Stehn, 2005; Gupta et al, 2004). 
Increase employee empowerment. The greater availability of information 
enables greater empowerment of employees, since they can now use the 
accurate and comprehensive information contained in ERP to make decisions 
which used to be formally referred upwards or to other departments due to lack 
of information (Sia et al, 2002; Shang and Seddon, 2002). 
Facilitate organisational learning. ERP is not just an IT tool but is also 
embedded with advanced business management concepts. Using ERP and 
absorbing its embedded management knowledge present to be valuable learning 
opportunities across the organisation (Shang and Seddon, 2002). 
Table 3.1 summarises all potential ERP benefits found in the literature review and 
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2005; Gupta et al, 2004 
Increase employee empowerment Sia et al, 2002; Shang and 
Seddon,2002 
Facilitate organisational learning Shang and Seddon, 2002 
Table 3 .I: Summary of potential benefits for using ERP systems 
User companies may often expect to receive the full range of benefits mentioned above 
once the ERP systems go live. However, this is actually unrealistic and unfeasible in 
real practices (Buonanno et al, 2005). In fact, the fully exploration of potential benefits 
of ERP is a long-term task that requires continuous contribution and effort of managers 
and employees across the whole company, as further discussed in section 3.3. 
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3.2.6 Potential issues for using ERP systems 
This section describes and discusses some of the key issues that may occur when using 
ERP systems in organisations. These issues are further developed and discussed in 
chapter six. 
Data accuracy 
ERP systems require extremely high data accuracy to work effectively and efficiently 
(Koh et al., 2000; Zhou et al., 2005). The integrated nature of ERP determines that all 
data entered into the system will be stored in the central database and become available 
immediately to the whole company. As a consequence, if system user input incorrect 
data into the system, it will raise immediate impact and problems to the entire company 
and may disturb the operation of all functional divisions (Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003). 
System users thus need to use and operate the system carefully and earnestly in order to 
reduce the probability of occurrence of user mistakes (Gargeya and Brady, 2005). On 
the other hand, data stored in the system must be regularly purged to ensure highest 
level of accuracy possible (Loh and Koh, 2004). If outdated and duplicated data of the 
ERP system is not discarded properly, it may lead to low data accuracy, reduce speed of 
data search and increase data storage space and cost (Loh and Koh, 2004). Overall, the 
continuance of data accuracy depends on long-term efforts and carefulness of well-
trained system users and IT maintenance staff. 
Conflicts between greater management control and greater employee empowerment 
ERP systems make user companies become more transparent by increasing their ability 
to gather more information in greater detail and in real time throughout the organisation 
(Sia et al, 2002). Consequently, managers can "remain in touch with the activities on 
the ground and are able to involve themselves in the decisions of the subordinates", and 
thus have greater control on their staff (Sia et al, 2002; Shang and Seddon, 2002). 
On the other hand, with greater availability and accessibility of information, employees 
are now in a better position to make decisions which used to be formally referred 
upwards or to other departments due to lack of information (Sia et al, 2002; Shang and 
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Seddon, 2002). This actually serves as a means of greater employee empowerment (Sia 
et al, 2002). 
However, as widely acknowledged, control and empowerment are actually opposite 
ends of the management power (Sia et al, 2002). Greater empowerment often means 
looser control, and vice versa. Therefore, finding a good balance between employee 
empowerment and efficient management control is frequently reported as a challenge 
faced by companies using ERPs (Sia et al, 2002; Elmes et al, 2005). 
Technical integration vs. social integration 
There is no doubt that ERP systems replace the traditional isolated information systems 
and help companies achieve data integration and break down functional boundaries. 
However, Allen (2005) states that, the technical data integration achieved by using ERP 
does not mean the social integration of people within diverse functions. In particular 
Allen (2005) argues that new value conflicts (e.g. conflicts over work priorities, over 
dependency on the commitments of others, and over evaluation fairness) may emerge 
with the use of ERP. If these value conflicts are not managed carefully, they may place 
"a strain on the close and trusting social relationships needed for cross-functional 
cooperation through ERP" (Allen, 2005). Therefore Alien concludes that these value 
conflicts must be solved in order to achieve social integration between different 
functional areas. Technical and social integrations are the prerequisite for achieving 
functional integration of the whole organization. 
Cultural misfits 
Cultural misfits are considered as one of the most important factors to affect the 
efficiency ofERP systems. For example, ERP systems require name to be entered in the 
Western format as first, middle, and last name. System users would find it difficult to 
understand which part of an Indian, Malay, or Chinese name should be considered a last 
name and a first name (Soh et al, 2000). The report formats (especially financial reports) 
of different countries might be different. Managers might get confused and not be able 
to find particular figures when reading reports provided by ERP systems of subsidiary 
operating in another country. 
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3.3 ERP implementation and post-implementation 
Many companies expect to achieve the full range of benefits from their ERP systems 
once the systems go live (Buonanno et al, 2005). However, they soon became 
disappointed that, the actual performances of the systems do not meet their expectations 
(Buonanno et al, 2005). The survey conducted by Trunick ( 1999) reveals that 40 percent 
of implemented ERP systems perform to only some of their full effectiveness and 20 
percent are scrapped as complete failure. Willis and Willis-Brown (2002) argue that the 
main reason for causing such disappointment and system inefficiency is due to the 
companies see the "go live" point as their final goal but fail to apply a long-term view to 
consider that the go-live of the new system is not the end of the ERP implementation 
journey but another beginning. From ERP implementation studies, Willis and Willis-
Brown reveal that ERP implementation must go through two distinct phases in order to 
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Figure 3.1: The two phases and performance trend for ERP implementation 
(source: Willis and Willis-Brown, 2002) 
Time 
The first phase of ERP implementation can be described as focusing on the effort 
necessary to reach the 'go live' milestone. This includes the typical implementation 
stages (e.g. system vendor selection, system requirements identification and the 
execution of the whole implementation project) and the 'go live' stage. As shown in 
figure 3.1, the major hurdle to overcome in the 'go live' stage is a dip in performance of 
the ERP system. Almost every ERP project manager will be confronted with problems, 
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such as late orders, billing errors, and inaccurate inventory records, in the first few 
months after the system goes lived (Hammer, cited by Willis and Willis-Brown, 2002). 
If the company properly reengineers for the new processes and thoroughly masters the 
change culture, a significant performance dip can be avoided. Besides, companies 
should start recognising that the 'go live' stage is not the end of the journey but merely 
a beginning. They gradually turn to the second phase of ERP implementation. 
The second phase is the post-implementation phase, in which the standard ERP system 
is continuously improved and extended to maximise the potential benefits and value 
return. The success of the post-implementation phase depends on three critical stages 
(Figure 3.1): 
The first stage aims to stabilise the installed system. An audit or evaluation of the 
new system should be conducted to identify major breakdowns, inconsistencies 
and deficiencies. All users must be trained and retrained to ensure they have 
sufficient skills and knowledge to operate the system. Process discrepancies and 
critical functionality shortages must be filled and corrected. The goal of this stage 
is to make sure that all functions of the new system are working correctly and 
properly and therefore build the foundation for further ERP extension. 
The second stage is to add functionality and to reengineer necessary processes. It is 
not surprised to find that the initial system requirement identification is not 
comprehensive enough when the new system is actually being used. More system 
functionalities and business processes might be needed in order to improve the 
operational performance and gain a better competitive advantage. External 
resources (e.g. consultants and academics) can be consulted to find out how the 
current system functionalities can be strengthened and what innovative business 
processes can be added. When companies are satisfied that their ERP systems can 
well support the operation of their back offices, they can go to stage three. 
The third stage is to extend the focus of ERP system from back-office operation to 
front-office operation and from internal integration to external integration. 
Companies can consider integrating their standard ERP systems with front-office 
applications, such as SCM and CRM. They can choose these new applications 
either from their existing system vendors or from third-party vendors whose 
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products can be easily integrated with the current ERP systems. They can also add 
e-business capabilities to the systems to enable them directly exchange data with 
other systems of business partners in the supply chain and achieve inter-enterprise 
integration. Mobile ERP is another possible extension which permits the user to 
take the ERP system to anywhere with him/her. One example is that, the sales 
representative in the field can use a mobile device to check the order and inventory 
information from the ERP system and even wirelessly send new customer orders to 
the system. Satellite-based global positioning system is another excellent extension 
which allows the ERP system to track company assets, such as trucks and materials 
which have moved beyond the plant. Delivery routes and schedules can be 
dynamically tracked and optimized. 
Therefore, the 'go live' milestone of the system is not the end of the ERP journey. The 
system post-implementation stage is actually more crucial than the implementation one. 
User companies need to properly and continuously use, maintain and enhance the 
installed ERP in the post-implementation stage, in order to maximise potential benefits 
and value return of the system. This study thus focused on ERP post-implementation 
rather than on implementation. It aimed at investigating barriers and risks that could 
prevent user companies from achieving long-term ERP success in the Chinese context. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Successful implementation of ERPs will bring a set of substantial benefits to companies 
in operational, managerial, strategic and organisational dimensions. However, it is 
unrealistic and impossible for companies to receive this full range of potential benefits 
once the system goes live. In fact, in order to maximise value return of the system and 
ensure continuous ERP success, companies must be ready for the long-term fight of 
ERP post-implementation. It can be expected that a wide range of barriers and risks 
may affect the success of long-term ERP exploitation in user companies. As concluded 
in the previous chapter, these ERP barriers and risks will not be limited to technical 
dimensions (e.g. software, ICT infrastructure), but more importantly can also be found 
in various human and organisational aspects. Therefore, this study aimed at 
investigating and exploring potential ERP post-implementation barriers and risks across 
technical, human and organisational dimensions in the Chinese context. 
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Chapter Four: PEST Analysis of China 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapter one, at the beginning of this research project, the first 
temptation of the researcher was to undertake a national study of the whole of China. 
This however soon proved to be virtually impossible, due to the fact that China is by no 
means a homogeneous country. In particular, China has more than 2,000 cities. There 
are important changes occurring in coastal cities of China, whereas other parts of the 
country are still very traditionally led by the central government. Some regions in the 
country have achieved very high level of IT and IS utilisation, whereas other regions 
may not currently be ready for adopting IS in general and ERP in particular. There are 
also significant differences in organisational culture and information sharing in different 
types of organisations, namely between state-owned companies and newly created 
private organisations. Moreover, companies operating in different industrial sectors 
also have different characteristics and diverse needs for the use of IT. Therefore, it 
became clear that such a complex and wide study is not only unrealistic and potentially 
unfeasible, but may result in findings that are neither significant nor meaningful (Peng 
and Nunes, 2007b ). 
Faced with the necessity of focusing the research and the need of identifying an 
appropriate set of cases to carry out the project, the researcher adopted a Political, 
Economic, Social and Technological (PEST) analysis as a tool to narrow the scope of 
the study, as well as to identify an appropriate region, a business sector and a type of 
Chinese company where ERPs are routinely used. Additionally, as discussed in chapter 
two, the nature of IS determinates that the adoption and use of IS can be significantly 
affected by the business context and environment in which the system is being used. 
Therefore, the PEST analysis conducted also aimed at studying the Chinese context and 
its impact on the adoption and use of ERP in Chinese firms. 
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This chapter firstly provides an overview of the history of China and the concept of 
PEST analysis. Subsequently, this chapter presents and discusses the results derived 
from a PEST analysis of China. As concluded from this chapter, the researcher 
identified and selected State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the electronic and 
telecommunication manufacturing sector in the Guangdong province as a suitable 
context to base this study on. 
4.2 A brief historical overview of the People's Republic of China 
The People's Republic of China, in short PRC or China (note: China is used in this 
thesis), was established in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with Mao 
Zedong as the first president of the country. Under the leadership of Mao, China went 
through a stable period with continuous economic growth from 1949 to 1957. The 
country's Gross National Product (GNP) did grow with an annual rate of nearly 9 
percent during China's first Five-Year Plan (a national economic plan from 1953 to 
1957) (Perkins, 1997:30). 
Nevertheless, China soon entered to a turbulent period which lasted for nearly twenty 
years, from 1958 to the death of Mao in 1976 (Perkins, 1997:32). In 1958, with the 
experience of continuous economic success in the past years, Mao initiated and led a 
new and ambitious economic plan, named the Great Leap Forward, which was initially 
scheduled to run from 1958 to 1969 (Peng, 1987; Li and Yang, 2005). The goals of 
Great Leap Forward were to significantly increase the production of steel by involving 
China's vast peasant population into steel production, and to rapidly transform mainland 
China from a primarily agrarian economy into a modern, industrialized communist 
society (Peng, 1987; Li and Yang, 2005). Unfortunately, significant mistakes were 
made during the Great Leap Forward. Instead of achieving its goals, the Great Leap 
Forward led to widespread economic and social dislocation and was eventually 
terminated in 1961 (Li and Y ang, 2005; Peng, 1987). Mao took most of the blame for 
the failure ofthe Great Leap Forward (Li and Yang, 2005; Peng, 1987). 
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In order to restore his political base, crush his opposition and secure Maoism (Mao's 
thoughts) as the state's dominating ideology, Mao initiated and launched in 1966 the 
Cultural Revolution, which eventually run out his control (Perkins, 1997:32-34; Pu, 
1996:48). During the Cultural Revolution, many CCP leaders were maligned, 
persecuted, forced to step down from the political arena, and were put under house 
arrest. The national education system including schools and universities were closed 
down and many economic activities were halted due to students and workers 
considering revolution through learning and following Maoism as the main priority of 
their activities. Intellectuals became suspected to be opposite to Maoism and thus were 
made targets of political persecution. The country's legal system was completely broken 
down and replaced by anarchy (Perkins, 1997:32-34; Pu, 1996:48). The turbulence of 
Cultural Revolution lasted for ten years and was finally ended with the death of Mao 
and the arrest ofthe "Gang ofFour1" in 1976 (Perkins, 1997:32-34). 
Both Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution have been criticised, inside and 
outside China, as two major mistakes made by Mao in his old age and caused political 
and economic disasters to the country for two decades (Perkins, 1997:32-34). 
In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP 
summarised the lessons learned from the Cultural Revolution, and approved the motion 
of Deng Xiaoping (the de facto leader of the country at that moment) regarding China's 
economic reform and transforming the CCP from a revolutionary party to one with its 
emphasis on economic reconstruction (Zheng, 1999:11; Perkins, 1997:34). Since then, 
China has entered a path of economic recovery and development (Perkins, 1997:34). 
After nearly three decades of economic reform, China has now become an aspiring 
economic superpower in the world. 
1 
"The Gang of Four was the name given to a leftist political faction composed of four Chinese Communist party 
officials. They came to prominence during the Cultural Revolution ( 1966-76) and were subsequently charged with a 
series of treasonous crimes. The members consisted of Jiang Qing, Mao's last wife and the leading figure of the group, 
and her close associates Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen". (source: Wikipedia website 
http://en. wikipedia.orglwiki/Gang_ of_ Four) 
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4.3 The concept and use of PEST analysis 
PEST, as an analysis framework of macro-environmental factors, is also referred to as, 
STEP (Clulow, 2005), SEPT (Narayanan and Fahey, 1994:199-202), or STEEP (Voros, 
2001). 'PEST' is an acronym for four types of factors existing in a firm's external 
macro-environment, namely (Ward and Rivani, 2005): 
Political factors (e.g. political/legal system of the country, government policies and 
regulations); 
Economic factors (e.g. economic situation of the country, any factors affecting the 
purchasing power of customers and the cost of capital of firms); 
Social factors (e.g. demographic, education and cultural aspects); 
and Technological factors (e.g. trends and development of technologies which 
affect production efficiency). 
The usefulness of PEST lies in the assumption that the success of a particular 
organisation or management solution cannot be understood without having the 
information relevant to the specific business environment (Buchanan and Gibb, 1998). 
Business environment could be defined as all relevant physical and social factors 
outside an organization that are considered into decision-making process (Duncan, 
1972). According to Ward and Rivani (2005), PEST analysis assumes that specific 
external and indirect circumstances that characterize the business environment are able 
to influence organisational capacity to produce value. Hence, PEST analysis provides a 
"satellite view" to assess the external environment (Ward and Rivani, 2005). This is 
particularly relevant when trying to narrow very large business environments in order to 
study organisational information systems (Peng and Nunes, 2007b ). 
PEST has been conventionally used in two different ways: first, to analyse the position 
of a particular organisation (e.g. Vrontis and Vignali, 2001) or industry sector (e.g. 
McManus et al., 2007: 19-36) within a particular business environment; second, to 
analyse the viability of general management solutions in a business environment (e.g. 
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Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2005). This chapter proposes to 
use PEST to analyse the study of a specific IS solution (i.e. ERP) in a particular 
business environment (i.e. China). That is, the purpose of the PEST analysis proposed 
in this chapter was to develop an in-depth understanding on the context (e.g. China) that 
was the original target of the study, and subsequently to identify a narrower context (e.g. 
a specific region and a type of company) where ERPs are routinely used and thus would 
allow this study to generate more in-depth and meaningful findings. 
However, PEST is far from being a prec1se and clearly circumscribed analysis 
framework. There are an almost unlimited number of variables that may emerge from 
each dimension. Therefore there is the need to prioritise those variables that have 
highest impact on the industry, sector, or country being studied. For the purpose 
proposed in this chapter all these aspects of PEST were considered having an IS lens 
and aiming at conclusions that will enable the narrowing of the context. 
Moreover, the PEST analysis presented in this chapter was essentially a desktop study 
which was based on the process of a systematic literature review. A large number of 
English and Chinese literature (including journal articles, books, official statistical 
reports, market research reports, news and online articles) were reviewed, compared and 
synthesised and then used as raw materials to construct arguments and standpoints for 
the PEST analysis. 
4.4 PEST analysis of China 
4.4.1 Political dimension 
4.4.1.1 Political system of China 
Under a dictatorship of the proletariat regime (Tung, 1974), the CCP is the dominating 
force in China's politics and has more than 69 million members nationwide. As shown 
in figure 4.1, the top leaders of the CCP (the General Secretary, Standing Committee of 
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the Politburo, and members of the Politburo) were elected by the Central Committee of 
the party (a body of approximately 200) which is in turn elected by the party's National 
Congress which consists of approximately 2,000 delegates and is held every five years 
(Shirk, 1994: 17). 
r+ General Secretary 
(Chairman of the 
National Central Standing Committee 




Figure 4.1: Structure of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party 
According to the Party Constitution of the CCP, when the National Congress is not in 
session, the Central Committee of the CCP carries out its decisions, directs the entire 
work of the Party and represents the CCP in its external relations; the Central 
Committee meets in Plenary Session at least once a year, when the Central Committee 
is not in session, the Politburo and its Standing Committee exercise the functions and 
powers of the Central Committee; the General Secretary of the CCP is responsible for 
convening the meetings of the Politburo and its Standing Committee. China' s modern 
history proves that important policies and guidelines regarding the long-term 
development of the country must be discussed and approved in the Plenary Session of 
the Central Committee or the National Congress of the CCP before taking into action. 
For example, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP 
approved Deng Xiaoping's proposal regarding China's economic reform in 1978; the 
Fourteenth National Congress of the CCP decided to shift China's economic system 
from planning economy to market economy in 1992, etc. 
While the CCP is the core of leadership in China and sets directions for the country, the 
National People ' s Congress (NPC) and the State Council (also known as the central 
government of China) are responsible for the governance of the country. The NPC 
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consists of approximately 3,000 delegates which come from the local people's 
congresses at different levels and have different statuses, e.g. members of CCP, 
members of other parties, entrepreneurs, workers, teachers and farmers, etc. As stated 
by the Constitution of PRC, NPC is the highest organ of state power and exercises the 
state's legislative power (including setting and amending the country's constitution, 
laws and institutions) and supervises the work of the State Council and other 
administrative bodies. The NPC is re-elected every five years and meets in session once 
a year. The President and Vice-President of China are elected by the NPC every five 
years. The current President of China is Hu Jintao who is also the General Secretary of 
the CCP. The President of China has the power to appoint and dismiss the Premier and 
Vice Premier of the State Council (the central government). Wen Jiabao and Zeng 
Qinghong are respectively the current Premier and Vice Premier of the State Council. 
According to the Constitution of PRC, the State Council is the highest executive organ 
of state power and responsible to the NPC. The State Council enforces the constitution 
and laws which were enacted by the NPC, and leads and directs the work of the 
country's ministries and local governments at different levels. 
4.4.1.2 Legal system of China 
The foundation of China's preliminary institutionalization and legalization was build by 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) who had stipulated a 
large number of laws and carried out the work of supervision from 1949 to 1954 (Pu, 
1996:47-48). With the establishment of the NPC in 1954, the legislative and supervisory 
roles of the CPPCC were taken over by the NPC (Pu, 1996:48) who instituted the first 
version of Constitution of PRC in September 1954. NPC had made a lot of progress on 
both legislative and supervisory functions from 1954 to 1956 (Pu, 1996:48). However, 
from 1958 to 1976, especially in the turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution, the 
role of the NPC lost momentum: legislation was almost stopped and supervision hardly 
existed; no sessions of the NPC were convened for ten years; the role of laws and legal 
institutions were marginalized and replaced by personal dictatorship and anarchy (Pu, 
1996:48; Potter, 1999: Ill). 
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From the lessons of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP learned that "in order to assure 
people's democracy [and social stability], the laws and institutions of socialism must be 
strengthened" (Pu, 1996:48). The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the CCP in 1978 therefore considered that a healthy and comprehensive 
legal system was the prerequisite for ensuring the success of the economic reform in the 
long term and stated that the nation must be ruled by law: "ff¥t:I:JJ-f«, 1f¥t:16,-f«, tA 
it;&,F • .ii¥t:&,~" (literally, there must be laws for people to follow, the laws must 
be followed by people, the enforcement of laws must be strict, and law-breakers must be 
dealt with) (Zheng, 2004: 190; Potter, 1999: Ill). Since then, the legislative and 
supervisory roles of the NPC have been resumed and strengthened (Pu, 1996:48). 
Legislation on business activities has been placed as a top priority due to economic 
necessity. Laws on contracts, property rights, and domestic and foreign business 
relations (e.g. the Economic Contract Law, the General Principles of Civil Law, the 
Company Law, the Securities Law and the Foreign Economic Contract Law etc), have 
been enacted and repetitively revised since 1978 (Potter, 1999: 116-118). While the NPC 
enacted laws, the power of law enforcement is granted to the State Council, the 
Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, all of which are 
responsible to the NPC (Pu, 1996:47). 
However, despite these efforts, China's current legal system still manifests certain 
drawbacks. It is evident that China has now set up various laws and regulations which 
cover most corners of the country after a twenty-year effort (Jiang, 2006; Ji, 2005). 
However, "1f¥t:::f1«, 1A¥t:/f'F" (literally, the laws are not being followed, the 
enforcement of laws is not strict) have been the major issues existing in China's current 
legal system (Jiang, 2006). Jiang (2006) points out that laws and regulations of the 
country are too strict and also quite ambiguous and unspecific. According to Jiang 
(2006) and Ji (2005), when laws and regulations strictly cover too many corners of the 
social life, people try not to follow them. When laws and regulations are ambiguous 
and lack clear instructions for handling actual situations, law enforcement becomes 
extremely difficult and loose, and in turn increasing the possibility for people to break 
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the law (Jiang, 2006; Ji, 2005). Overall, China's legal system is still imperfect and thus 
must be continuously improved in order to satisfy the new requirements of a 
competitive market economy. 
4.4.1.3 Economic reform policies 
Soon after the CCP came to power in the country, it copied the development strategy 
and economic institutions from the Soviet Union, who was the only other large 
communist country that could serve as a model (Shirk, 1994:8; Perkins, 1997:30). Rapid 
development of the heavy industry, which is centred on steel and machinery, had been 
considered as the main development strategy of China since the 1950s (Shirk, 1994:8). 
In order to achieve this goal, China adopted the Soviet-style planning economic system 
(Shirk, 1994:9) which was characterised by the highly centralized economic control of 
the government. The planning economic system allowed the government to own the 
majority of resources of the country and enabled industrial labour, material inputs, 
finance, outputs and distribution to be centrally controlled by the government to 
guarantee that heavy industry had the first claim on resources (Shirk, 1994:9). Most 
Chinese enterprises in the planning economy were owned by the state and so called 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which basically acted as social-economic entities to 
fulfil production quotas assigned by the government rather than profit making units. 
The aim was to provide lifelong employment to citizens, and provide employees with 
social and welfare services through facilities owned by SOEs, such as schools, hospitals 
and houses (Sun et al, 2005; Zheng, 2004:129). However, it was inevitable that SOEs 
which were not driven by profit making objectives would have difficulties in competing 
in an openly competitive market environment. In other words, in order to protect SOEs 
and the government itself as the investor, strong competition in the domestic market had 
to be eliminated. Because domestic enterprises of the time were either owned or 
controlled by the government (Chen, 2005), the only potential source that could cause 
strong competition in the domestic market would be foreign competitors. As a result, 
participation of foreign products and investors in the national market was strictly 
limited during the planning economic era (Shirk, 1994:8). The government intended to 
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establish a self-reliant industry and built an airtight wall between the domestic economy 
and the world economy by direct controls on imports and foreign investments and other 
foreign trade policies (Shirk, 1994:8). 
The Soviet-style planning economy enabled China to achieve continuous economic 
growth for a few decades. The country's GNP kept growing with an annual rate of 
nearly 9 percent from 1953 to 1957 and above 4 percent even in the turbulent period 
from 1958 to 1976 (Perkins, 1997:30-32). China's industrial growth was at an 
approximate rate of 10 percent per year from 1949 to 1980 (Shirk, 1994:1 0). However, 
despite the continuous economic growth, the planning economy actually caused crucial 
economic problems to China in the 1970s: 
1) Poor investment decisions and weak project designs were frequently made by SOEs 
whose workers and management teams had few positive incentives on their jobs 
(Perkins, 1997:34) under the institutions of the planning economy. Since SOEs in 
the time were the mainstay for maintaining social stability and economic 
development, the losses and inefficiency of SOEs caused significant burdens to the 
country and the national economy. 
2) After closing the country to international business for three decades, China's 
economy, technologies and business expertise were seriously lagging behind 
developed countries. The gaps between China and developed countries had rapidly 
increased during the ten-year Cultural Revolution (Research Lab of the Party 
History of the Central Committee of the CCP, 2001). 
3) Total factor productivity of China declined between the early 1950s and 1979 at an 
average annual rate of 2. 75 percent (Shirk, 1994:1 0) largely due to laggard 
technologies, outdated management concepts and the unmotivated work force of the 
country. 
4) In order to resolve the problem of production inefficiency, the state had to pump 
more and more capital and labour from other sectors into industry to sustain its high 
growth (Shirk, 1994:1 0). This however would not be a long-term solution. 
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Thus in 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP 
approved Deng Xiaoping's proposal to reform China's economic system by absorbing 
understanding of market economy from western countries (Research Lab of the Party 
History of the Central Committee of the CCP, 2001 ). The fundamental concept behind 
the economic reform was to reduce the government's highly centralised control on 
economic activities and allow economic activities to be influenced by market conditions 
in order to establish a stronger and more competitive economic system. However the 
revolutionary leaders of the CCP were initially unwilling to legitimate the market 
economy while negating the old planning economy (Zheng, 1999: 17). At the Twelfth 
National Congress ofthe CCP in 1982, the leadership defined China's economic system 
as one in which "the planning economy is the main pillar and market economy a 
supplementary element" (Zheng, 2004:65). Five years later, at the Thirteenth National 
Congress of the CCP, the market economy acquired an equal status to that of the 
planning economy in party ideology, the leadership defined the country's economic 
system as one "combining planning and market economies" (Zheng, 2004:65). After 
Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992 and seeing the benefits that market economy 
brought to southern costal cities, at the Fourteenth National Congress of the CCP in 
1992, the leadership finally announced that the goal of China's economic reform is to 
completely shift the traditional planning economic system to a socialist market economy 
system (Liu, 1997:82; Zheng, 1999:18). The Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth 
Central Committee of the CCP in 1993 subsequently outlined the development plan of 
the market economy system and divided the reform of China's economic system into 
two phases (Liu, 1997:85): 
- From 1994 to 2000, a preliminary market economy would be established and 
Chinese people would be leading to a relatively comfortable life; 
- From 2000 to 2020, the market economic system will be further improved and 
perfected, and China's per capita GNP is expected to reach the same level as that of 
a moderately developed country. 
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Accompanied with the economic reform, two significant national changes have been 
made in China: 
1) Many SOEs have been gradually reformed to shareholding, limited liability or 
private companies which results in substantial improvements on company 
performance and employee incentives. 
2) China has been opened up to the outside world which results rapid increase on the 
amount of international trading and foreign direct investment (FDI) received, and 
thus brings numerous new and advanced technologies and management concepts to 
the country. 
The economic reform, as well as the SOE reform and China's opening up to the outside 
world, presented to be a substantial solution towards the economic problems faced by 
China in the planning economy era. Detailed policies regarding SOE reform and 
China's opening up to the outside world are discussed in the following two sections. 
4.4.1.4 SOE reform policies 
SOEs undertook many social and economic responsibilities in the planning economic 
era (Sun et al, 2005; Zheng, 2004:129) and thus were the mainstay for maintaining 
economic development and social stability. However, as discussed above under the 
institutions of the planning economic system, SOEs had extremely poor performance 
and experienced serious losses. In fact, there were at least three lethal reasons that 
determined the inefficiency and failure ofSOEs in that period of time: 
1) When the government was both the owner and supervisor of SOEs, executive and 
operational managers in these companies had no real power. As such, management 
decisions (e.g. the commissions of management teams, investment decisions and 
reward schemes etc) were highly interfered by the state or government agencies who 
frequently made their decisions based on political and social criteria rather than on 
business needs (Yusuf et al., 2006:22-4). 
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2) Since SOEs were not driven by profit-making objectives and would not be 
responsible for any profits or losses (Chen, 2005), management of SOEs would not 
put too much effort in minimising waste, reducing cost and improving performance. 
3) SOEs had very soft budget constraints and could easily received loans from local 
banks without worrying the interests and even redemptions of loans (Yusuf et al., 
2006: 170). As a consequence, top managers would not receive too much pressure 
even when the company was experiencing significant losses. 
In order to prevent SOEs from loss making and enable SOEs to compete in the new 
economic environment, reforming SOEs has been considered as the most essential part 
in the economic reform since 1980s. The SOE reform in the early stage ( 1980s to the 
early 1990s) was mainly focused on improving enterprise governance, increasing 
autonomy of SOEs and increasing the incentives of SOE managers and staff (Wen, 
2004; Cheung, 2005; Zheng, 2004: 130), but no substantial results were achieved (Zheng, 
2004: 130) because no real efforts were put to separate the enterprise ownership and 
enterprise management of SOEs. Since SOEs were still owned and run by the 
government, the overall situation was not much different from that of the pre-reform era 
(Yusuf et al., 2006). 
Nevertheless, with the leadership's decision to completely shift the traditional planning 
economy to the market economy in 1992, the reform of SOEs entered a new stage. The 
move to build a modem enterprise system by corporatising SOEs was integrated into the 
development plan of the market economy system by the Third Plenary Session of the 
Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP in 1993 (Zheng, 2004: 131 ). The Company 
Law was subsequently enacted in 1994 in order to provide a modem legal framework 
for transforming SOEs from national enterprises to private companies (Zheng, 2004:131; 
Gamaut et al., 2005:46). According to the Company Law, after an SOE is transformed 
to a company, it will be run by its standard internal management organs (i.e. the broad 
of directors) and the government will no longer involve directly in enterprise 
management. In 1995, the central government approved the proposal of Zhu Rongji 
(China's former premier) and launched a new SOE reform policy called 'im::ktDUJ'' 
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(literally, keep the big ones and let go the small ones) (Gamaut et al., 2005:3; Zheng, 
2004:131; Cheung, 2005). The core of this policy was to maintain the state control on 
large-size SOEs and let go the smaller and low-profit or loss-making ones. As a result, 
between 1996 and 2001, close to 50,000 of small and medium-size SOEs were 
restructured and privatized through selling or leasing to the public or employees; 
declaring bankruptcy; merging with other companies; or other forms (Garnaut et al., 
2005:3; Wen, 2004; Cheung, 2005). On the other hand, many of the large SOEs have 
been restructured through one of the following ways (Gamaut et al., 2005:46-50; Yusuf, 
2006:156-157): 
Internal restructuring. The Company Law requires a company to have at least two 
shareholders, but it allows SOEs to register as limited liability companies with the 
state or a state-owned entity as the sole owner through a set of internal restructuring 
procedures (e.g. change the operating mechanism of the SOE, settle its creditors' 
rights and liabilities, and set up standard internal management organs etc ). 
Although the state is still the owner of the SOE after such reform, the company will 
now be supervised and managed by its standard internal management organ (e.g. 
the board of directors) rather than by the state. This type of SOEs is also called as 
Wholly State-Owned Enterprises. 
Ownership diversification. Instead of maintaining the state as the sole owner of the 
firm, the ownership of SOEs may actually have been diversified by bringing in 
outside investors. Specifically, SOEs can be restructured to limited liability 
companies with at least two but not more than fifty shareholder/investors. While the 
biggest shareholder is the state or a state-owned entity, the other 
shareholders/investors can be private or foreign firms. SOEs can also be 
restructured to shareholding companies and listed in the stock market. While the 
state, directly or indirectly, holds the biggest part of the shares, the other shares can 
be purchased by the public through the stock market. SOEs that have gone through 
such ownership reform are also known as Majority State-Owned or Majority State-
Controlled Enterprises. These SOEs are no longer merely invested by the state and 
will have many shareholders. Nevertheless, the biggest shareholder must be the 
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state or an SOE. The firm is supervised and managed by its board of directors and 
management team. 
Overall, with the '1Jltj;:~'j"' policy, SOEs in any size (e.g. small, medium, large and 
very large-sized), have experienced some type of reform (Gamaut et al. , 2005:5). Since 
thousands of small and loss-making SOEs were privatized, the number of SOE has been 
rapidly reduced in recent years (Gamaut et al., 2005:5). Large and medium-size SOEs 
have been transformed to wholly or majority state-owned companies, which have totally 
different but more efficient operating mechanism (Yusuf et al. , 2006). Additionally, if 
crucial organisational problems of the SOE still remain unsolved after the reform, the 
firm may be restructured for a second time (Mo, 2005). Therefore, reform of Chinese 
SOEs is never a straightforward task. 
After experiencing such transformation, reformed SOEs, on the one hand, inherit some 
features of traditional Chinese SOEs (e.g. a party system within the firm, management 
structure, organisational culture, work force, and work behaviour, etc), on the other 
hand, develop some new features (e.g. have a board of directors) by adopting western 
market economic and company principles. As a result, the organisational structure of 
reformed SOEs manifests as a combination of traditional Chinese SOE style and 
western style. Figure 4.2 shows the internal structure of a typical reformed SOE and the 
key external entities associated with it. 
Figure 4.2 : Internal and external relationship network of a typical reformed SOE. 
(Source: modified from figure 9.1 in Chen, 200 I: 163) 
70 
Chapter Four PEST Analysis of China 
As shown in the figure, most internal entities (e.g. the board of directors, board of 
supervisors and top management team) of reformed SOEs are similar to those of 
western companies, except the party system within the company which is inherited from 
traditional SOEs. In fact, all organisations (e.g. ministries, governmental bureaus and 
SOEs) that are owned or controlled by the state in China will be embedded with a party 
system. In SOEs, the party system exists as an independent function and will not affect 
the normal administrative functions of the firm (Liu, 2005). Since many staff, especially 
members of the management teams in SOEs are members of the CCP, the party system 
aims to regulate, manage and monitor the activities and behaviours of CCP members 
within SOEs and ensure the ideologies of CCP members in SOEs are consistent with the 
Central Committee of the CCP (Liu, 2005). The party systems within reformed SOEs 
are led by the Party General Secretary which will always be either the chairman of the 
board of directors or the general manager of the company. On the other hand, most 
external entities in the figure can be easily understood from their names. A notable 
point is that as the state retained itself as the owner or largest shareholder of modem 
SOEs, the government, which is now considered as an external entity, still has strong 
control on these firms. Specifically, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) was established in 2003 by 
the State Council as the top ministry for controlling state assets of SOEs (Gamaut et al., 
2005:6). The SASAC is delegated as the owner of a group of China's largest state 
enterprises (currently 150 in number, SASAC website http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963 
340/n297112lln4956567/4956583.html). These large group enterprises govern various 
industrial sectors throughout the country (Cai and Tylecote, 2005). SASAC, acting as 
the shareholder, has rights to appoint board members and supervise these large national 
enterprise groups (Tylecote and Cai, 2004). Except these 150 central SOEs, modem 
SOEs in provincial level are controlled by local ministries or governmental bureaus of 
different regions (Tylecote and Cai, 2004). Key members in the boards of directors and 
top management teams of these SOEs are also appointed by and are responsible to 
related local ministries or governmental bureaus, who are the owners or the largest 
shareholders of these firms. More details regarding the SOE reform are presented in 
section 4.4.2.3. 
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4.4.1.5 Open-door policies and WTO accession 
As discussed above, in order to import advanced foreign technologies and management 
concepts to the country and accelerate the success of economic reform, China has 
gradually opened up the domestic market to foreign investors and competitors since 
1979 (Sun et al., 2005). In 1979, four special economic zones (SEZs) were established 
in four southern coastal cities (Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong province 
and Xiamen in Fujian province) under the SEZ policy to attract foreign direct 
investments (FDI) from external investors and companies (Shirk, 1994:34-35; Yusuf et 
al., 2006: 1-2). SEZs were given unique freedoms to conduct various types of market 
economic experiments which eventually made SEZs the vanguards of the country's 
economic reform (Shirk, 1994:36). Concessionary investment terms and better business 
climate offered by SEZs attracted large amount of FDis, especially from overseas 
Chinese companies that were located in Hong Kong and Taiwan and were an important 
source of business expertise (Shirk, 1994:35). With the success of the initial SEZ policy, 
the CCP applied similar open-door policies to other fourteen coastal cities in 1984, and 
to all cities of China's entire coastline in 1988 (Shirk, 1994:39). China's economic 
reform entered to a new stage in 1992, and many inland areas were finally opened for 
foreign investments (Shirk, 1994:41 ). The reasons for opening coastal areas first, as 
argued by Zhao Ziyang (General Secretary of the CCP in 1988), were that: "the 
economic and cultural differences between the coastal and inland areas made it 
impossible for all parts of the country to develop at the same speed; therefore the coastal 
areas should be allowed to move ahead by using their better labour, communications 
and infrastructure, and scientific and technological capacity to attract foreign business 
and expand exports" (Shirk, 1994:39-40). 
The open-door policies successfully attracted large amount of FDis to the country (Gao, 
2005). However the Chinese government worried that these participations of foreign 
investors and competitors in the Chinese market since the 1980s, on the one hand, 
brought numerous advanced technologies and business expertise to the country (Cheung 
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and Lin, 2004}, on the other hand, might cause insufferable competition to domestic 
industries (Shirk, 1994:68) in which domestic companies, especially pre-reformed SOEs, 
were still relatively small in size and lacked advanced technologies in production, 
management and new product development. In order to protect domestic industries from 
too drastic international competition, many industrial foreign-invested companies were 
restricted by regulations from participating in the domestic market and thus mainly 
engaged in the export business in the mid-1980s (Sun et al., 2005). The Chinese 
government also maintained a high import tariff to increase the selling prices of many 
imported products and utilised import quotas to limit the quantity of many types of 
foreign products, especially electronic and machinery products, to be imported to the 
country (Shirk, 1994:68; Sun et al., 2005). Nevertheless, in order to meet the 
requirements raised by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as soon as possible, the 
Chinese government has gradually reduced the import restrictions since 1992 (Shirk, 
1994:67-8). 
The CCP leaders considered the accession to the WTO (formerly General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) was the requisite for China to reconnect to the international economy 
and accelerate the progress of economic reform (Lardy, 2002:9-21; Anderson, 1997). 
China made application for joining the WTO in 1986, but due to various political 
reasons the progress of the negotiation for WTO accession was very slow (Shirk, 
1994:70-71; Anderson, 1997). With the government's announcement for completely 
shifting China's economic system to market economy in 1992, the negotiation for WTO 
accession also entered to a new stage (Tuan and Ng, 2004). Since then, China, on the 
one hand, had been continuously negotiating with the leaguers of the WTO, on the other 
hand, had gradually adjusted the import restrictions to satisfy the trading requirements 
raised by WTO leaguers (Lardy, 2002:9-21). After 15 years of negotiation, China 
finally joined the WTO in 2001. 
As a part of the agreement for joining the WTO, China has made substantial market 
access commitments to industrial foreign-invested companies who for the first time 
were given trading and distribution rights in the domestic market (Sun et al., 2005). In 
73 
Chapter Four PEST Analysis of China 
addition to industrial sectors, China has agreed to relax foreign investment restrictions 
on many service sectors, including distribution services, telecommunications, insurance 
services and financial and banking services (Sun et al., 2005; Zeng, 2005). The Chinese 
government has also eliminated the import quotas by 2005, and gradually reduced the 
import tariff on industrial products from 24% to 9.4%, on vehicles from 100% to 25% 
and on vehicle parts to 10% (Lardy, 2006:76-80; Zeng, 2005; Sun et al., 2005). 
4.4.1.6 Informatization policies 
In order to survtve and compete under the new business environment, Chinese 
companies must achieve substantial improvements on productivity and operational 
efficiency by utilising advanced ITs. However, effective use of IT in companies depend 
on various national factors, such as the development of IT industry, the building of 
national IT infrastructure and the environment for using IT in the country. In other 
words, in order to facilitate the use of IT in companies, the country must first achieve 
informatization to a basic level. 
The Chinese government started developing the country's informatization in the mid-
1980s (Liu, 1996). For example, in 1986, the High Tech Research and Development 
Program which launched by the Chinese government regarded IT as one of the 
preferential fields for development (Liu, 1996). However, no profound efforts had been 
put to develop the national information network and information infrastructure until the 
early 1990s. 
The building of China's national information highway was started in 1993 when the 
government launched the Golden Bridge Project which aimed to form a national 
network across the whole country to link together all discrete and diverse networks 
nationwide and thus act as the backbone of China's national information infrastructure 
and the interface to international networks (Lovelock and Farhoomand, 1999). 
Accompanied with the Golden Bridge Project, another 13 golden projects were 
subsequently launched by the government to build various national networks and 
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electronic systems to satisfy a large set of government, economic, academic, social and 
enterprise requirements (Lovelock and Farhoomand, 1999). In the early 2000s, a new 
development strategy announced by the Sixteenth Central Committee of the CCP stated 
that China would utilise informatization to facilitate the development of the national 
industry. A mature national industry would in turn enable the country to achieve high 
level of informatization and modernization (China Economic Yearbook Editing 
Committee, 2004:111). The development of the IT industry has also been identified as 
the top priority in the country's lOth five-year national economic plan, which called for 
the government to invest US$151 billion over a period of five years (2001-2005) to 
further develop the national IT and telecommunication infrastructure (Quan et al., 2005). 
With continuous support of the government, the development of informatization in 
China has been significantly accelerated in the last ten years, and consequently 
facilitates the adoption of IT/IS in Chinese companies. 
4.4.1. 7 Conclusion of political dimension 
Economic, social and technological changes in a dictatorship of the proletariat regime, 
like China, are typically associated with political aims and policies. The understanding 
of the current situation in China and associated changes in political ideology enabled the 
researcher to better interpret and understand the remaining dimensions of PEST. 
Furthermore, this dimension enabled the identification of SOEs as the main driving 
force in Chinese economic politics. 
4.4.2 Economic dimension 
4.4.2.1 Prominent results since China's economic reform 
One major factor to understand economic situation of a country is the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). It serves as "the value of a nation's annual total production of goods 
and services and serves as a major indicator of economic growth" (Wright et al., 
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1996:26). According to Yusuf et al. (2006:3), in 1979, China's GDP was $177 billion 
of which more than half was generated by agriculture and the per capita GDP was only 
$183. China was among the world's poorest countries (Yusuf et al., 2006:3). During the 
last two decades, China has experienced remarkable economic growth at an average 
annual rate of over 9% (Keng, 2006; Zeng, 2005). By the end of 2005, China's GDP 
had risen to US$2.229 trillions of which 12.4% was generated by agriculture, 47.3% 
was generated by industry (41.8%) and construction (5.5%), and 40.3% was generated 
by service sectors, and the per capita GDP in 2005 rose to US$1740 (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, 2006a). In 2007, China is ranked the third-largest economy in the 
world behind the US and Japan. Furthermore, due to a set of political developments 
reported in the previous section, the Chinese economy has become increasingly open. 
China's annual amount of imports and exports had risen from US$20.6 billion in 1978 
to US$1422.1 billion by the end of 2005. Therefore, China has become the world's 
third-largest trading nation (Yusuf et al., 2006:3). As the world's second-largest 
recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Yusuf et al., 2006:3}, China's total 
accumulative FDI inflows had risen rapidly from US$1.8 billion in 1983 to US$620. 7 
billion2 in 2005. By the end of 2003, about 226,373 companies were set up in China by 
foreign investors from more than 180 countries (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2004 ). All these achievements so far have been unmatchable in the rest of the world 
(Zeng, 2005). 
It is obvious that, China's economic reform and recovery will significantly facilitate the 
IT/IS adoptions in the country from at least three dimensions: 
1) The government is able to generate sufficient capital to invest in the 
development of national informatization and IT industry which provides the 
fundamental for IT/IS adoption in organisations; 
2 The figure in 1983 was provided by Zeng (2005); the figure in 2005 was calculated based on the data provided by 
Zeng and the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006). 
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2) More citizens and employees are able to use IT and the Internet and hence 
develop certain computer and IT literacy skills and are more positive for using 
information systems in their workplaces; 
3) Domestic companies have experienced rapid growth in terms of revenue and 
company size, and hence have strong needs and sufficient capital for 
implementing IT/IS to strengthen their operations. 
4.4.2.2 Inequality of economic development 
Despite the rapid economic growth, China' s economic development manifests 
significant inequality between different cities and regions, in terms of income, education, 
living standards, transportations, purchasing power and FDI received etc. The best way 
to show the economic inequality in China is to use the per capita GDP generated by 
different regions of the country (Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.3: Per capita GDP of different regions in China in 2002 
(Source: Klotz, 2004) 
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As shown in Figure 4.3, the seven regions (Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Tianjin and Beijing) with the per capita GDP above US$ 1,600 in 2002 are all 
coastal regions and located in eastern China. In contrast, the per capita GDP of most 
inland regions is between US$ 400 to US$ 800. Table 4.1 shows more economic data of 
the seven coastal regions ranking by their regional GDP in 2003. 
Region Regional GDP Percentage Regional Percentage of Number of 
(RMB 100 of national FDI national FDI industrial SOEs 
million) GDP (US$1 0,000) (unit) 
Guangdong 13625.9 11.7% 782,294 14.6% 2,103 
Jiangsu 12460.8 10.7% 1,056,365 19.7% 1,242 
Zhejiang 9395 8.1% 498,055 9.3% 861 
Shanghai 6250.8 5.4% 546,849 10.2% 1,606 
Fujian 5232.2 4.5% 259,903 4.9% 888 
Beijing 3663.1 3.1% 219,126 4.1% 1,362 
Tianjin 2447.7 2.1% 153,473 2.9% 1,625 
Total 45.6% 65.7% 
Table 4.1: Economic data of the seven coastal regions in China in 2003. 
(Source: summarized from table 3-11, 18-16 and 14-2 ofChina Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2004) 
As shown in the table, the regional GDP and FDI of these seven coastal regions 
respectively accounts for 45.6% and 65.7% of the country's total in 2003. The reasons 
causing unbalance economic development between coastal regions and inland regions 
are complicated. Historically, as can be found out from the words of Zhao Ziyang, the 
General Secretary of the CCP in 1988 (quoted by Shirk, 1994:39-40), economic 
differences between coastal and inland regions existed for a long time and thus caused 
that labour quality and technological capabilities of coastal regions were better than 
those of inland regions. Therefore, as discussed in section 4.4.1.5, when the CCP 
decided to open the domestic market to foreign investors in 1979, coastal regions were 
opened first and given freedom to conduct various types of market economic 
experiments which eventually led coastal regions become the vanguard of the country's 
economic reform and achieve rapid economic growth. 
As analysed in the previous section, the development of economy provides various 
positive impacts for IT adoptions. Thus it can be argued that the general level of IT 
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utilization in the coastal regions is much better than that of the inland regions. This 
argument is further demonstrated by the statistical data giving in section 4.4.4.1 which 
shows the number of netizens (users of the Internet) in the seven coastal regions 
accounted for 40.7% of the country's total in 2005 and more than 95% of the 
populations in many inland regions still cannot get access to the Internet. This evidence 
clearly shows that, coastal regions rather than inland regions will be more suitable to 
carry out this research. On the other hand, the number of netizens of Guangdong (a 
southern coastal province in China) is the highest among the seven coastal regions of 
the country. In fact, as shown in table 4.1, Guangdong also has the highest regional 
GDP and the second highest regional FDI among the seven coastal regions in 2003. In 
truth, Guangdong is the first region that has been opened up to foreign investors. As 
mentioned in section 4.4.1.5, three of the four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
established in 1979 are located in Guangdong province. Consequently, Guangdong 
presents itself as an ideal context for conducting this research study. 
4.4.2.3 Companies operating in contemporary China 
The economic and SOE reform, discussed in section 4.4.1, results in companies with 
diverse ownerships emerging and competing in the Chinese market. As shown in Figure 
4.4, companies operating in contemporary China can be categorised as SOEs (including 
wholly state-owned companies and state-controlled companies) and non-SOEs 
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Year SOEas% Non-SOE as SOE assets Average Average %of %of 
of all %of all as% of total asset size of asset size of loss- loss-
industrial industrial industrial SOEs non-SOEs making making 
enterprises enterprises Assets (RMB mn) (RMB mn) SOEs non-
SOEs 
1999 37 63 68 134 36 41 22 
2000 34 66 67 155 39 35 19 
2001 28 72 65 184 39 36 19 
2002 24 76 62 210 40 35 17 
2003 19 81 57 260 46 36 15 
2004 15 85 53 317 50 40 18 
2005 10 90 48 428 52 
2006 8 92 46 541 56 
Table 4.2: Current status of SOEs and non-SOEs in the industrial sector. 
(Source: data from 1999 to 2004 are obtained from table 1.1, Garnaut et al., 2005 :8; data in 2005 and 2006 are 
obtained from the China Statistics Yearbook in recent years). 
It should be noted that according to National Statistics Bureaus of China (NSBC), all 
Chinese SOEs are industrial companies, while 70% of them are in the manufacturing 
industry, 6% are in the mining industry and 24% are in the industry of production and 
supply of electric power, gas and water. As shown in table 4.2, in the industrial sector, 
the number of SOEs has reduced significantly since 1999 and they accounted for only 
8% of all industrial enterprises in 2006. In contrast, the number of non-SOEs has been 
continuously increasing. However, despite this reduction in numbers, SOEs still held 
more than 46% of the total industrial assets in 2006. The average asset value held by 
SOEs has been dramatically increasing year by year. In 2006, the assets held by SOEs 
were in average valued at RMB 541 million which was almost 1 0 times higher than the 
average asset value of non-SOEs (RMB 56 million). These phenomena demonstrate that, 
with the 'zhuada fangxiao' policy (discussed in section 4.4.1.4), large amount of small 
and medium-size SOEs have been leased or sold and thus fallen in the group of non-
SOEs, while the remainder SOEs that are still owned or controlled by the state are 
generally large-size SOEs holding a large amount of the assets and resources of the 
country and thus playing an extremely crucial role in the country's economy. Based on 
these facts, it can be concluded that, in comparison to private and foreign companies, 
SOEs currently are still the most important type of company to China's economy. 
Therefore, Chinese SOEs present to be a very adequate context to carry out this study. 
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However, as shown in the table, loss-making SOEs account for 40% of all SOEs in the 
industry. In contrast with non-SOEs of which 82% are profit making, operational 
efficiency of SOEs seems to be much poorer than non-SOEs. In truth, it is widely 
recognised that SOEs in China are 'big' enough (e.g. in company sizes and assets) but 
not 'strong' enough (e.g. has low international competitiveness; many are loss-making 
or just reaching the break even point). Hence, there are urgent needs for SOEs to 
further improve their operation and management modes in order to enhance their core 
competitive capability and improve operational efficiency by utilizing advanced 
information technologies (e.g. ERP). This also further supports that a study on ERP 
exploitation in the context of Chinese SOEs would be both meaningful and significant. 
Additionally, as discussed earlier, contemporary SOEs are either wholly owned or 
majority owned by the state (Giles et al, 2006; Cai and Tylecote, 2005), as shown in 
Figure 4.4. As discussed in section 4.4.1.4, since the state is the owner or the largest 
shareholder of SOEs, it holds the ultimate controlling role in these companies (Qiang, 
2003). Under this condition, wholly SOEs and majority SOEs currently have very 
similar context in terms of corporate governance, organisational culture, rules, 
structures and work behaviour, etc (Zhao, 2005; Cai and Tylecote, 2005; Tylecote and 
Cai, 2004; Zhang, 2004; Jiang, 2003; Qiang, 2003; Huang, 2002). Due to these 
contextual similarities, wholly SOEs and majority SOEs often share the same 
characteristics and problems in the development and use of technologies (Tylecote and 
Cai, 2004; Cai and Tylecote, 2005). Based on these facts, it was considered not 
necessary to study these two types of SOEs separately in this project, which focused on 
the use and exploitation of technology (i.e. ERP system) in the context of Chinese SOEs. 
4.4.2.4 The manufacturing industry of China 
As discussed in the political section of this PEST analysis, in order to enable the 
country to achieve high level of industrialisation and modernisation, the Chinese 
government has set the development of the manufacturing industry as a top priority in 
the political agenda since the 1980s. 
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As a consequence, China's manufacturing industry has achieved continuous and rapid 
development during the last few decades. The development of the national 
manufacturing industry has been further boosted since China jointed the WTO in 2001 
(Yang and Li, 2005). In particular, the industrial output value of China's manufacturing 
industry has increased from RMB 8,443 billion in 2001 to RMB 27,457 billion in 2006, 
which represents an average annual growth rate of 65% (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2007). With such a rapid development, China has now become the world's 
manufacturing centre. According to the statistics provided by the NSBC (2007), the 
annual export amount of China reached US$969.1 billion in 2006. Additionally, and 
more importantly, more than 39% of China's national GDP was generated by the 
manufacturing industry from 2000 to 2004 (NBSC, 2005). These statistical evidence 
prove that, the manufacturing sector is the pillar of China's national economy. 
As classified by the NSBC, China's manufacturing industry consists of 31 sub-sectors. 
Among these, the top 8 manufacturing sectors contribute to more than 50% of the total 
industrial output of the country, as shown in table 4.3. The electronic and 
telecommunication equipment manufacturing sector in China proves to be particularly 
important, since its industrial output accounts for more than 10% of the total of the 
national industry. 
Manufacturing sector 
Industrial output % of the total 
(RMB l billion) of the entire 
industry 
Electronic and telecommunication equipment 3,307.8 10.4 
manufacturing sector 
Ferrous metals smelting and manufacturing sector 2,540.4 8 
Chemical manufacturing sector 2,044.9 6.5 
Transport equipment manufacturing sector 2,038.2 6.4 
Electrical machinery manufacturing sector 1,816.6 5.7 
Textile manufacturing sector 1,531.6 4.8 
Petrochemical manufacturing sector 1,514.9 4.8 
Building material manufacturing sector 1,373.5 4.3 
Total of the top 8 manufacturing sectors 16,114.4 50.9 
Table 4.3: Industrial output of the top 8 manufacturing sectors in China in 2006 
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In truth, because electronic and telecommunication products (e.g. PCs, mainframe 
computers, cables, etc) are necessities for building the national and local IT 
infrastructure, this electronic and telecommunication sector is closely related with the IT 
industry (Wang and Li, 2004). As a consequence, companies in this sector are often 
pioneers for IT and IS adoption (Editing Department of Yearbook of the PRC, 2004 ). 
Moreover, according to a report provided by the Guanghua Management School of the 
University of Beijing (2006), many Chinese companies in this sector had passed the 
stage for implementing ERP, and engaged in the post-adoption phase for optimising of 
their ERP systems. Consequently, the electronic and telecommunication equipment 
manufacturing sector presents itself to be a suitable sector for a study of ERP post-
adoption. 
4.4.2.5 Conclusion of economic dimension 
A number of important facts were identified from the analysis of the economic 
dimension. Firstly, the southern coastal province, Guangdong, presents itself to be the 
most prominent region in China. Specifically, Guangdong was the pioneer of China's 
economic reform, and also the first region that was open to foreign investments in the 
1980s. It has the highest regional GDP and the second highest regional FDI among the 
31 regions in the entire China. In addition, the number of netizens in Guangdong has 
also been the highest in the country. As a result, Guangdong presents itself as a region 
where the use of IS in organisations is mature enough to allow an exploration of post-
implementation issues of ERP systems. Secondly, although the number of SOEs has 
been significantly reduced due to the national SOE reform, this type of company still 
holds more than 50% of the total industrial assets in China. In other words, SOEs 
currently play a crucial role in sustaining the continuous development of China's 
national economy. A study on China's SOEs is therefore important and meaningful. 
Thirdly, China's electronic and telecommunication manufacturing sector is a core 
segment of the country's industry. It was also identified that companies in this sector 
should have achieved high level of utilisation of IS in general and of ERP in particular. 
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Therefore, this manufacturing sector seems to offer a desirable context for a study of 
ERP post-implementation. 
Overall, these realisations and facts led the researcher to select SOEs in the electronic 
and telecommunication manufacturing sector in the Guangdong province as suitable 
context for carrying out this project. Additionally, modem Chinese SOEs refer to 
enterprises that are either wholly owned or majority owned by the state. Because 
wholly and majority SOEs currently prove to have very similar context and 
characteristics for the use of technologies, they were not studied separately in this 
research. 
4.4.3 Social dimension 
4.4.3.1 Employment educational level 
As discussed in section 4.2, China's education system was completely broken down 
during the period of Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. Although the education 
system has been rebuilt during the last two decades, the impacts of Cultural Revolution 
can still be found in contemporary China. According to official data provided by the 
China Labour Statistical Yearbook, by the end of 2003, 7.1% of China's workforces 
were illiterate or semi-illiterate, more than 72% of China's workforces had graduated 
from only primary or secondary school, and 85.2% of departmental heads and 85.7% of 
professional and technical personnel in the country did not attain a university bachelor 
degree. Although individual capabilities of managers and employees cannot be simply 
measured by educational qualification, low education level is definitely an obstacle for 
Chinese managers and employees to accept, learn and use new technologies and 
scientific concepts which seem incomprehensible to them. Low-educated employees 
may often cause significant resistances when implementing and using ERP systems in 
companies (Wright and Donaldson, 2002; Sherer and Alter, 2004), since this type of 
employee will be less willing to change the traditional ways in which they do their jobs. 
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In order to increase the national education level, the Chinese government has required 
and facilitated the domestic education institutions, especially universities, to increase 
the recruitment number of new students since 1999. As a result, the number of annual 
university graduates was rapidly increased from around 1 million in 1999 to 3.38 
million in 2005, and there will be another 4.13 million students graduated in 2006 
(China education and research network, 2005). With retirement and layoff of current 
employees and the entering of new graduates, it can be anticipated that the total 
educational level of China's workforce will be fundamentally changed in the future. 
However, although the national situation of the employment educational level can be 
described as above, the actual employment educational levels of different types of 
companies in China are varied and difficult to describe. No statistical data is found to 
illustrate the employment educational levels of various types of companies in China. 
Nevertheless, it is generally recognised that foreign-invested firms have higher 
education requirements on their employees than Chinese firms, and high-skilled and 
high-educated individuals are more interested in working in large-size firms rather than 
SMEs in China. SOEs, especially non-reformed SOEs might still have thousands of 
low-educated employees that have been working in the firm for more than three decades. 
4.4.3.2 Chinese culture and its organisational impacts 
Culture, as defined by Hofstede (1997:5), is the "collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another". 
Hofstede (1997:5, 10) points out that culture shapes a person's patterns of thinking, 
feeling and potential acting and has many types, e.g. national culture of a country and 
organisational culture of a company. Therefore, because organisational culture (which 
shapes employees' patterns of organisational thinking, feeling and acting) is embedded 
within national culture, differences on national cultures cause differences on 
organisational cultures and employees' organisational behaviours. 
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Hofstede's studies (1997; 2001) investigate the cultural differences of more than 50 
countries in the world according to five dimensions: power distance, collectivism vs. 
individualism, femininity vs. masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term vs. 
short term orientation. Based on Hofstede's study, one conclusion can be drawn is that 
the Chinese culture is fundamentally different from that of western countries in terms of 
high power distance, low individualism and low uncertainty avoidance, etc. Many 
recent studies (Martinsons and Westwood, 1997; Martinsons and Hempel, 1998; 
Reimers, 2002; Liang and Xue, 2004; Zhang et al., 2005) thus demonstrate that the 
unique Chinese culture partially shapes the ways that Chinese people conduct 
organisational and business activities and influences the implementation and use of 
IS/ERP in Chinese companies. 
Based on the analysis of Martinsons and Westwood (1997), the Hofstede's dimensions 
of power distance and uncertainty avoidance have an important impact in the use and 
exploitation of IT and ERPs. 
The high power distances of the Chinese result in very centralized decision making and 
directive management systems in China's companies (Martinsons and Westwood, 1997; 
Martinsons and Hempel, 1998), in detail: 
most important decisions of Chinese companies are made by the top managers; 
the information flows in Chinese enterprises generally follow the direction of 
top-down directives and bottom-up reporting; 
subordinates tend to follow the directives of their supenors rather than to 
question the suitability of the superior's decisions. 
Survey findings of Reimers (2002) show that centralized decision making renders many 
negative impacts for ERP implementation in China's companies in at least two ways: 
first, centralized decision making in the steering committee may lead to some delay in 
the decision making process thus causing schedule and possibly budget overruns of the 
ERP project; second, centralized decision making enables senior management to 
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unilaterally change some project parameters and thus increases the possibility for 
making mistakes. Pei (2005) finds in her case study that because Chinese employees 
generally accept work as assignment from their managers without knowing the reasons 
of doing so and have relatively low motivation of working as a member of a team, it is 
difficult for Chinese companies to form an effective project team to ensure the success 
of ERP implementation. In addition, the centralized decision making and top-down 
directive and bottom-up reporting approach in Chinese companies reduces the need and 
willingness to exchange information between managers and across departments of the 
company and thus become a significant constraint on IS/ERP implementation and use 
(Martinsons and Westwood, 1997; Martinsons and Hempel, 1998). 
The cultural characteristic of low uncertainty avoidance results that Chinese people are 
more tolerant of uncertainty and unclear information, and tend to accept situations as 
they are rather than to predict and control the situations (Martinsons and Westwood, 
1997). Thus, Chinese managers are less inclined to use systematic procedures and 
explicit information to tailor business plans and forecasts to predict the uncertain future 
(Martinsons and Westwood, 1997; Martinsons and Hempel, 1998). Also instead of 
conducting a rational analysis of data related to a specific problem, Chinese managers 
are inclined to make their decisions based on subjective experience, common sense and 
intuition (Martinsons and Westwood, 1997). Since a major purpose for using ERP is to 
collect comprehensive sets of data to support business planning and decision making, it 
can be argued that Chinese managers will not be willing to fully utilise such data and 
thus underutilise the full power of their ERP systems. Reimers (2002) reinforces that 
managers in traditional Chinese companies do not trust the data provided and the 
suggestions made by the ERP systems and they tend to modify the (production and 
purchasing) quantities recommended by the system based on their own experiences. 
Martinsons and Westwood (1997) conclude that the IT investments in Chinese 
companies typically aim to automate, control and monitor the company's basic 
operations rather than to improve business planning and decision making. 
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Furthermore, Martinsons and Westwood (1997) point out that westerners tend to use 
low context forms of communications which enable them to directly convey meaning of 
a message into explicit and elaborate codes (e.g. words and numbers) and therefore 
facilitate the use of MIS in western companies. In contrast, due to cultural specific traits, 
Chinese people tend to use high context and implicit forms of communications. 
"Chinese messages are comparatively terse in words but rich in meaning. Subtle cues 
are used to enrich the explicit content. Audible clues, such as tone, dynamics and any 
hesitation in response, together with facial expressions and body language must be 
perceived and interpreted in order to fully understand the words being communicated" 
(Martinsons and Westwood, 1997). Therefore, Martinsons and Westwood argue that 
high context forms of communications may make use of MIS in Chinese organisations 
both difficult and undesirable. 
The Chinese culture also results in a special form of relationships among Chinese 
people which is called Guanxi. Guanxi, a Chinese term, is commonly defined as the 
special personal relationship/connection between two persons (e.g. friends, superiors 
and subordinates, businessmen and government officers, and business partners) with 
one needing something and the other one having the ability to give something (Suet al, 
2003; Fan, 2002). Guanxi can be understood as the phenomenon that people develop 
extensive networks of interpersonal relationships to exchange favours and reciprocally 
share scarce resources and cope with uncertainties (Suet al, 2003). In China, guanxi is 
the most important personal social asset (Fan, 2002). Individuals spend most of their 
time on building their guanxi networks, especially with superiors, governmental officers 
or business partners, and utilise such personal assets in finding solutions for business 
problems and acquiring additional resources for their companies (Fan, 2002; Martinsons 
and Hempel, 1998; Lowe, 2003: 12). As a result, guanxi networks of people within or 
between Chinese organisations are always complicated. However, the approach for 
utilizing guanxi to solve problems and acquire additional resources actually causes 
many personnel issues (e.g. corruption, unfair competition etc) in China's companies. 
From the perspectives of IS, guanxi networks can create significant barriers of 
communications and cause difficulties for information sharing and use of IS in Chinese 
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organisations. Chinese people consider information as a major personal asset which is 
rarely broadcasted or made accessible to a large audience (Martinsons and Hempel, 
1998). Information exchanges and sharing within Chinese companies do depend on the 
nature of the relationship/guanxi between those communicating (Martinsons and 
Westwood, 1997). In other words, Chinese people may only be willing to exchange 
important information with those who they trust and have good guanxi, instead of 
sharing the information freely across the whole organisation. This phenomenon can 
actually cause difficulties and resistances for using IS/ERP in Chinese companies, when 
IS, especially ERP, aims to facilitate information to be shared smoothly and freely 
throughout the whole company. 
4.4.3.3 Conclusion of social dimension 
The analysis of social and cultural issues clearly indicates that these issues can 
significantly affect working behaviours of Chinese people and the use of IS in Chinese 
companies. The social and cultural factors identified in this section actually provided a 
basis for the researcher to identify potential cultural and organisational barriers that 
Chinese firms may encounter during ERP exploitation. 
4.4.4 Technological dimension 
Since the main subject studied in this research project is information technology, this 
section will specifically focus on the current development and use of information 
technologies in China rather than on other technologies. 
4.4.4.1 Popularization of computers and the Internet in China 
According to the official data provided by the China Internet Network Information 
Center, by October 1997, the number of netizens (users of the Internet) in China was 
only 0.62 million and there were only 0.3 million PCs can be used to access to the 
Internet. With the rapid development of inforrnatization in China, the number of 
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netizens and the number of PCs that can access to the Internet had risen to 111 million 
and 49.5 million by the end of 2005 (China Internet Network Information Center, 2006). 
The total number of desktops in the country had also risen from 6.3 million in 1996 to 
53 million in 2004 (Gong, 2002; Shanghai Electronics Manufacturing Profession 
Association, 2005). However, when taking China's total population into account, the 
levels of computer and Internet popularization in China are still very low. As shown in 
table 4.4, 24.7 persons in average occupied one PC in China in 2004, whereas in the 
developed countries, almost one or two persons would have a PC. 
Country Number ofPCs (10,000 sets) Persons per PC 
USA 22300 1.32 
UK 3589 1.68 
Gennany 4630 1.78 
Japan 6920 1.84 
China 5299 24.7 
Table 4.4: Persons per PC in China and the developed countries in 2004 
(Source: recalculated from data given by Shanghai Electrical Manufacturing Profession Association, 2005) 
Based on the statistical report of the 17th China Internet development survey provided 
by the China Internet Network Information Center, the number of China's netizens had 
risen to 111 million in 2005 and China is now the second largest Internet-using country 
in the world behind the US. Among the 111 million netizens, 29.1 million netizens 
connected to the internet via leased lines (e.g. netizens who first connect to LAN via the 
Ethernet and then connect to the Internet via leased lines), 51 million via dial-up or 
ISDN, and 64.3 million via broadband (e.g. ADSL, Cable Modem etc). The number of 
netizens that connect to the Internet via broadband has been raised most rapidly from 
6.6 million in 2002 to 64.3 million in 2005. Note that the total number of netizens by 
method of connection exceeds the Ill million total netizens because the report double 
counts netizens that reported accessing the Internet at the office and at home. However, 
the report also mentions that the number of China's netizens only accounted for 8.5% of 
the country's total population, and the usage of the Internet in China has manifested 
significant inequality by regions. According to the report, the numbers of netizens in 
many inland regions were less than 2% of the country's total (e.g. 0.1% in Tibet, 0.2% 
in Qinghai, 0.3% in Ningxia, 0.6% in Hainan), and more than 95% of the population in 
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many inland regions cannot access to the Internet. In contrast, the usage of the Internet 
in coastal regions is much better than that of the inland regions. Table 4.5 takes the 
seven coastal regions mentioned in section 4.4.2.2 as examples to show the usage of the 
Internet in coastal regions. 
Region Number of Regional number of Regional number of 
netizens in the netizens as% of the total netizens as % of regional 
region ( 1 0,000) in the country population 
Guangdong 1486 13.4 17.9 
Jiangsu 790 7.1 10.6 
Zhejiang 707 6.4 15.0 
Shanghai 463 4.2 26.6 
Fujian 428 3.9 28.7 
Beijing 397 3.6 11.3 
Tianjin 229 2.1 22.4 
Table 4.5: Popularization of the Internet in the seven coastal regions in 2005 
(Source: extracted from table 4.2 in Statistical Report of China's Internet Development Status, China 
Internet Network Information Center, 2006) 
As shown in the table, 40.7% of the country's netizens were located in the seven coastal 
regions and in average 19% of population in the seven coastal regions can access to the 
Internet. Guangdong, the southern coastal province that has been chosen for conducting 
this research project, has almost 1.5 million netizens and accounts for 13.4% of the 
country's total. 
In addition, the information available on the Internet was greatly enriched in recent 
years. There was a total of 668,900 websites in the country in 2004, of which 60.7% 
were company websites, 13.6% were personal websites, 11.4% were commercial 
websites, 4.6% were educational websites, 4.6% were other public websites, and 3.6% 
were government websites (China Internet Network Information Center, 2005b ). The 
netizens can retrieve large amount of information through the Internet, including news, 
journal articles, government policies, company information, product details, market 
analysis and research reports etc. Official statistics (China Internet Network Information 
Center, 2006) shows that, in 2005, the Internet services that netizens frequently use 
include: news browse (67.9%), search engines (65.7), email (64.7%), synchronous 
communication tools (41.9%), online forums (41.6%) and online shopping (24.5%). 
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4.4.4.2 Development of informatization in China 
In fact, the rapid popularization of the Internet in China is mainly boosted by the rapid 
development of informatization in terms of information network and information 
infrastructure building in the country. As mentioned in section 4.4.1.6, the building of 
China's national information highway was started in 1993. After more than ten years of 
effort, China has now built up a modem information network which covers more than 
2000 cities in the country and links to all major international networks in the world 
(China Economic Yearbook Editing Committee, 2004:111). It however should be 
pointed out that despite this network building, Chinese netizens often would not be able 
to access to international websites freely, due to Internet control by the Chinese 
government. Moreover, China currently has 9 network operators who form the 
backbone of China's networking infrastructure and have around 200 Internet service 
providers (ISPs) who can provide Internet services across different provinces (UNDP-
APDIP, 2006). According to the survey of the China Internet Network Information 
Center (2006), the total international intemet bandwidth provided by the 9 network 
operators in 2005 was 136,106 megabyte per second (Mbps) which was almost 49 times 
higher than the total international intemet bandwidth of the country (2799 Mbps) in 
2000. The international intemet bandwidth provided by the three largest networks 
(China Public Computer Net, China Network Communication and China Scientific Net) 
respectively reached 70,622 Mbps, 38,941 Mbps and 15,120 Mbps in 2005 (China 
Internet Network Information Center, 2006). Wide geographical coverage and large 
network bandwidth enable Chinese netizens to be easier and quicker to access to the 
Internet and communicate with people all around the world and thus facilitate the rapid 
popularization of the Internet in China. However, it should be recognised that China's 
networking infrastructure development still lags far behind the developed countries. 
Data gathered by Chon (2002) shows that the international internet bandwidth of New 
York in USA, London in UK and Amsterdam in Netherlands has already reached 
149,835 Mbps, 85,519 Mbps and 24,480 Mbps respectively by 2002. 
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4.4.4.3 Development ofinformatization in China's companies 
In order to survive and compete under the drastic market competition, Chinese 
companies have invested heavily in IT in recent years. Around 70% of large and 
medium size domestic enterprises have established company websites by 2002 (Gong, 
2002). In 2004, the number of company websites reached 446,156 and accounted for 
60.7% of the total number of websites in the country. 32% and 24% of the company 
websites were created respectively by manufacturing companies and IT companies, and 
11.3% of the company websites contained online trading functions (China Internet 
Network Information Center, 2005b). Many leading domestic companies have 
successfully conducted e-business activities, such as e-commerce, e-purchasing and e-
collaboration, to increase sales and reduce transactional cost since 2001 (Gong, 2004). 
According to China Center for Information Industry Development (CCID) Consulting 
(quoted in China Economic Yearbook Editing Committee, 2004:114), China's business-
to-consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) trading amount reached to RMB 5.2 
billion and RMB 270.4 billion in 2003. The success of e-business application in many 
leading companies was based on the implementation of enterprise management systems 
(including ERP, SCM, CRM and PLM etc). As reported by Analysys International 
(2006), in the fourth quarter of 2005, China's enterprise management software market 
size reached RMB 1.6 billion, increasing 26.1% year on year and 13% quarter on 
quarter. Since China aims to utilise informatization to drive the development of 
industrialization (as mentioned in section 4.4.1.6), manufacturing companies as the 
main part of China's industrial sector have been the major investors of enterprise 
management systems. Nevertheless, other sectors such as construction, energy, 
transportation and other services sectors also invested heavily in these information 
systems. According to CCW Research (quoted by Zuo, 2005), IT investments of the 
manufacturing sector reached RMB 24.5 billion in 2004, of which 61% were on 
hardware and IT infrastructure building and 39% were for IS development and IT 
services outsourcing. Furthermore, 50% were invested by large-size manufacturing 
companies and 33.2% were invested by medium-size manufacturing companies. 
Another report provided by Wang (2006) shows that, IS investments of manufacturing 
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companies in recent years consisted of approximately 63% on ERP systems, 12% on 
SCM systems, 6% on CRM systems, 8% on PLM systems and 11% on other types of 
information systems. It is also reported that after successfully implementing ERP 
systems, many large manufacturing companies started to invest in SCM and CRM 
systems to improve their relationships with suppliers, customers and business partners. 
On the other hand, IT investments from small-size manufacturing companies were still 
relatively small since many small-size companies lacked sufficient investment capital 
and lacked consciousness for using IT to improve business performance (Zuo, 2005). 
Nevertheless, according to the national statistics bureau, the number of small-sized 
companies accounted for 88% of the total of companies in the industrial sector. Small-
sized companies therefore represent a huge market for potential IT investments. In 
addition, many small-size companies in China are actually involved in the supply chains 
of large and medium-size companies in the industrial sector and act as distributors, 
component manufacturers and regional agencies of large and medium-size companies. 
Hence, while large and medium-size firms invest heavily in IT, they will also require 
and drive small-size firms in the same supply chain to utilize IT to improve internal 
performance in order to increase the operational efficiency of the whole supply chain. 
4.4.4.4 Development of the Chinese ERP market 
The core of informatization development in China's companies is to utilise enterprise 
management systems to improve their daily performance. An efficiently operating ERP 
system is the prerequisite for implementing their policies and the backbone to support 
other types of enterprise management systems (e.g. CRM and SCM). Due to this fact, 
China's ERP market size has been increasing rapidly in recent years. The ERP market 
size in Mainland China was around US$70 million in 2000 (CCID Consulting, quoted 
by Xue et al, 2005). CCID Consulting, cited by Zhang et al (2005), reports that China's 
ERP sales reached US$226.9 million in 2003 and will grow at an estimated rate of 
23.5% and reach US$652.8 million in 2008. A later report ofCCID Consulting, cited by 
Wang (2006), states that China's ERP sales reached US$289.96 million in 2004. When 
taking the global ERP market which reached US$23.65 billion in 2004 (ARM Research, 
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2005) into consideration, China's ERP sales accounted for 1.2% of the global ERP 
market. In fact, the ERP market in China has experienced more than 20 years evolution 
which consists of four periods as discussed below. 
Introductory period (1980s) 
MRP and MRP II, the former generations of ERP, were introduced to China's 
companies in the 1980s and used by a few large manufacturing SOEs. However, since 
China's economic reform had just started, the competition in the market was not strong 
and not many entrepreneurs and managers had the consciousness to use information 
systems to improve business performance (Zhou et al, 2005:1-2). On the other hand, 
since all MRP and MRP II systems were imported from foreign vendors, significant 
misfits occurred when the systems were implemented in Chinese firms (Zhou et al, 
2005:1-2). Consequently, the MRP/MRP II usage and successful implementation rate in 
China were extremely low. Nevertheless, many Chinese firms started recognising the 
development and impacts of MRP and MRP II systems during this period (Zhou et al, 
2005:1-2). 
Developing period (1 990 - 1996) 
This second period saw the concept of ERP system being introduced to China's 
companies. With the implementation of economic reform and 'open door' policies, the 
competition of domestic market was significantly increased. Domestic companies 
started recognising that, their traditional management mode had to be replaced by a 
scientific and advanced one in order to adapt the environmental changes in the market 
economy (Zhou et al, 2005:2-3). Such change on people's notion provided the 
prerequisite and increased the probabilities for domestic companies to implement ERP 
in the future. However because the domestic ERP market in this period was dominated 
by foreign ERP vendors whose products were complicated and expensive and the IT 
infrastructure development of many Chinese firms was still poor, the major ERP 
adopters in this stage were foreign invested and joint-venture companies (Zhou et al, 
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2005:2-3). Nevertheless, the emergence and implementation of foreign ERP systems in 
China elicited the germination and development of domestic ERP vendors (Zhou et al, 
2005:2-3). 
Exploiting period (1997- 2003) 
After the product research and development in 1997, two major domestic financial 
software vendors, UFIDA (former UFSoft) and Kingdee successfully launched their 
ERP systems: UFERP and Kingdee K/3 ERP in 1998 and transformed from financial 
software vendors to enterprise management software vendors. In reality, many domestic 
ERP vendors have gradually emerged since 2000, e.g. LangChao Genersoft, Digital 
China, NewGrand, Bocsoft and hundreds of small ERP vendors. In 2000, the domestic 
ERP market was still dominated by foreign ERP vendors who totally held 81.6% of the 
market share (Li, 2004a). SAP was the biggest player in the domestic market and took 
30% of the market share in 2000 (IDC, cited by ChinaByte, 2003). Nevertheless, the 
structure of China's ERP market has been gradually changing in 2001. As reported by 
CCID Consulting (quoted by Xue et al, 2005), in 2001, the top eight players hold 76% 
of the ERP market, with six Chinese domestic companies holding 51.7% and two 
foreign ERP leaders holding 24.3% market share. The market share of SAP reduced 
from 30% in 2000 to 16.9% in 2001, while three domestic ERP vendors, UFIDA, 
Kingdee and LangChao Genersoft, respectively took 16.2%, 13.2% and 10.3% market 
share in this year. In 2002, UFIDA, for its first time, beat SAP and became the biggest 
player in the domestic ERP market (CCID Consulting, quoted by BeijingBusinessToday, 
2003). Domestic vendors further consolidated their market positions and dominated the 
national market by holding 79% of the market share in 2003 (CCW Research, 2004). 
Since then, the competition of the domestic ERP market has become increasingly 
drastic. Foreign ERP vendors, led by SAP and Oracle, were most welcomed by high-
end enterprises due to the advanced technologies, comprehensive functions and high 
stability of their systems, whereas domestic ERP vendors, led by UFIDA and Kingdee, 
were largely accepted by low-end companies due to the low-cost and localized features 
of their products (Chen, 2005). In order to attract more customers and increase market 
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shares, domestic vendors, on the one hand, strived to improve the functionalities of their 
products while on the other hand, foreign vendors aimed to further localize their 
systems. As a result, both foreign and Chinese ERP vendors achieved significant 
development during this period of time. 
Popularising period (2004- present) 
During the developing period discussed above, most large enterprises have implemented 
ERP systems and some of them have started investing on SCM and CRM systems to 
address the external supply chain. However, according to the China Internet Network 
Information Center (quoted by Zhou et al, 2005:5), China has more than 3.6 million 
SMEs which accounted for 95.9% of the total number of companies in the country, but 
80% SMEs still had not implemented ERP systems by 2004. In order to popularise the 
use of ERP systems in China, SME is the major sector that must be addressed. 
Consequently, a set of ERP packages (e.g. SAP Business One, UFIDA's U860) 
emerged to address the SME ERP market. Moreover, in order to build up a strong sales 
network to cover all sectors and regions of the country, the major ERP vendors, 
especially UFIDA and SAP, formed long-term partnerships with thousands of local 
agencies and provide them with substantial trainings and supports to ensure local 
agencies can render professional and wide-range IT services (including system 
implementation consultation, staff training, system management and maintenance 
outsourcing) to customers (Li, 2004b; CCW Research, 2005a, 2005b ). Hence, in the 
popularising period, driven by the major ERP vendors, the whole domestic ERP/IT 
industry has achieved significant development which benefits numerous current and 
future ERP users. 
4.4.4.5 Conclusion of technological dimension 
The analysis of IT development and usage in China clearly indicates that studies of IS 
post-implementation are now not only topical, but probably highly desirable. In 
particular, and due to the large investment in ERP systems (thousands of Chinese 
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companies have implemented these systems), it is clear that studies focusing on ERP 
post-implementation issues are now required to provide a vision of their utility, 
associated business advantages and risks. 
4.4.5 Summary of PEST analysis 
China's political system can be described in two parts: first, the CCP is the dominating 
party and the core of leadership in China by setting directions for the country; second, 
the country is governed by the State Council (also known as the central government of 
China) who is responsible to the National People's Congress. 
China's economic status and national environment have been profoundly changed due 
to the economic reform accompanied with the SOE reform and opening up to the 
outside world since 1978. China has experienced a continuous economic growth with an 
annual rate of 9% during the last two decades as a result of this economic reform. The 
strong economic development enabled the government to generate sufficient capital to 
invest in the building of the national IT infrastructure and IT industry and thus provide 
the prerequisite for IT and IS adoptions in the country. However, China's economic 
development is extremely unbalanced. Statistical data shows that economic 
development in coastal regions is much faster than that of inland regions. Slow 
economic growth causes insufficient IT development and utilization in inland regions. 
On the other hand, due to the economic and SOE reform, various types of companies, 
e.g. SOEs, private companies and foreign companies etc, have emerged and compete in 
the domestic market. However, two social issues are considered to affect the use and 
implementation of ERP systems in companies operating in China. The first one is 
China's low-educated labour force. It is considered that low-educated workforces may 
be less willing to change the traditional way in which they do their jobs and thus cause 
resistances for implementing ERP systems in China's companies. Secondly, the Chinese 
culture also seems to affect the use of ERP in Chinese companies. It is considered that 
organisational behaviours (such as centralised and experience-based decision making, 
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directive management mode, less inclined to set up business plans) can be barriers for 
successful ERP implementation and use in Chinese firms. 
Nevertheless, despite all these obstacles, ERP system has become increasingly popular 
in Chinese business environment. In fact, more and more companies operating in China 
seem to recognise that ERP system is the most powerful tool to enable them to survive 
and compete under the increasingly drastic market conditions. As a result, most large 
Chinese companies, especially manufacturing companies, have implemented ERP 
systems and thus driven more and more SMEs in the same supply chain to use ERP to 
improve internal performance. After the introductory, developing and exploiting stage, 
China's ERP market has now reached a mature stage. All political, economic, social 
and technological issues discussed in the PEST analysis are summarised in Figure 4.5. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Through the PEST analysis, the researcher developed an in-depth understanding on 
China's current context in terms of political, economic, social and technological 
dimensions. The PEST analysis has led to a set of crucial conclusions. 
Firstly, based on the PEST analysis, the researcher identified Guangdong (a southern 
province in China) as an ideal context for the study of ERP post-implementation. 
Guangdong is one of the pioneer regions of China's economic reform and one of the 
most important and fast-growing economic regions in the country. Consequently, the 
region has achieved very high levels of informatization development and IS adoption, 
therefore it presents itself as an ideal context where to study a phenomenon such as 
post-implementation of ERP. Conversely, other regions that are starting to implement 
ERP solutions would be ideal to study ERP implementation. Therefore, Guangdong 
was selected as the region for carrying out the study. 
A second important conclusion ofthe PEST analysis was the realisation that SOEs hold 
more than 50% of the total industrial assets in China. Therefore, SOEs currently play a 
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Figure 4.5: Summary of PEST analysis 
Political Issues 
The CCP, NPC and State Council is the core of China's political 
system; 
China's legal system has been continuously perfected since 1978; 
Economic reform policy to transform China's economic system from 
planning economic to market economic since 1978; 
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) reform policies to transform SOEs to 
various types of state-owned, state-holding or privatized companies; 
'Open door' policy and WTO accession to facilitate international 
trading, attract FDI, absorb advanced technologies and increase 
competition of domestic market; 
-
Social Issues 
The employment educational level in China is relatively low whereas 
employment educational level does not seem to be a major issue for 
foreign companies, reformed SOEs and other large-size companies; 
The Chinese culture results in very centralized decision making and 
directive management systems in China's companies and Chinese 
people are more tolerant of uncertainty and unclear information. These 
cultural characteristics cause several constraints for implementation and 
use of ERP in Chinese companies. 
PEST Analysis 
Economic Issues 
Continuous economic growth since China's economic reform provides 
the prerequisite for IT/IS adoptions in Chinese companies; 
Inequality of economic development between coastal regions and 
inland/west regions affects the regional IT utilization; 
Companies operating in contemporary China can be categorized as 
SOEs and non-SOEs whereas considering the large amount of assets 
holding by SOEs and their less efficient performance, the need for SOEs 
to utilize IT to further improve their performance is more urgent. 
Technological Issues 
- The number of people that owned computers and can access to the 
Internet has been rapidly increased since the mid-1990s whereas the 
number of PCs is still far lower than developed countries and the usage 
of the Internet manifests serious regional inequality; 
- lnformatization development in companies has achieved prominent 
results, especially in manufacturing sector and large enterprises; 
The use of ERP systems in China has pasted the initiatory, introducing 
and developing period and reached the popularising period. Most large 
domestic companies have implemented ERP and thus drive many SMEs 
in the same supply chain to use ERP to improve internal performance. 
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crucial role in sustaining the continuous development of China's national economy, in 
contrast with other types of companies (e.g. private companies and foreign firms) in the 
country. The contribution of these latter companies is expected to grow, but currently a 
study of ERP post-implementation in SOEs is expected to yield more important and 
significant findings. Therefore SOEs were selected to study in this project. 
Additionally, modem SOEs refer to enterprises that are either wholly owned or majority 
owned by the state. Because wholly and majority SOEs currently have very similar 
context and characteristics for the use of technologies, they were not studied separately 
in this research. 
Finally, it was identified from the PEST analysis that, 70% SOEs in China are 
manufacturing companies, while the remainder 6% are in the mining industry and 24% 
are in the industry of production and supply of electric power, gas and water. This data 
clearly shows that, it would be more meaningful and desirable for this study to focus on 
the 70% manufacturing SOEs rather than all or the remainder 30% SOEs in China. In 
addition, it was identified that the electronic and telecommunication manufacturing 
sector is a core segment of the country's industry. Due to close link with the IT 
industry, companies in this sector have achieved very high level of IS and ERP 
utilisation. Therefore, this manufacturing sector is selected to carry out this ERP post-
adoption study. 
Consequently, the PEST analysis presented in this chapter allowed the researcher to 
narrow an initially over-ambitious study (i.e. ERP post-implementation in China) to a 
realistic and clearly limited context. One that is eminently feasible and will guarantee a 
better chance of success to the project (i.e. ERP post-implementation in SOEs, in the 
electronic and telecommunication manufacturing industry in Guangdong, in China). 
After refining the research context and selecting a feasible set of Chinese companies to 
base this study on, the next chapter presents and discusses the research methodology 
adopted for this project to investigate and explore ERP exploitation barriers and risks in 
this selected context. 
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Chapter Five: Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to respond to the research questions defined in chapter one and achieve theory 
building, testing and extension, a mixed-methods research strategy was designed and 
used for this study. This mixed-methods approach consisted of two stages. At the first 
stage, a questionnaire survey was carried out to test the risk and barrier ontology that 
was established from the literature review (as presented in the next chapter). 
Subsequently, an exploratory case study component was conducted at the second stage 
to further explore, explain and triangulate the findings derived from the questionnaire 
survey. 
This chapter presents and discusses the research philosophy, methodology and design 
adopted for this research project. In particular, the reasons for adopting a mixed-
method research design are discussed and justified. Data collection methods (i.e. 
questionnaire and semi-structured interview) and instruments employed by this research 
is also justified and discussed. In addition, this chapter also describes and discusses 
how the data collection processes were conducted, as well as how the data collected 
from the questionnaire and the interviews were analysed. 
5.2 Research philosophy 
One of the initial considerations for this research was to determine which philosophical 
stance was to be adopted. Research philosophy concerns the ways, views and 
paradigms that we use to understand how knowledge is developed, which in turn will 
affect the way that we do research (Saunders et al., 2003:83). Researchers might call 
research philosophy in different ways, e.g. research paradigm (Saunders et al., 2003), 
philosophical assumptions (Crotty, 1998, quoted by Creswell, 2003:6), epistemology 
(Hirschheim, 1994 ), and knowledge claim ( Creswell, 2003 :6), etc. Regardless the 
actual term that is being used, here research philosophy refers to "our theory of 
knowledge, in particular how we acquire knowledge [ ... ] two basic points which need 
to be looked at [are]: what [we think] is knowledge; [and] how do we obtain 'valid' 
knowledge" (Hirschheim, 1994). 
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Hirschheim (1994) states that information systems are essentially social systems rather 
than technical systems, and as a result information systems epistemology draws heavily 
from social sciences. Two research paradigms, which are prevalent in research in 
general and in social sciences research (Burrell and Morgan, 1985), are discussed below: 
- Positivism. Positivism is the research philosophical stance which is generally 
adopted by the physical and natural scientists (Saunders et al., 2003:83) who 
assume that objects exist independently and the nature of an object is static and 
thus the reality about an object can be objectively and deductively tested and 
explained through repetitive experiments. In social sciences research, positivists 
prefer "working with an observable social reality and that the end product of 
such research can be law-like generalisations", and they assume that "the 
researcher is independent of and neither affects nor is affected by the subject of 
the research" (Remenyi et al. 1998, quoted by Saunders et al., 2003:83-84). As a 
result, researchers in this tradition tend to apply a value-free manner and highly 
structured methodology to collect quantifiable data (e.g. numbers and attitudes), 
which enables statistical analysis and generalisation (Saunders et al., 2003:83). 
- Interpretivism. Interpretivism (also called sometimes interchangeably and 
wrongly as constructivism) is an epistemological stance which is opposite to 
positivism. Interpretivists argue that "the social world of business and 
management is [continuously evolving and is] far too complex to lend itself to 
theorising by definite 'laws' [. . . and that] rich insights into this complex world 
are lost if such complexity is reduced entirely to a series of law-like 
generalisations [ ... and therefore] it is necessary to explore the subjective 
meanings motivating people's actions in order to be able to understand [the very 
diverse realities in the social world]" (Saunders et al., 2003:84). As a result, 
instead of objectively observing the subject, interpretivists prefer interacting 
with the research participants to "seek to understand the subjective reality of 
those that they study in order to be able to make sense of and understand their 
motives, actions and intentions in a way that is meaningful for these research 
participants" (Saunders et al., 2003 :84; Burrell and M organ, 1985 :28). 
It is important to note that there are other approaches that can be used for specific 
research projects, such as critical realism and social constructivism, etc. However, these 
approaches were deemed to be unsuitable for this research. 
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The goal of critical realism is to critique "existing social systems [ ... and then] act to 
change [ ... current] social circumstances" (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). However, 
this research set out to identify, explore and investigate ERP exploitation barriers and 
risks in Chinese SOEs, but it did not aim at changing the status quo of these companies. 
On the other hand, the aim of social constructivism is to study and explore social facts, 
which "do not exist in the physical object world [ ... but] depend on human agreement 
that they exist and typically require human institutions for their existence" (Searle, 1995, 
quoted by Ruggie, 1998). In order to do so, studies that employ a social constructivist 
paradigm often need to adopt a more interactive approach in data collection, such as the 
Delphi method, which relies on a panel of independent experts to get involved in two or 
more rounds of data collection (Duncan, 2008; Wagner, 2004). However, for this 
particular research, it was considered infeasible for the researcher to go back to China to 
conduct multiple rounds of data collection from a specific panel of experts. 
Therefore, these unsuitable approaches are not further considered and discussed here. 
As concluded in chapter two, the success of ERP does not only depend on technical 
aspects, but is also attributed to human and organisational factors. It was thus deemed 
that in this particular research, in-depth human perceptions, insights and attitudes must 
be sought in order to study and understand ERP exploitation issues in the context of 
Chinese SOEs. It is obvious that positivism would be neither suitable nor desirable for 
an in-depth study of a very complex human activity system. It was therefore thought 
that interpretivism would be a more suitable approach for this research. Specifically, it 
was felt that the interpretivism approach would provide deeper insights into 
organisational strategies, processes and user needs that are concerned with ERP 
exploitation. This approach also proved to be relevant to many other studies that are 
investigating underlying causes for human issues, for example issues associated with 
managers, IT staff and system users. Such an approach would also consider factors 
such as socio-political, socio-technical, regional, cultural, organisational and 
interpersonal contexts, which are extremely important for a study of ERP exploitation in 
China. As a result of these considerations, the interpretive research perspective was 
adopted for this research. 
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5.3 Research strategy 
A research strategy is a general plan that contains clear objectives derived from the 
research question and provides specific direction and methods for collecting data to 
answer this research question (Saunders et al., 2003; Creswell, 2003). This section 
describes the various research strategies available in the research field, and discusses 
why the mixed-methods strategy was adopted as the most suitable research strategy for 
this project. 
5.3 .1 Candidates of research strategies 
According to Creswell (2003:13-15) and Saunders et al. (2003:91-95), research 
strategies that are widely employed by researchers can be divided into three categories, 
namely quantitative strategies, qualitative strategies and mixed-methods strategies. This 
section enumerates the candidates of research strategies that can be potentially applied 
for this interpretivist research. 
5.3.1.1 Quantitative strategies 
Quantitative strategies are generally based on the epistemological stance of positivism, 
and often adopt the deductive approach of which the main focus is to collect 
quantitative data to test a pre-defined theory or hypothesis (Saunders et al., 2003). 
Typical quantitative strategies include experiment and survey: 
Experiment is traditionally used in natural sciences but is increasingly adopted by 
social sciences researchers, particularly psychologists (Saunders et al., 2003). The 
basic idea of an experimental study is to examine the possible influences or cause-
and-effect relationships between two factors under certain conditions (Leedy and 
Ormrod, 2001 :229). Galliers (1992: 150) reinforces the idea that experiments 
attempt to identify precise relationships between chosen variables via a designed 
laboratory environment, using quantitative analytical techniques, with an endeavour 
to deriving generalisable findings applicable to real-life situations. 
The survey strategy is a popular and common quantitative strategy in business and 
management research (Saunders et al., 2003:92). It aims at obtaining snap shots of 
practices, situations or views at a particular point in time via interviews or 
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questionnaires (Gallieres, 1992: 150). In addition, a survey can be a cross-sectional 
or a longitudinal study with the intent of generalising from a sample to a targeted 
population (Babbie, 1990, cited by Cresswell, 2003:14). Saunders et al. (2003:92) 
further point out that the survey strategy allows the collection of a large amount of 
data from a sizable population and represents a highly economical way for doing 
research studies. 
5.3.1.2 Qualitative strategies 
Qualitative strategies are based on the philosophical stance of interpretivism, 
constructivism and critical realism. Qualitative strategies adopt an inductive approach 
and aim at collecting qualitative data to build up theories (Saunders et al., 2003). 
Typical strategies used in social sciences research include action research, inductive 
approaches (e.g. grounded theory and ethnography), and case study, etc: 
Researchers conducting an action research will need to form an alliance with the 
subject of the research (e.g. an organisation), and even become a member of it 
(Saunders et al., 2003). The allied organisation will often provide necessary access 
authority and resources to the researcher. Findings derived from the research will be 
used by the organisation to change the current problematic situation (Saunders et al., 
2003:94 ). An action research thus has two folds: on the one hand, it contributes to 
the practical concerns of people engaged with an immediate problematic situation 
and aims at helping them to change the current situation; on the other hand, it 
enables the researcher to access to valuable sources of information and contribute to 
theoretical knowledge in the research field (Goduscheit et al., 2007; Gallieres, 
1992: 152). Please note that a study that adopts an action research approach may not 
necessarily be a qualitative study. For example, projects that aim at building 
prototypes of computer programs may often involve the use of questionnaires to 
collect user feedbacks. 
Traditional research designs are deductive in nature, and usually rely on a literature 
review leading to the formation of an hypothesis or theoretical framework. This 
hypothesis or theoretical framework may then be put to the test in the real world 
(Allan, 2003) or used to direct and organise the data collection and analysis of the 
research (Yin, 2003). In contrast, inductive approaches, such as grounded theory, 
investigate the actualities in the real world and analyse the data with no 
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preconceived hypothesis and theories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, cited by Allan, 
2003). In other words, in a grounded theory study, data collection starts without the 
formation of an initial theoretical framework (Saunders et al., 2003:389). 
Predictions, in terms of theories, themes and issues to be addressed by the study, 
will emerge from the process of data collection and analysis. The researcher then 
needs to continue the data collection and analysis process to confirm, or otherwise, 
these predictions (Saunders et al., 2003:93). 
Ethnographic research comes from the discipline of social and cultural anthropology, 
and is also firmly rooted in the inductive approach (Saunders et al., 2003:93). The 
purpose of an ethnography study is to "interpret the social world the research 
subjects inhabit in the way in which they interpret it" (Saunders et al., 2003:93). In 
particular, ethnographers are required to spend a significant amount of time in the 
field. They often immerse themselves in the life of people they study, and seek to 
study the phenomena in their social and cultural context, normally through the use 
of participant observation and interview (Myers, 1999). Ethnographic research is 
thus well suited to provide IS researchers with rich insights into the human, social, 
and organizational contexts of information systems (Myers, 1999). Moreover, both 
Saunders et al. (2003 :93) and LeCompte and Schensul (1999, cited by Creswell, 
2003: 14) stress that "the research process [of an ethnography study] needs to be 
flexible and responsive to change since the researcher will constantly be developing 
new patterns of thought about what is being observed". 
Case study, as defined by Robson (2002:146), is "a strategy for doing research 
which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence". Yin (2003:2) 
reinforces that the case study approach allows the researcher to retain the holistic 
and meaningful characteristics of real-life events and phenomena. It is particularly 
useful in obtaining anecdotal evidence and in-depth human insights to explore the 
social context of interest (Saunders et al., 2003:93). When doing case study 
research, investigators may focus on a single case, which presents itself to be critical 
and can promote understanding of similar situations (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001: 149; 
Yin, 2003). Alternatively, researchers may focus on multiple cases in order to 
enable comparisons, build theory, or propose theoretical replications (Leedy and 
Ormrod, 2001: 149; Yin, 2003 ). Please note that a case study may not necessarily 
be a qualitative research. For instance, a case study may use questionnaire as the 
main data collection method. 
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5.3.1.3 Mixed-method strategies 
Galliers (1994:150-152), Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) and Creswell (2003:15-16) 
stress that research strategies based on either quantitative or qualitative approaches have 
their own strengths and limitations. In order to overcome the limitations of a single 
strategy researchers may often apply mixed strategies and methods in their study. A 
mixed-method strategy can be defined as a research design that uses qualitative and 
quantitative data collection techniques in either parallel or sequential phases to study the 
same concept(s) (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998:41). It is obvious that a mixed-method 
strategy stresses combining both quantitative and qualitative methods in a single study 
to achieve triangulation, and aims at supplementing the limitation of each single method 
(Creswell, 2003: 15-16). 
The term 'triangulation' is broadly defined by Denzin (quoted by Jick, 1979) as "the 
combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon". In practices, the 
concept of triangulation can often be applied to two ways, namely method triangulation 
and data triangulation (Jick, 1979). Method triangulation refers to the phenomenon that 
different data collection methods are used to collect different sets of data to study the 
same concept/reality (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998:41 ). On the other hand, data 
triangulation refers to the phenomenon to use multiple techniques to analyse and 
interpret the same set of data from different dimensions (Jick, 1979). It is apparent that, 
when a study adopts a mixed-method design that consists of multiple data collection 
methods, method triangulation would be achieved. 
According to Jick (1979) and Creswell (2003: 15-16), the approach for using multi-
methods to achieve method triangulation can provide researchers with a range of 
benefits: 
- It allows researchers to be more confident on their results; 
- It helps to neutralize or cancel the biases that may exist by using a single method; 
- It stimulates the creation of new ways to combine different approaches, 
strategies and methods to answer a specific research question; 
- It helps to uncover the unique or deviant dimension of a sophisticated 
phenomenon which might be overlooked by using a single method, and lead to a 
deeper explanation and understanding of the research problem. 
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In a mixed-method study researchers can combine the use of any research methods as 
far as these methods suit the needs of the research (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). By 
observing previous studies, Creswell (2003:208-225) identifies six common ways that a 
















This strategy contains two phases and is characterised by the 
collection and analysis of quantitative data followed by the 
collection and analysis of qualitative data. The priority is given to 
the quantitative data collection. The purpose of this strategy is to use 
qualitative results to further explore and explain the findings of a 
primarily quantitative study. 
This strategy is characterised by an initial phase of qualitative data 
collection and analysis which is followed by a phase of quantitative 
data collection and analysis. The priority is given to the qualitative 
aspect of the study. 
This strategy contains two distinct data collection phases. However 
in this design, either method may be used first when collecting data 
from a targeted individual/case/organisation, and the priority can be 
given to either the quantitative or the qualitative phase, or even to 
both if sufficient resources are available. 
This strategy is selected as the model when a researcher uses two 
different methods in an attempt to confirm, cross-validate, or 
corroborate findings within a single study. The quantitative and 
qualitative data collection is happening simultaneously in one phase 
of the research and is considered as equally important. 
This strategy uses one data collection phase, during which both 
quantitative and qualitative data are collected simultaneously. 
However, one method (either quantitative or qualitative method) 
must take the predominant position while the other method should 
be embedded/nested within the predominant method to address a 
different question than the dominant method or seeks information 
from a different level. 
This strategy may take on the design features of both concurrent 
triangulation and concurrent nested strategy. For instance, It may 
involve a triangulation of quantitative and qualitative method which 
may be embedded with a supplement method to further explore the 
issue. However all data are collected at the same time during one 
data collection phase. 
Table 5.1: Six types of mixed-methods strategies 
(source: Creswell, 2003). 
5.3.2 Selection of research strategies 
Six candidates of research strategies (i.e. experiment, survey, action research, grounded 
theory, case study and mixed-methods strategy) have been discussed above. This 
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section discusses the applicability of each of these research strategies in relation to the 
nature and research questions of this study, and aims at conclusions that will enable the 
researcher to select the most suitable research strategy for this project. 
5.3.2.1 Justification of the mixed-method strategy 
The applicability of each of the six potential research strategies to this research was 
carefully analysed and evaluated. 
Firstly, the experimented strategy was considered. As argued by Galliers ( 1993: 150), 
an experiment is an ideal strategy for the study of a small number of variables that are 
required to be investigated intensively. Nonetheless Galliers also points out that, in 
order to focus on a limited context, the designed laboratory situation for carrying out the 
experiment is often simplified. As a consequence, the experiment may not cover or 
consider all key factors that exist in the real context. These factors may have an impact 
on the variables and relationships being studied, and therefore the experiment may 
result in omitted findings. Because the implementation and use of ERP is closely 
related with and can be reduced significantly affected by the context, a study in ERP 
post-implementation will not be efficiently and successfully carried out without 
considering the full context. Due to this reason, the experiment strategy was considered 
to be unsuitable for this research. Moreover, an experiment can only allow the 
researcher to study a limited number of variables intensively ( Galliers, 1993: 150). 
Since a study of ERP exploitation will inevitably concern a large number of variables, 
these variables may not be fully investigated by using experiments. As a consequence, 
the experiment strategy was not used for this project. 
Secondly, the applicability of the survey strategy was analysed. The survey strategy, 
which is based on the deductive approach, is also often considered to be suitable and 
desirable for testing theories (Saunders et al., 2003). As further stated by Saunders et al. 
(2003 :92), the main strength for using a survey is that it enables researchers to study a 
large number of variables and make generalisable statements derived from a sizable 
population in a highly economical way. As concluded from the PEST analysis, the 
researcher selected a very specific set of Chinese companies (i.e. SOEs in the electronic 
and telecommunication manufacturing sector in Guangdong) to base this study on. The 
survey strategy thus presents itself to be suitable for generating generalisable findings to 
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this specific context of Chinese SOEs. Nevertheless, because ERP is used in a social 
and organizational context, the study of ERP post-implementation needs to take into 
account in-depth human insights in order to explore fully the social and organizational 
context in which ERP is used. In particular, in-depth human insights should be sought 
in order for the researcher to explore potential causes and consequences associated with 
identified ERP barriers and risks in the context of Chinese SOEs. However, as pointed 
out by Robson (2002) and Galliers (1993) a survey often will not allow researchers to 
explore intensively the human insights behind the variables being studied. In other 
words, the survey strategy may not fully satisfy the needs of this research project, in 
terms of in-depth understanding of the phenomenon being studied. 
Thirdly, the suitability of the action research strategy was evaluated. As discussed by 
Saunders et al. (2003 :93-94), researchers engaged with action research should ally with 
and even become a member of the organisation being studied. The researcher will then 
aim at changing the current problematic situation faced by the organisation through 
research. In the context of this research, the researcher did not form an alliance with 
any of the targeted companies and more importantly would not aim at changing the 
current situation of any particular company. The fundamental objectives of this 
research were to capture snap shots of the barriers and risks that Chinese companies 
may encounter when using ERP, and seek in-depth insights about why these barriers 
and risks exist and what impacts they may result in. Considering the nature and 
objectives of this research, the action research strategy proved to be a totally 
inappropriate approach for this research project. 
Fourthly, the researcher considered the applicability of grounded theory and 
ethnography. The core of both of these inductive approaches is to start data collection 
without a predefined theoretical framework and then identify theories and themes 
through analysis of the collected data (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001: 154). It is thus likely 
that these approaches may be best suited for a research where a theoretical framework is 
difficult to be constructed prior to data collection. However, for this project, the 
researcher would be able to establish a theoretical ERP barrier and risk ontology (as 
presented in chapter six) through the process of a critical literature review from other 
contexts, for instance USA and Europe. This certainly presents a different situation to 
that required to use these inductive approaches. More importantly, the next step of this 
project should be to collect data to test the suitability of this theoretical ontology. It is 
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obvious that when ground theory and ethnography are prominent inductive approaches 
for building theories, they are not suitable for theory testing. Consequently, neither 
grounded theory nor ethnography was adopted for this study. 
Fifthly, the suitability of the case study strategy was considered. As stated by Saunders 
et al. (2003:93), a case study is particularly useful to obtain anecdotal evidence and in-
depth human insights to explore issues within a given social context. Case study thus 
served to be a suitable strategy for this project to seek in-depth human insights in order 
to fully understand the identified ERP barriers and risks in the Chinese context. This 
research strategy however is often criticised for its incapability to achieve generalisation 
(Yin, 2003; Galliers, 1993; Leedy and Orrnrod, 2001: 149). In other words, researchers 
cannot be sure that results derived from either a single- or multiple-case study research 
are generalisable to other situations (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001 : 149). As the researcher 
selected a very specific set of Chinese companies to base this project on, it was 
considered essential and meaningful for this study to produce findings that were 
generalisable to this specific context. Consequently, the case study strategy cannot fully 
satisfy the needs of this research project. 
Overall, the applicability of the five potential strategies based on either quantitative or 
qualitative approach was analysed and evaluated. None of these single-approach 
strategies however was considered as an ideal approach for this research project, 
although some of them partially fit the needs of this study. For instance, the survey 
strategy may enable the researcher to study a large number of variables and achieve 
generalisations, but it may not allow the researcher to explore the human insights 
behind these variables intensively. In contrast, the case study strategy may enable the 
researcher to investigate subjective human insights and attitudes thoroughly, but it is 
difficult for the researcher to make generalisable statements through either single- or 
multiple-case study. This situation actually reflects the traditional pitfall associated 
with a single-approach strategy. As argued by many researchers (e.g. Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 1998; Creswell, 2003), by adopting a solely quantitative or qualitative research 
strategy, it may often be difficult for researchers to produce simultaneously 
generalisable and in-depth findings in the same piece of study. 
Faced with the limitations of a single-approach strategy, the researcher decided to 
combine both quantitative and qualitative methods to form a mixed-method strategy for 
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this study. As stated by Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) and Creswell (2003), the main 
purpose for using multiple methods in the same piece of study is to offset the limitations 
and biases that could exist by using a single method, as well as supplementing the data 
derived from each method. The mixed methods approach enables triangulation to take 
place and will often lead to more comprehensive, significant and meaningful findings 
(Saunders et al., 2003; Creswell, 2003). More importantly, when a mixed-method 
strategy composed of both a quantitative and a qualitative study was adopted for this 
project, the quantitative component (e.g. survey) was designed to allow generalisable 
statements on barriers and risks that Chinese SOEs may encounter in ERP post-
implementation to be made, and the qualitative component (e.g. case study) aimed to 
enable the researcher to seek in-depth human insights to explore the causes and impacts 
of the identified ERP barriers and risks. In short, the use of a mixed-method strategy 
might help to produce generalisable as well as in-depth findings for this ERP post-
implementation research. 
5.3.2.2 Design of the mixed-method strategy for this project 
Since the mixed-method approach was adopted, this section describes and discusses 
how the mixed-method strategy for this project was constructed and designed. 
As discussed earlier, this project focuses on a limited context to study the exploitation 
of ERP. Therefore, findings that were generalisable to this specific context were 
considered to be not just essential but highly valuable and meaningful. A deductive 
quantitative study should thus be conducted. On the other hand, it was expected that 
some findings derived from the quantitative study might be different from original 
expectations because of different contexts between China and the West. This is 
certainly a very common issue to occur when doing quantitative research. Therefore, it 
was considered that a follow-up qualitative study should be carried out, in order to 
explore further any unexpected findings derived from the quantitative component. 
Consequently, it clearly emerged that there was a need for the researcher to adopt a 
research design, which consisted of a quantitative study and a follow-up qualitative 
component, for this research project. In fact, this emergent research design followed a 
typical QUAN and qual approach, which is one of the six mixed-method designs 
proposed by Creswell (2003 :213) (as briefly introduced in table 7.1 in this chapter). 
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As presented by Creswell (2003) the QUAN and qual design consists of two phases (as 
shown in figure 5.1). At the first phase, a deductive and quantitative study is conducted 
and takes the predominant position of the entire research. A supplementary qualitative 
study is carried out at the second phase to further explore and explain the findings and 
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Figure 5.1: Sequential explanatory strategy 
(Source: Creswell, 2003: 213) 
As mentioned by Saunders et al. (2003 :92), a survey allows researchers to collect a 
large amount of data from a sizeable population in a highly economical way to produce 
generalisable statements. Therefore, the survey presented itself as the most suitable 
quantitative strategy to be used at the first data collection phase of this study to identify 
generalisable aspects of ERP post-implementation barriers and risks within the selected 
context. Furthermore, this research project was aiming to capture a 'snap-shot' of the 
current issues for using ERP rather than to study how these issues change over time. 
The survey conducted in this project was thus a cross-sectional rather than a 
longitudinal study. 
On the other hand, as argued by Saunders et al. (2003:93) the case study strategy is a 
particularly useful approach for gaining in-depth human insights and exploring existing 
theories. Case study was thus selected as the most suitable qualitative strategy to be 
adopted at the second data collection phase of this project to explore in-depth human 
insights to examine the causes and impacts behind the barriers and risks identified from 
the quantitative study. More importantly, the case study, as a supplementary qualitative 
component, could reinforce and further explore the findings derived from the survey, 
and thus could enable triangulation to take place and result in more comprehensive and 
meaningful outcomes. Additionally, because a single-case study might not yield 
sufficient qualitative evidence to triangulate with the quantitative findings, a multi-case 
study was conducted in this project. The companies involved in the case study were 
identified from the set of SOEs which also participated in the survey research. 
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Overall, the mixed-methods strategy adopted for this study was a sequential QUAN and 
qual design, which consisted of two phases. At the first phase, a cross-sectional survey 
research was conducted and took the predominant position in the study. A 
supplementary qualitative component (i.e. follow-up case study) was carried out at the 
second phase to further explore and validate the findings derived from the survey study, 
and therefore achieved triangulation and theory extension. It is obvious that, if the 
survey research held the principal role in this study, then this research was mainly 
driven by a deductive approach. 
5.4 Critical literature review for initial barrier and risk identification 
Before conducting the survey in the selected SOEs, there was a need for the researcher 
to establish explicit theoretical IS lens to frame the study and guide the data collection 
process, in order to generate meaningful and significant findings. 
As a consequence, the researcher carried out an initial desktop study based on a critical 
literature review. As discussed in the introduction chapter, the process of this extensive 
literature review did not return any specific studies on ERP post-implementation 
barriers and risks. Nevertheless, the researcher identified and retrieved, through the 
critical analysis of the literature, a large amount of IS and general business research 
studies, case studies and theoretical papers in both English and Chinese. By analysing, 
systematically comparing and synthesising these articles and materials, the researcher 
identified and established a variety of barriers and risks which Chinese companies 
might encounter in ERP exploitation. 
Specifically, as a result of the systematic review, the researcher established 29 ERP 
barriers and 40 ERP risks that might prevent Chinese companies from successfully 
using, maintaining and enhancing their ERP systems. A barrier ontology and a risk 
ontology were developed to represent these identified ERP barriers and risks. The 
established ERP barrier and risk ontologies were then used as the theoretical basis for 
constructing the survey of this project. 
These ERP barriers, risks and ontology are presented and discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
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5.5 Candidates of data collection methods 
As the sequential explanatory mixed-methods approach, consisting of a survey and a 
case study research, was adopted for this project, the next task of the researcher was to 
identify and select the specific data collection methods to be used respectively for the 
survey and the case study. A data collection method refers to the specific way that is 
used to collect data from the targeted research units (Saunders et al., 2003). The 
frequently-used data collection methods in social sciences research include 
questionnaire, interview, observation, and using documents and content analysis. This 
section describes and discusses these data collection methods in details. 
5.5.1 Questionnaire 
A questionnaire is a quantitative data collection method in which all respondents are 
asked to respond to the same set of questions in a predetermined order (deVaus, 2002). 
Questionnaires are frequently adopted in surveys, experiments and case study research, 
and can be used to collect opinions, attributes, beliefs and behaviours from the target 
stakeholders (Saunders et al., 2003 :280). Closed-ended questions with fixed answers 
are often used in questionnaires, although open-ended questions may also be adopted 
where appropriate (Bryman, 2004: 133-138). Each respondent is required to complete 
and return the questionnaire at their own convenience without the presence of the 
researcher (Bryman, 2004:132). A questionnaire can be posted to the respondents who 
return it by post after completion (postal questionnaire), alternatively, it can be 
delivered to and returned by the respondents electronically through using either email or 
the Internet (online questionnaire) (Saunders et al., 2003:282). Online questionnaires 
can also be distinguished as e-mail questionnaire which is sent to the respondents by 
emails, or web-based questionnaire which operates by inviting respondents to visit a 
website at which the questionnaire can be found and completed online (Bryman, 
2004:480-481 ). In real world practice, researchers may combine the use of both postal 
and web-based questionnaire by embedding the URL of the web-based questionnaire in 
the postal questionnaire, and thus offering prospective respondents alternative ways to 
complete and return the questionnaire (Meckel et al., 2005). 
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The advantage for using questionnaire is that, when each respondent is asked to respond 
to the same set of questions, it provides an effective way for collecting standardised 
answers from the sample (Saunders et al., 2003:281). The questionnaire represents an 
efficient and economical way for researchers to collect data from a large sample in a 
wide geographical area at the same time (Bryman, 2004:133-134). Also since the 
respondents fill in the questionnaire without the presence of the researcher, the 
possibility of researcher bias can be removed (deVaus, 2002; Bryman, 2004:133). 
However these benefits may be accompanied with certain deficiencies. A notable one is 
that, any doubts that respondents may have when filling in the questionnaire may not be 
further clarified or explained by the researcher. In order to overcome this specific 
deficiency, Saunders et al. (2003:283) suggest that researchers should keep the 
questionnaire as short, clear and simple as possible, and increase the validity of the 
questionnaire by carrying out a pilot test to identify and tackle any uncertainties and 
ambiguities in the questionnaire prior using it to collect data. 
A questionnaire can be used for either descriptive, explanatory or exploratory purposes 
(Robson, 2002:232). Many questionnaire surveys on social sciences issues (especially 
demographic issues) are descriptive in nature (Robson, 2002:232). When a 
questionnaire is carried out for descriptive purposes, it aims at generating an accurate 
profile to describe the general patterns and characteristics of the phenomena studied 
(Robson, 2002:59). Researchers must have extensive prior knowledge on the 
phenomena being investigated in order to identify appropriate aspects on which to 
collect data by using descriptive questionnaires (Saunders et al., 2003:97; Robson, 
2002:59). It is possible for a questionnaire to go beyond the descriptive purpose to a 
more explanatory purpose. This means, to use the questionnaire to seek explanations of 
the phenomena studied and the patterns of results obtained as well as identifying and 
explaining relationships between aspects of the phenomenon (Robson, 2002:235). On 
the other hand, this data collection method may also be used for exploratory purposes to 
find out what is happening, seek new insights on little-understood situations, and 
generate ideas for further research (Robson, 2002:59). Robson (2002:234) however 
points out that questionnaires may not be the best method for carrying out exploratory 
work. Robson's concern is that, because questionnaires are mainly composed by 
closed-ended questions and it is an inefficient and ineffective procedure to ask a large 
set of open-ended questions in a questionnaire, this presents a difficulty to fully explore 
the complex social contexts. This viewpoint however proves to be over-simplified in 
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real world research. In reality, questionnaires are frequently adopted for exploratory 
studies (e.g. Tang, 2000) to probe and identify a set of characteristics for events and 
situations of which the researcher knows little about. The early findings derived from 
the exploratory questionnaire may then be verified, supplemented and further explored 
by using follow up qualitative and/or quantitative methods. In response to Robson's 
concern, it can be argued that although a questionnaire on its own may not be well 
suited to the needs of an exploratory study, it may be used in conjunction with other 
follow up research methods to achieve the exploratory goal effectively and efficiently. 
5.5.2 Interview 
An interview is a purposeful discussion, which is initiated by the interviewer in order to 
obtain research-relevant information from the interviewee for specific research purposes 
and objectives (Kahn and Cannell, 1957, quoted by Saunders et al., 2003:245; Cannell 
and Kahn, 1957, quoted by Robson, 1993:229). Interviews can enable the researcher to 
gather a great deal of useful information from the interviewee, including facts, beliefs, 
feelings, motives, behaviours and perceptions, etc (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001: 159). As 
classified by the level of formality and structure, interviews can be categorised as 
structured interviews, semi-structured interviews and in-depth interviews (Saunders et 
al., 2003 :246). 
The structured interview is one of the two main ways for performing a survey research 
and involves the interviewer asking the interviewee a set of fixed and standardised 
questions in a predetermined order (Bryman, 2004:109-110). It enables the researcher 
to gather a set of generalisable and standardised responses. Due to its similarity with 
the questionnaire, structure interview is often referred to as interviewer-administered 
questionnaire (Saunders et al., 2003; Robson, 1993). The main difference between a 
questionnaire and a structured interview is that, when the questionnaire is administered 
by the respondent without the presence of the researcher, a structured interview is 
managed by the researcher/interviewer often over the telephone or by face-to-face 
(Saunders et al., 2003). As compared to questionnaires, structured interviews tend to 
have more open questions and offer a better opportunity for researchers to help 
respondents with questions that they found difficult to understand and answer (Bryman, 
2004:134). Nonetheless, making appointments with respondents to phone or visit them 
in a convenient time may be a difficult task. Telephoning or travelling to the 
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respondents can also be costly and require more time and effort from the researcher. 
Saunders et al. (2003:284) therefore conclude that structured interviews may not be 
suitable for a research of which the selected sample is large and dispersed in a wide 
geographical area. Furthermore, structured interviews are suitable for quantitative 
studies (Bryman, 2004:109) of which the purposes are descriptive or explanatory, but it 
is incapable for exploring in-depth findings (Saunders et al., 2003:247-248). Therefore 
in exploratory qualitative studies, semi-structured and unstructured interviews are more 
likely to be used to explore in-depth human insights and seek new findings (Saunders et 
al., 2003:248). 
In semi-structured interviews, a list of themes and questions to be covered and explored 
will be pre-defined prior to the collection of data (Saunders et al., 2003:246). When 
compared to structured interviews, semi-structured interviews are more flexible because 
the interviewer in this case may omit or add some questions and change the orders of 
questions depending on the flow of the conversation in order to fully explore the views 
of the interviewee (Saunders et al., 2003:246; Bryman, 2004:321). Because the 
interviewer is often free to probe beyond answers and can extend the predetermined 
questions flexibly (May, 1997:111 ), semi-structured interviews as compared to 
structured or unstructured interviews are more suitable to be used to seek further 
clarification and explanation for the specific themes and aspects derived from the 
preliminary stages of a research. 
An unstructured interview is an informal conversation between the interviewer and the 
interviewee with no predetermined list of questions to work through (Robson, 
2002:270). The interviewer talks with the interviewees freely about events, behaviour 
and beliefs in relation to the topic area. Nevertheless, the interviewer needs to have a 
clear idea about what aspects should be covered and explored (Saunders et al., 2003:247; 
May, 1997:112-113; Bryman, 2004:320-321). Unstructured interviews are particularly 
helpful to 'find out what is happening [and] to seek new insights' (Robson, 2002:59) for 
exploratory studies (Saunders et al., 2003 :248). Because the unstructured interview is 
an entirely open conversation and does not require a predefined list of questions to work 
through, it may be best used at the beginning of the study in which little is known in 
order to explore and identify a set of preliminary findings for further investigation. 
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In general terms, when doing interviews the interviewer can conduct it either face-to-
face or over the telephone. Telephone interviews may lead to a number of advantages 
in relation to access, speed and cost in contrast with face-to-face interviews (Saunders et 
al., 2003:269). However, conducting an interview and recording the interviewee's 
responses over the telephone is a difficult process, especially for semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews in which unpredictable questions and responses may come up. 
Moreover, in a telephone interview, the researcher will not be able to observe the non-
verbal behaviours of interviewees (e.g. body languages). These non-verbal aspects 
sometimes can be crucial for the interviewer to understand the interviewee's speeches. 
In addition, without a face-to-face contact with the interviewer, the interviewees may 
put less trust in the interviewer and thus become less willing and even refuse to answer 
sensitive questions (Saunders et al., 2003). 
5.5.3 Observation 
If someone's research questions and objectives "are concerned with what people do, an 
obvious way in which to discover this is to watch them do it" (Saunders et al., 
2003:221). Observation is a data collection method in which the researcher/observer 
watches what people do, records this in some way and then describe, analyse and 
interpret what has been observed (Robson, 1993: 190). A major advantage of 
observation is that, instead of asking people about their views, feelings or attitudes, the 
observer just directly watches what people do and listens what people say (Robson, 
2002:310). Observations thus can help researchers identify information that people may 
not be willing to reveal in interviews or questionnaires (Bryman, 2004: 165-167). 
However observation is neither an easy nor a trouble-free method (Robson, 2002:311). 
There is a major issue concerning the extent to which an observer affects the situation 
under observation (Robson, 2002:311). Specifically, participants may perform 
differently if they are aware of the observation taking place (Leedy and Onnrod, 
2001: 158). The closeness of the researcher to the situation may also lead to significant 
observer bias (Saunders et al., 2003). Observations may "call for a heavy investment of 
time and effort and should not be used without careful consideration of their resource 
implications in the real world study" (Robson, 2002:31 0). 
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Observations can be performed in many different forms (Bryman, 2004: 167). The two 
polar extreme types are participant observation and structured observation (Robson, 
2002:309). 
Participant observation is a qualitative method with flexible designs (Robson, 2002:31 0). 
It is closely related with the research strategy of ethnography (Bryman, 2004:292). In 
participant observations, the observer "attempts to participate fully in the lives and 
activities of subjects and thus becomes a member of their group, organisation or 
community" (Gill and Johnson, 1997, quoted by Saunders et al., 2003:222). Participant 
observations are normally unstructured, although the observer must have a clear idea 
about what aspects should be discovered (Saunders et al., 2003:222). By working with 
people and engaging in the social situation for an extended period of time, participant 
observers may be in a better position to interpret the observed activities and behaviours 
by using their own experiences (Robson, 2002:314; Saunders et al., 2003:230). 
However, this method may be seen as a totally unacceptable approach to positivists due 
to its high level of subjectivity (Robson, 2002:314 ). 
In contrast, structured observation is a quantitative method with fixed designs and 
highly predetermined structures (Robson, 2002:31 0; Saunders et al., 2003:231 ). 
Structured observations normally use explicitly formulated schedules for the 
observation and recording of behaviour (Bryman, 2004: 167). Structured observers 
adopt a more detached stance as compared to participant observers, and tend to be a 
'pure observer' without trying to become an integrated part of the group or organisation 
(Saunders et al., 2003:231). Because its main function is to tell the researcher about 
how often things happen rather than why they happen, structured observation may form 
only a part of the data collection approach for a research (Saunders et al., 2003:231 ). 
5.5.4 Using documents and content analysis 
Instead of collecting primary data by using questionnaires, interviews or observations, 
researchers may use documents as secondary or supplementary sources in a multi-
methods study for triangulation purposes (Robson, 2002:349-352). Documents of the 
kind referred to in research are materials that have not been produced specifically for 
the purpose of the research (Bryman, 2004:381) and thus will not be affected by the fact 
that the researcher is using it (Robson, 2002:349). Documents cover a wide range of 
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information sources, including company reports, government reports, minutes of 
meetings, letters, memos, diaries, newspapers, magazine articles, etc (Robson, 2002:351; 
Bryman, 2004:380). However, researchers may find it difficult to retrieve relevant 
documents for their research in real world practices. Specifically, it is often possible 
that the purposes of the retrieved documents may not suit the needs of the study, or the 
retrieved documents may not contain sufficient details or may contain inaccurate and 
unreliable information (Robson, 2002:350). In addition, the retrieved documents do not 
stand on their own, but need to be analysed and situated within a theoretical frame of 
reference in order that their contents are understood (May, 1997: 171) and can be used to 
support the main findings ofthe research (Robson, 2002:352). Documents collected for 
the research can be analysed in many diverse ways, but the most common approach to 
documentary analysis is content analysis (Bryman, 2004:392; May, 1997:171). Strictly 
speaking, content analysis is a method of analysis rather than a method of data 
collection, but many researchers may consider it as a data collection method due to the 
fact that content analysis refers to a set of procedures used to extract and gather useful 
data from the retrieved documents (Bryman, 2004:181). Content analysis can be done 
by following either a quantitative or qualitative approach. 
Quantitative content analysis is "an approach to the analysis of documents and text that 
seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and 
replicable manner" (Bryman, 2004:181). The researcher has to predetermine a 
theoretical frame that contains codes or categories (Robson, 2002:354). Relevant words 
or sentences of the documents collected will be sorted and situated under specific codes 
and categories of the predefined frame (May, 1997: 1 71 ). After the coding process is 
completed, the data obtained can be analysed by using statistical methods and 
procedures (Robson, 2002:357). The focus of quantitative content analysis is to 
examine '"the frequency with which certain words or particular phrases occur in the text 
as a means of identifying its characteristics" (May, 1997: 171 ). 
Qualitative content analysis is the most appropriate approach to the qualitative analysis 
of documents (Bryman, 2004:392). The qualitative content analysis "comprises a 
searching-out of underlying themes [and theories in the documents] ... being analysed" 
(Bryman, 2004:393). Unlike quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis 
does not have predefined categorises for coding. Instead it follows the principles of 
qualitative data analysis, that is, to identify and generate codes and categories from the 
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data sources, and then code relevant text of the documents into the coding scheme for 
analysis (Bryman, 2004:393). The extracted themes and theories are usually illustrated 
with brief quotations from the related documents (Bryman, 2004:392). 
5.6 Data collection for the survey research 
After discussing the candidates of data collection methods, this section describes and 
discusses the selected methods and procedures used for collecting data in the survey 
research of this project. 
5.6.1 Target companies of the survey 
As concluded from the PEST analysis, the researcher identified and selected the SOEs 
operating in the electronic and telecommunication manufacturing sector in Guangdong 
in China as adequate companies for carrying out this research. As a consequence, each 
company that was invited to participate in the survey research should simultaneously 
satisfy three criteria: it must be a State-Owned Enterprise; it must operate in the 
electronic and telecommunication manufacturing sector; it must be located in the 
Guangdong province in China. 
According to the statistics provided by the Guangdong Statistical Bureau (GSB), the 
number of SOEs that satisfy these three criteria is 118 at the time of conducting this 
survey. As a consequence, the survey research of this project was carried out across 
these 118 SOEs in Guangdong. 
On the other hand, no data could be found to show how many of these 118 SOEs had 
ERP systems at present. However, as identified in the PEST analysis, most SOEs in the 
electronic and telecommunication manufacturing sector in Guangdong have achieved 
high level of informatization. It was therefore predicted that the majority of the selected 
SOEs should have adopted ERP systems for a few years. In truth, as presented in 
chapter seven, findings derived from the survey research confirmed this initial 
expectation was true, as 88% of the SOEs that participated in the study have 
implemented ERP. Nevertheless, even if a selected SOE had not yet adopted ERP, it 
was considered that managers of the company would still hold meaningful and valuable 
opinions regarding the barriers and risks that are preventing their company from using 
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such an advanced IS application. Due to this reason, companies that had not currently 
adopted ERP were not excluded from this research project. 
5.6.2 Selection of data collection method 
Questionnaire and structured interviews are common data collection methods used in a 
survey research (Robson, 2002; Saunders et al., 2003:92; Bryman, 2004). The 
structured interview was however rejected immediately in this survey, because it would 
be an infeasible and inefficient approach to contact and carry out structured interviews 
with managers of the 118 target SOEs that are dispersed in the 21 cities across the 
Guangdong province. As compared to structured interview, the questionnaire proves to 
be a more feasible and efficient approach to be used for this project. A questionnaire 
can be completed and returned by the respondents without the presence of the 
researcher and thus presents to be a highly efficient and economical way for collecting 
responses from prospective respondents. As a consequence, the researcher selected 
questionnaire rather than structured interview as the ideal data collection method to be 
used for the survey research of this study. 
In addition postal questionnaire instead of email questionnaire was used in this case, 
because it was possible for the researcher to retrieve the address of each of the selected 
SOEs while it would not be a practical approach to attempt to gather personal email 
addresses from Chinese managers who are conventionally reluctant to disclose personal 
contact details (e.g. email) to external people. Nevertheless, a web-based version of the 
questionnaire was used in conjunction with the postal/paper-based questionnaire. The 
web-based questionnaire was administered through a web server. The URL to access to 
the web-based questionnaire was embedded in the postal questionnaire, and thus 
providing an alternative way for prospective respondents to complete and return the 
questionnaire. It was hoped that, as demonstrated by Meckel et al. (2005), the 
combination of the use of both postal and web-based questionnaire would help to 
increase the response rate. 
5.6.3 Purposes for doing the questionnaire survey 
The main purpose for doing the questionnaire survey was to examine the suitability of 
the theoretical ERP barrier and risk ontology (as presented in chapter six) in the context 
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of selected SOEs. Please note that the fundamental aim of the questionnaire survey 
conducted in this project was not to test hypotheses/theories. Instead, it aimed to use 
the theoretical ontology as the lens to explore and understand ERP barriers and risks, as 
well as their casual relationships, in the context of Chinese SOEs studied. Hence, this 
study followed interpretivism rather than positivism in a research approach. 
In particular, the survey aimed to examine and explore whether and to which extent 
each identified ERP barrier existed in SOEs. Please note that, the established barrier 
ontology presented in chapter six contained 29 ERP barriers, namely 7 cultural barriers, 
9 organisational barriers, 4 external barriers, and 9 system barriers. It was however 
considered that, the identified external barriers (e.g. government intervention and 
control) are relatively sensitive topics under the bureaucratic environment in China. As 
pointed out by Roy et al (2001), due to a long history of bureaucratic intervention and 
control, Chinese people are often reluctant to offer their views on questions that may be 
sensitive. Worse of all, when a survey contains sensitive questions, Chinese 
respondents may often tend to limit their co-operation and even refuse to participate in 
the survey (Roy et al, 2001 ). Due to these reasons, the researcher decided not to include 
the 4 external barriers in this questionnaire, in order to reduce potential risk of non-
response. As a consequence, only 25 ERP barriers (i.e. 7 cultural barriers, 9 
organisational barriers, and 9 system barriers) presented in the barrier ontology were 
covered in the questionnaire survey. 
On the other hand, the questionnaire survey also aimed to identify which of the 40 
identified risk events would be understood and accepted by respondents as risks for 
ERP exploitation, as well as, to assess the importance of these ERP risks in SOEs. In 
addition, as discussed in section 6.3.3 in chapter six, a risk event that has a high impact 
may not have a high probability of occurrence, and vice versa. For instance, system 
crash can certainly lead to significant impact to user companies, but the probability of 
occurrence of this risk is low. As a consequence, when assessing the importance of a 
risk, both its probability of occurrence and level of impact should be considered (Cadle 
and Y eates, 2001 :231 ). Moreover, a risk event may occur not just once but repetitively 
within a given context. While the probability of occurrence tells us 'how likely' a risk 
event may occur, it provides no information about 'how often' this event may happen. 
As a consequence, the frequency of occurrence of a risk event may often be considered 
as a further dimension in risk assessment (Covello and Merkhofer, 2003). Based on 
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these considerations, the questionnaire survey aimed at exploring the importance of the 
identified ERP risks in Chinese SOEs from three dimensions, namely probability of 
occurrence, level of impact and frequency of occurrence. 
Finally, by analysing the quantitative data collected from the questionnaire survey, the 
researcher aimed at identified a set of ERP barriers and risks that were the most crucial 
to SOEs, as well as exploring and investigating the correlations between the identified 
ERP exploitation barriers and risks. 
In sum, it clearly emerged from above discussion that the purpose of this survey was 
exploratory in nature. By doing the cross-sectional questionnaire survey, the researcher 
aimed at achieving the following objectives: 
To explore whether, and to which extent, each of the 25 predefined ERP barriers 
exist in SOEs; 
- To identify which of the 40 predefined risk events would be perceived by 
respondents as risks for ERP exploitation, as well as, to assess the importance of 
each identified risk according to its likelihood, impact and frequency of occurrence; 
- To explore which ERP barriers and risks are the most crucial to SOEs; 
- To explore the correlations between the barriers and risks identified. 
5.6.4 Questionnaire instrument 
In order to gather consistent and reliable data from prospective respondents, an effective 
and valid questionnaire instrument must be developed. This section presents and 
discusses how the questionnaire instrument used in this project was designed, developed 
and validated. 
5.6.4.1 Design of the questionnaire instrument 
"The validity and reliability of the data you collect and the response rate you achieve 
depend, to a large extent, on the design of your questions [and] the structure of your 
questionnaire. A valid question will enable accurate data to be collected, and one that is 
reliable will mean that these data are collected consistently" (Saunders et al., 2003:291 ). 
126 
Chapter Five Research Methodology 
This quotation clearly shows that, the design and development of the instrument is a 
crucial process to ensure the success of a questionnaire survey. 
As pointed by Robson (2004:241), "the questions for the questionnaire ... should be 
designed to help to achieve the goals of the research and, in particular, to answer the 
research questions". May (1997:88) reinforces that questions of questionnaires should 
be built on past work or theories related to the research topic. In this research project, 
the questionnaire design was based on a barrier and risk ontology, which was created 
through a process of critical literature review and was presented in chapter six. 
From the ontology presented in chapter six, it became apparent that out of the 25 
predefined barriers and 40 predefined risks, some were related with business aspects, 
while the rest focused on technical issues. This clearly indicated that two different 
questionnaires needed to be designed to obtain perspectives from both business 
managers and ICT experts. As a result, 10 barriers and 17 risks that were concerned 
with general business aspects were used to construct questionnaire A (appendix 2), 
which was required to be filled in by the operation manager of the company or one that 
had sufficient knowledge on the company's operation. The rest 15 barriers and 23 risks 
that were concerned with technical aspects of ERP were grouped into questionnaire B 
(appendix 3), which was expected to be completed by the IT manager of the firm or one 
that had extensive knowledge on information systems or ERP. 
In order to achieve the objectives highlighted in section 5.6.3, the two designed 
questionnaires (appendix 2 & 3) contained the following sections: 
- Section 1 was concerned with general information about the respondent 
company, e.g. whether the company is using ERP (if not, what are the reasons 
for not using; if yes, when did they implement it), and whether the company is 
using foreign or domestic ERP system, etc. 
Section 2 involved the barriers associated with ERP exploitation. Respondents 
were asked to which extent they agree or disagree with the listed barrier 
statements. Each item was scored using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). All barrier items were thus scaled, so 
that the greater the score, the greater the extent that a barrier exists in the 
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company. An open question was added at the end of this section to explore any 
barriers that were not included in the list but were experienced by respondents. 
- Section 3 focused on the risks of ERP post-implementation. The researchers 
attempted to identify which of the 40 predefined risk events would be perceived 
by respondents as risks for ERP exploitation, as well as, to assess the importance 
of each identified risk according to its likelihood, impact and frequency of 
occurrence. In order to achieve these objectives, each of the 40 predefined risk 
events was examined in the questionnaire through four questions: 
1) Whether this event could be perceived as a risk to ERP exploitation ( 1 = 
yes, 2= no). 
2) What the probability of occurrence of this risk event could be (measured 
on a 3-point Likert scale, ranging from high [3] to low [1]). 
3) What level of impact this risk could result in (measured on a 3-point 
Likert scale, ranging from high [3] to low [1]). 
4) What the frequency of occurrence of this risk event could be (measured 
on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from very often [ 5] to very rarely [ 1 ]). 
An open question was added at the end of this section in order to explore any 
risks that were not included in the list but were experienced by the respondents. 
- At the end of the questionnaire, the respondents were asked what position they 
hold in the company. This piece of information is important to enable the 
researcher to check whether or not respondents of the questionnaire were 
appropriate stakeholders. 
- Also at the end of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate whether 
they want to receive a report of the findings, and whether they would like to 
participate in the second stage of the study. If so, respondents were asked to 
provide appropriate contact details. 
In addition, appropriate codes were assigned to all answers of the questionnaire 
questions in order to facilitate data analysis at the later stage. 
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5.6.4.2 Instrument translation 
The questionnaire used in the survey was originally developed in English and then 
translated into Chinese. The questionnaire could actually have been designed directly in 
Chinese, but since the literature review was undertaken in English as based mostly 
(90%) on English sources, the initial script was written in that language using its 
terminology. Furthermore, the study is based at an UK university and the entire 
research group uses English, so if the questionnaire was to be discussed and reviewed 
by both supervisor and colleagues, then the language would have to be English. 
However, Carlson (2000) points out that it is always a difficult task to translate a 
questionnaire instrument from one language into another language due to cultural and 
linguistic differences. Carlson (2000) particularly raises the issue of 'emic' and 'etic' 
problems. These two terms are neologisms that emerged from an analogy with the terms 
'phonemic' and 'phonetic' and were coined by the linguistic anthropologist Pike (1954). 
'Emic' concepts refer to terms that are specifically defined under a particular culture. 
They may or may not hold any relevance in any other cultures. 'Etic' concepts are 
concepts that are held universally. Carlson (2000) argued that many Western 'emic' 
concepts may have little relevance to other cultures, and thus cause difficulty when 
translating them into other languages. This is particularly true when translating English 
instruments into Chinese, as many terms, concepts and expressions used in English may 
not make sense in the Chinese context. As exemplified in a research study of Pratt 
(1991 ), some 'emic' Western terms, such as 'self-concept' and 'individual differences', 
can often cause confusion in the Chinese context and thus are difficult to translate into 
appropriate Chinese phrasing. Carlson (2000) stresses that an inappropriately translated 
instrument may have low reliability and validity, and data obtained with instruments 
that are poorly translated are meaningless. This issue can be particularly serious in a 
questionnaire survey because any ambiguities and problems, which respondents may 
encounter when filling it in, cannot be further clarified and explained (Peng and Nunes, 
2008a). 
In addition, a review of literature on data collection methods suggested that a literal 
word-by-word translation can often result in awkward sentence structure and 
incomprehensive meaning in the target-language version. As a consequence, 
experienced translators always strive to adapt their translation to achieve conceptual 
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equivalence rather than literal equivalence when translating instruments (Carlson, 2000; 
Harkness and Schoua-Glusberg, 1998). The term 'conceptual equivalence' means that 
the meanings of the text in both versions of the instrument are conceptually the same 
despite the text not being literally translated. In order to ensure a conceptually 
equivalent instrument, careful attention must be paid to the translation process (Carlson, 
2000). According to Carlson (2000) and Harkness and Schoua-Glusberg (1998), four 
approaches may be used in translating questionnaire instruments: 
- One-way translation. This approach involves the use of a single translator to 
translate the instrument from the original version to the target version in one go. 
- Back-translation. Back translation, also called as double- or two-way translation, 
involves at least two translators. The first translator translates the instrument 
from the original language to the target language. Then, the second translator, 
who has no contact with the first translator and has no knowledge about the 
original instrument, translates it from the target version back to the original 
language. The two instruments in the original language are then compared for 
accuracy and consistency. 
- Committee translation. This approach requires two or more translators (the 
committee) to translate the instrument from the original version into the target 
version, working either independently or in collaboration. The committee will 
then either combine the translations to produce a consensus version or have an 
independent observer to select the most appropriate translated version for use. 
- Decentering translation. The above approaches require that the instrument in 
the original language should be fully developed and validated before translation 
starts. In contrast, decentering translation assumes that the instrument 
developed in the original language is not considered finalised until the 
translation to the target language is completed. In other words, the instrument in 
the original language is just a first draft. As the translation process reveals 
problems in the original version, modifications can be made to the original 
version. Both versions of the instrument should be revised during the translation 
process until achieving conceptual equivalence. 
One-way translation approach was rejected immediately for the project, because as 
argued by Carlson (2000), despite the fact that this method is the simplest and cheapest 
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approach to implement, it often results in low validity and reliability for the translated 
instrument. 
Both back- and committee-translation approaches require the use of more than one 
translator. These two approaches thus prove to be infeasible for this project, which has 
insufficient resources to recruit multiple translators. Moreover, since the researcher of 
this project is fluent in both English and Chinese and has working experience in 
translation, it was unnecessary to employ alternative translators. As a consequence, 
neither back-translation nor committee-translation was adopted. 
In contrast with the other three approaches, the decentering translation method 
presented itself to be a more feasible and suitable approach to be used for this study. 
Carlson (2000) points out that the development of both language versions 
simultaneously is considered as the optimal method in translating instruments. 
Harkness and Schoua-Glusberg (1998) reinforce that many translation problems related 
to the original version of the instrument only become apparent after the translation is 
started. It is therefore better to keep the original version 'open' and enable it to be 
reviewed and revised repetitively as translation is in progress (Harkness and Schoua-
Glusberg, 1998). Previous translation experience of the PhD candidate of this survey 
also suggested that, by developing and revising both language versions simultaneously, 
it is easier for translators to ensure that, the text in both versions were conceptually 
equivalent and reflected the intended meanings of the questions, and therefore ensuring 
high validity of the instrument. Nevertheless, for many studies of which researchers are 
not fluent in both languages, it is impossible for them to develop the original and target 
versions simultaneously. Researchers of these studies thus often design the original 
version first and then recruit expert translators to handle translation, and adopt back or 
committee translation rather than decentering translation in the study. Due to these 
reasons, the decentering translation approach was adopted as the ideal method for 
translating the script of the survey reported in this paper. By drawing on the principle 
of the decentering approach, the researcher developed and translated the questionnaire 
script though a set of rigorous processes: 
Step 1. Constructed the draft questionnaire in English based on the predefined 
theoretical ontology. 
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Step 2. Initially validated the English version by consulting with the project 
supervisor and other colleagues in the research group (especially regarding 
its content, format, layout and structure as well as the relevance of the 
English questions). 
Step 3. Translated the English version into the Chinese version (there is a need to 
check a number of Chinese textbooks and articles to identify proper 
Chinese terms and phrasings to represent the original English text). 
Step 4. Iteratively revised both language versions until it was assured that both 
versions were conceptually equivalent and reflected the intended meanings 
of questions. 
After the translation process was completed, a pilot test was conducted to test the 
internal validity of the Chinese version of the questionnaire. 
5.6.4.3 Pilot test of the questionnaire instrument 
Internal validity in relation to questionnaire refers to the ability of the questionnaire to 
measure what it claims to measure (Saunders et al., 2007:366). Findings derived from 
a valid questionnaire should represent the reality of what the researcher is measuring 
(Saunders et al., 2007:366). In order to improve internal validity, questionnaires are 
often pilot tested prior to be used for collecting data (Robson, 2002). A pilot test of the 
questionnaire involves a group of stakeholders that are similar to the prospective 
respondents to fill in the questionnaire and provide feedback to the researcher, who may 
then revise and refine the questionnaire accordingly (Bryman, 2004). It thus helps to 
identify and tackle any possible uncertainties and ambiguities in the questionnaire in 
order to ensure that respondents will have no problems in understanding and answering 
the questions and thus will be more likely to provide valid and reliable responses 
(Saunders et al., 2007:366-377). 
In order to improve internal validity of the instrument, a pilot test was performed in this 
project before the questionnaire survey was conducted. Because the Chinese version of 
the questionnaire was the one that was to be sent to the prospective respondents, this 
version rather than the English one was used and assessed in the pilot test. Each 
participant of the pilot test was required to complete the Chinese version of the 
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questionnaire, and then answer the following five questions which were developed 
based on the guidance provided by Bell (2005): 
Whether the layout, · structure and instruction of the questionnaire were clear 
and appropriate; 
- Which, if any, questions were unclear or ambiguous; 
- Which, if any, questions the respondent felt uneasy to answer; 
- How long the questionnaire took to complete; 
- Any other comments. 
The pilot test conducted in this study contained two stages. 
The first stage of the pilot test involved eight Chinese postgraduate students and 
researchers in the author's department. After the pilot test, a few ambiguous phrases 
and sentences in the questionnaire were identified by the students. After asking for 
suggestions from these students and discussing them with other Chinese colleagues, a 
number of corrections to the questionnaire were made. These students also reported that 
questions were relatively difficult to understand and they had to spend around 20-25 
minutes to complete the questionnaire. This however, as pointed out by the students, 
may be attributed to a lack of practical experience on specific barrier and risk items 
measured in the questionnaire. 
After the first stage, the questionnaire was sent to the general manager and the IT 
manager of an SOE, which was operating in the special equipment manufacturing sector 
in Guangdong, for further testing. No further ambiguity or uncertainty about the 
questionnaire was identified by these managers. Both Chinese managers provided 
positive feedback regarding the layout, structure and questions of the questionnaire. 
They also found the level of difficulty of the questionnaire questions was acceptable and 
that they spent around 1 0 minutes on completing the questionnaire. The researcher 
fmally reviewed the questionnaires completed by these two managers, and identified 
that their answers were of high quality. The researcher therefore concluded the pilot 
test and started conducting the questionnaire survey. 
After the pilot test was finished and the final version of the questionnaire was obtained, 
a web-based questionnaire with the same layout, structure and content as the paper-
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based version was developed and stored on a web server. The URL to access to the 
web-based questionnaire was embedded in the paper-based questionnaire, and thus 
providing an alternative way for prospective respondents to complete and return the 
questionnaire. As discussed in section 5.6.2, the combination of the use of both paper-
based and web-based questionnaire can often help to increase the response rate. 
5.6.5 Questionnaire administration 
After the questionnaire instrument was developed and pilot tested, the questionnaire 
survey was carried out across the 118 target SOEs. This section describes and discusses 
how the questionnaire survey of this study was administered. 
5.6.5.1 Retrieving an accurate contact list 
The first task of the researcher was to obtain a contact list of the 118 SOEs. However, 
retrieving a contact list for these SOEs was not as straightforward as initially thought. 
This figure of 118 companies was found in the Guangdong Statistical Yearbook Online 
(http://www.gdstats.gov.cn/tjnj/ml_e.htm). This site only provides the actual number, 
not a list of companies and respective contacts. 
Although a number of Chinese company directory databases were identified (e.g. China 
Yellowpages Online, China Telecom Yellow Pages, etc), none of them actually 
provided a complete contact list for the selected companies. This situation confirms the 
difficulties reported by Roy et al (200 1 ), that information contained in business and 
telephone directories in China are often inaccurate and incomplete. After some despair 
and further investigation, the researcher concluded that the GSB is currently the only 
possible source of a complete and accurate list for the 118 SOEs. However, in the first 
attempt by telephone, staff in the GSB refused to provide such a list to the researcher. 
This should not have been a surprise, since as stated by Manion ( 1994 ), local authorities 
in China typically have few incentives to co-operate and are reluctant to allow access to 
official materials. Fortunately, an internal officer of the GSB was contacted by using 
family relationship (a very common stratagem in China). With the help of this internal 
contact, the researcher eventually retrieved the needed company list from GSB. From 
this anecdotal evidence, it is clear that personal relationships or "guanxi" are critical to 
the success of research in China. As discussed in the PEST analysis, guanxi is defined 
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as the special personal relationships/connections between two persons (e.g. friends, 
superiors and subordinates, business partners, etc ), with one needing something and 
another having the ability to offer it (Suet al, 2003). People in China are connected by 
extensive guanxi networks, which are used to exchange favours and reciprocally share 
resources (Suet al, 2003). This has been a prevalent social custom in China in all areas 
of life; in family, as well as in dealing with political authorities, social institutions and 
business people (Steidlmeier, 1999). This phenomenon is widely acknowledged and 
personal guanxi is "seen as a prerequisite for most information and business exchanges" 
(Bjorkman and Kock, 1995). 
5.6.5.2 Delivering the questionnaire 
After a completed company list with accurate postal addresses was retrieved, the 
questionnaire was disseminated to the 118 SOEs by post. As explained in section 
5.6.4.1, operation managers and IT managers were prospective respondents of the 
questionnaire. Therefore, the designed questionnaires were posted to these managers 
with a cover letter (appendix 1) as well as a pre-paid return envelope. The aim of the 
cover letter, as proposed by Hoinville and Jowell (1977), was to explain the purpose of 
the questionnaire survey, provide assurances about confidentiality, stress importance of 
the study and encourage recipients to reply. The URL of the web-based questionnaire 
was also embedded in the cover letter. The respondents could either complete the 
questionnaire and return it by using the pre-paid envelope or fill in the web-based 
version and submit it online. 
In addition, it was recognised that the mail system in mainland China is relatively slow 
(Roy et al., 2001). In particular, it took at least 5 working days for the questionnaire to 
be posted from one city to another city in the Guangdong province. In other words, it 
would take at least 2 weeks for the questionnaire to be returned to the researcher even if 
the respondents completed and sent back the questionnaire immediately after receiving 
it. Considering this condition, a reminder was sent out one month after, meaning that 2 
extra weeks were given to the respondents to complete the questionnaire. The reminder 
contained the original questionnaires as well as a follow-up letter which reminded the 
respondents that a response was expected. 
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5.6.5.3 Getting sufficient and earnest responses 
Getting sufficient and earnest responses was the most significant challenge experienced 
in this survey research. One month after the original questionnaire a reminder was sent 
out. Two months after this reminder only three replies were returned and one of these 
replies was inadequately completed (i.e. most questions were left blank and a big 
'DON'T KNOW' was written by hand over many of the remaining questions). 
It is apparent that the researcher of this survey is not the only one who experienced this 
research difficulty in China. Apart from the argumentation made above from the 
literature review, concerning the use of social networks (guanxi) in research, the 
researcher sought advices through conversation with a Professor in the Management 
School in the Sun Yat-sen University in China. This professor revealed that there is a 
prevalent impression that Chinese managers would rarely fill in a questionnaire for 
someone who they did not know or did not have a relationship with. This may be 
attributed to a lack of understanding on the scholarly objectives of research, but also to a 
pragmatic unwillingness to be disrupted (Manion, 1994 ). Additionally, it was 
confirmed that it may stem from a lack of trust and the fear that any sensitive answers 
provided might be used as evidence to threaten their career in the future under the 
centrally controlled bureaucratic environment, as also put forward by Roy et al (200 1 ). 
In fact, as discussed above and confirmed by authors such as Alon (2006:215), "the 
process of doing research in China is different from the process followed in the West, 
and reveals some of the intricacies of doing business there". In particular, practical 
experiences of many researchers (e.g. Gamble, 2003; Alon, 2006:215) show that, one 
may never successfully conduct a research in China by using routine data collection 
process without building and utilizing local personal guanxi networks. 
Consequently and facing the failure of routine survey procedures, the researcher sought 
to use his own personal guanxi and relationships in order to get access to and gain trust 
from the prospective respondents, and thus increase the response rate, as well as ensure 
that the data obtained was of better quality and more earnest. Specifically, the 
researcher requested his family and friends in China to use their personal guanxi 
networks to seek internal contacts in as many selected SOEs as possible. When an 
internal contact of a particular SOE was found, he/she was asked to forward the 
questionnaire to appropriate managers in the company to fill it in. With such efforts, the 
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researcher successfully obtained valid and usable responses from a total of 42 out of 
118 companies, which represents a relatively high response rate of 3 5 .6%. 
Practical expenence gained from this survey research echoed that personal guanxi 
network was an essential tool to ensure success in collecting research data in China 
under the current circumstances in the country. Researchers who do not possess an 
extensive guanxi network in China will certainly be at a disadvantage and may 
experience substantial difficulty in data collection when doing research (questionnaire 
survey in particular) there. 
The use of personal guanxi to get access to companies in China may be associates with 
a set of ethical problems, as well as advantages and disadvantages. The use of this type 
of social network may seem questionable and even abusive by Western standards. It 
could be argued that the sample obtained is neither random nor self-selected. 
Ultimately, it could be argued that the respondents may be put under pressure to 
respond, by the very guanxi network that was used to reach them, and that such pressure 
may influence responses. However, the choices that had to be made were between no 
responses or understand the business environment and play by its rules. 
From the result of this survey study, it was apparent that this approach helped increase 
the response rate substantially and thus increase the external validity of the respondent 
sample. Since most respondents of the survey were contacted through personal guanxi, 
it was possible for the researcher to trace back to the respondents for any questions that 
were not answered properly. The respondents also seemed to fill in the questionnaire 
patiently and earnestly because all returned questionnaires were fully completed and the 
answers provided were of high quality. The major disadvantage of this approach was 
that, although the researcher attempted to use personal relationships to approach as 
many firms as possible, it was of course impossible to reach all of the 118 SOEs 
through the use of personal contacts. This was the reason why it was thought necessary 
and important to perform the routine data collection process first in order to ensure that 
each SOE had the opportunity and possibility to participate in the study. Also, due to its 
inherent deficiency, personal guanxi network should only be seen as a supplement tool 
to use for increasing the response rate rather than seeing it as the primary approach for 
collecting research data in China. 
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Due to its controversial nature, the issues presented and discussed in this section were 
actually also presented for discussion in the 7tlt European Conference on Research 
Methodology for Business and Management Studies (ECRM) in London (Peng and 
Nunes, 2008a). 
5. 7 Data analysis for the questionnaire survey 
The questionnaires were sent to the operation managers and the IT managers of the 118 
SOEs, from which 42 SOEs (2*42 = 84 respondents) completed and returned the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire data were then analysed by using the statistical 
software called SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Science). Data analysis of the 
questionnaire comprised four components, namely descriptive analysis of respondents, 
univariate analysis of the barrier items, univariate analysis of the risk items, and 
bivariate analysis of correlations between barriers and risks. These components are 
discussed in the below sections. 
In addition, factor analysis was also considered to be used in this study. However, the 
exploratory nature of this survey implied that each item measured in the questionnaire 
referred to an independent and specific aspect. Because these items/variables were 
independent from each other, it was impossible to group them into several common 
factors, which are the fundamental and prerequisite required to carry out factor analysis 
(Bryman and Cramer, 2005:326; Field, 2005:619-680). Due to this reason, factor 
analysis was not applicable in this study. 
5.7.1 Descriptive and univariate analysis 
Descriptive analysis of respondents aimed to provide a descriptive summary on 
respondents and their companies, e.g. number of respondents, job positions of 
respondents, number and percentage of respondent companies that used ERP, type of 
ERP vendor, etc. 
Univariate analysis of the barrier items refers to the descriptive analysis of the 25 ERP 
barrier examined in the questionnaire. Frequency table was used to present to which 
degree respondents agreed or disagreed with each barrier item. Additionally, the mean 
was used to summarise the distribution of values for each barrier variable. The mean 
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consists of adding the value of the variable for each case and dividing the sum by the 
number of cases (de Vaus, 2002:220). It is often considered the most efficient method 
for summarising a distribution of values (Bryman and Cramer, 2005:101). Therefore, in 
order to provide a summary of responses regarding the 25 barrier statements, the means 
of the 25 barrier variables were calculated. The standard deviation was then used to 
reflect the degree to which the values of each barrier variable differed from the mean 
(Bryman and Cramer, 2005:105). Subsequently, the researcher prioritised the 25 barrier 
variables based on their means, as presented in chapter seven. 
Univariate analysis of the risk items refers to the descriptive analysis of the ERP risk 
events examined in the questionnaire survey. For each risk event, four variables were 
generated, namely one nominal variable (i.e. whether this event could be perceived as 
an ERP risk) and three ordinal variables (i.e. its probability of occurrence, its level of 
impact, and its frequency of occurrence). As such, a total of 160 variables were 
generated for the 40 ERP risk events. Frequency table or mean was used to summarise 
the values for each of these variables. Moreover, the researcher also attempted to 
prioritise the identified ERP risks according to their importance. The importance of 
each ERP risk event was assessed by its risk score, which took into account its 
probability of occurrence, impact and frequency of occurrence. More specifically, the 
following formula was developed and used to calculate the risk score for each risk event: 
Risk score of each ERP risk= I [W*(Probabi/ity + Impact + Frequency)] 
Based on this formula, the calculation of the risk score for each identified risk event 
should go through the following 3 steps: 
Step 1 (Probability + Impact + Frequency): sum up the values gtven by each 
respondent for the three independent dimensions of this risk event, namely 
probability of occurrence (i.e. 3, 2 or I), level of impact (i.e. 3, 2 or 1) and 
frequency of occurrence (i.e. 5 to 1 ). 
Step 2 W*(Probability + Impact + Frequency): 'W' refers to whether or not the 
respondent perceived the risk event as an ERP risk, with '1' stands for 'yes' 
and '0' means 'no'. In case that the respondent did not perceive the given risk 
event as an ERP risk, the formula will turn the value generated from step 1 
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into 0: W*(Probability + Impact + Frequency) = O*(Probability + Impact + 
Frequency) = 0. 
Step 1 and 2 thus generate the individual score that each respondent gave for a 
specific risk event. 
Step 3 £ [W*(Probability + Impact+ Frequency)]: sum up the individual score that 
each of the 42 respondents of the survey gave for a particular risk event, and 
thus generate the total risk score received by this event. 
Consequently, by using this formula, the researcher calculated the risk scores for all of 
the 40 identified risk events. Subsequently, the 40 ERP risk events were prioritised 
based on their risk scores, as presented in chapter seven. 
5.7.2 Bivariate analysis 
As discussed in section 5.6.3, this survey study aimed at also exploring the correlations 
between the identified ERP barriers and risks. In particular, it aimed at investigating: 
- If the existence of a particular ERP barrier in the firm was related to the existence of 
other barriers; 
- If the occurrence of particular risks was related to the occurrence of other risks; 
- If the occurrence of particular ERP risks was related to the existence of particular 
ERP barriers. 
In order to explore potential correlations between the identified ERP risks, a bivariate 
analysis was conducted. A bivariate analysis is a statistical technique that aims at 
identifying the correlation between two variables. Specifically, it aims to examine when 
scores of one variable change, whether scores of the other variable would change in the 
same or directly opposite way (Field, 2005: 108-1 09). Measures of bivariate correlation 
indicate both the strength (i.e. 0 to 1) and the direction (i.e. positive or negative) of the 
relationship between a pair of variables (Bryman and Cramer, 2005:213). 
Correlations can be measured by using different statistical techniques, e.g. Pearson's 
correlation, Spearrnan's rho and Kendall's tau. According to Field (2005:130-131) and 
Bryman and Cramer (2005:225), as compared to the other techniques, Spearman's rho 
(rs) is a more common and appropriate approach to use to measure correlations of 
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ordinal variables. Because the barrier and risk variables of this study were ordinal data 
sets, Spearman's rho was adopted for this study. 
In addition, correlations identified by using statistical techniques must be further tested 
for statistical significance (i.e. P value) in order to ensure that the correlation is not 
come up by sampling error and has external validity (Bryman and Cramer, 2005:225). 
Statistical significance of correlations can be examined by using either one-tailed or 
two-tailed test. Only a correlation that gains a P value of .05 or less from the test can be 
accepted as statistically significant (Field, 2005:31 ). As pointed by Field (2005 :29), 
one-tailed test should be used if the correlation that we are examining is directional (e.g. 
the higher the education level, the higher the income level), while two-tailed test should 
be used if the correlation that is examining is non-directional (e.g. higher education 
level will affect income level, but we do not know whether the income level will 
increase or decrease). Because the correlations of the barriers and risks were directional 
(e.g. when a barrier is more likely to exist in the company, the probability of occurrence 
of a risk is higher), one-tailed test was selected to use in this study. 
By following this approach, the researcher explored a comprehensive set of statistically 
significant relationships between the identified ERP barriers and risks, as presented and 
discussed in chapter seven. 
5. 7.3 Validity and reliability of the survey 
Internal validity in relation to questionnaire surveys refers to the questionnaire's ability 
to measure what it claims to measure (Saunders et al., 2007:366). Specifically, answers 
derived from a valid question in the survey should represent the reality of what the 
researcher is investigating (Saunders et al., 2007:366). In order to ensure that all 
questions in the survey have high level of validity and enable that valuable and accurate 
responses are collected, the questionnaire instruments used in this study were developed, 
translated and pilot tested, as discussed intensively in section 5.6.4. 
On the other hand, the Cronbach's alpha test was considered to test reliability or internal 
consistency of the responses. Reliability or internal consistency measures the 
consistency of responses across all the questions or a subset of the questions of the 
questionnaire (Saunders et al., 2003:31 0). It "is particularly important in connection 
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with multi-item scales. It raises the question of whether each scale is measuring a single 
idea and hence whether the items that make up the scale are internally consistent" 
(Bryman and Cramer, 2005:77). The Cronbach's alpha is the most frequently used 
statistical test to examine internal consistency (Field, 2005:667). If the alpha value is 
higher than 0.7, it can be concluded that the items that make up the scale have high level 
of internal consistency (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). However, the exploratory nature 
of this survey implied that each item in the questionnaire referred to an independent and 
specific factor. Because a large amount of factors were covered in this survey, each 
factor was measured by a single item rather than multiple items. The nature of 
Cronbach's alpha (Bryman and Cramer, 2005:77) determines that, when a survey does 
not involve the use of multiple items to measure any single concepts, it is impossible to 
perform the Cronbach's alpha test to examine the internal consistency of the responses. 
Due to this reason, the Cronbach's alpha was not applicable in this survey research. 
Also due to the same reason, factor analysis was not appropriate for this survey study, 
as discussed above. Nevertheless the researcher believed that the data collected from 
the survey had high reliability, because respondents of the survey seemed to fill in the 
questionnaire patiently and earnestly and all returned questionnaires were fully 
completed and the answers provided were of high quality. 
5.8 Data collection for the case study research 
After the questionnaire survey was concluded, an exploratory case study research was 
conducted at the second stage of the mixed-method design of this project in order to 
verify and further explore the findings derived from the survey research. This section 
presents and discusses the procedures and issues associated with data collection of the 
case study research of this project. 
5.8.1 Selection of data collection method for the case study research 
Multiple data collection methods may be used for a case study. However, considering 
that this case study component was a supplementary study to triangulate with the 
questionnaire findings, and also due to time and resource constraints of this project, the 
researcher decided to adopt a single data collection method rather than multiple methods 
for this qualitative study. 
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In a multi-methods case study, documents are commonly used as a supplementary 
source to corroborate the findings derived from other data collection methods (Yin, 
2003:87~ Robson, 2002:352). Because this case study was not a multi-methods study 
and more importantly it was perceived that Chinese managers would always be reluctant 
to give internal documents to external members, documentary information was not 
collected and used in this case. 
On the other hand, according to Yin (2003), a case study research can always be 
flexibly designed in relation to the nature of the research question. All data collection 
methods (i.e. questionnaire, observation, and interview) discussed in section 5.5 may be 
used for a case study (Yin, 2003). 
A questionnaire here however was rejected immediately, because the purpose for 
conducting a case study research was, at this stage, to explore qualitative human 
insights and to verify and supplement the primary questionnaire findings, rather than 
seeking further quantitative evidence. 
The applicability of the observation method was then considered. As argued by Robson 
(2002:309-31 0) the purpose for doing observations is to seek understanding on human 
actions and behaviour by directly watching what people do and listening to what they 
say. However the purpose for doing a case study research here was not to understand 
human actions or behaviour, but to explore human perceptions and views on related 
ERP post-implementation issues. In addition it was perceived that, barriers and risks for 
ERP post-implementation may exist hidden in the business context, and thus may not be 
observed directly and easily. Due to these reasons, observation was considered as an 
unsuitable data collection method for this case study. 
Subsequently, the suitability of structured interview and unstructured interview was 
analysed. Structured interviews are similar to questionnaires and can only be used to 
generate quantitative findings rather than in-depth and qualitative evidence, and thus 
could not suit the needs of this exploratory case study. Unstructured interviews are 
open conversations of which the direction may be changed unpredictably as the 
conversation flows. Due to this reason, unstructured interviews were inappropriate to 
be used to seek further clarification and explanation for a set of precise issues that were 
predefined after the analysis of the survey data. 
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In fact, as compared to all above data collection methods, semi-structured interview 
presents itself to be the most applicable and desirable approach for this case study. As 
discussed in section 5.5.2, semi-structured interviews are carried out based on a list of 
predefined questions and thus follow clear and specific directions. This feature would 
allow the researcher to focus on a set of issues identified from the survey during the 
interview. On the other hand, because interviewers can probe beyond answers and 
extend the predetermined questions flexibly in semi-structured interviews, it offers 
researchers the opportunity to gather in-depth insights from the interviewee to fully 
explore the phenomena studied. Based on these considerations, semi-structured 
interview was selected as the ideal data collection method for the case study. 
In addition, all semi-structured interviews were conducted face-to-face rather than over 
the telephone. It was considered that, doing interviews face to face could lead to a 
number of advantages. In particular, it would enable the researcher to observe any non-
verbal behaviours (e.g. facial expressions, body language) of the interviewees to fully 
explore and understand their views. This is one important aspect of communication in 
China. It would also help to increase the interviewee's trust in the researcher, and thus 
leading to more earnest and meaningful responses. 
5.8.2 Purpose for doing follow-up interviews in the case study 
The main purpose to conduct a set of follow-up interviews in the case study was to 
verify and further explore the findings derived from the questionnaire survey. 
Therefore, a list of ERP issues to be covered and explored in the semi-structured 
interviews was identified based on the questionnaire findings. The reasons for selecting 
these areas to be further explored are discussed and justified in chapter seven, and thus 
are not presented in detail here. Nevertheless, in general, the researcher identified and 
selected from the questionnaire findings the following areas to be verified and further 
explored in the interviews: 
All of the 25 identified ERP barriers; 
- 24 shortlisted ERP risks (i.e. the top 15 risks, and another 9 risks that were 
found to have correlations with other ERP barriers and risks); 
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- As well as the 35 correlations identified (i.e. 17 correlations between barriers, 
10 correlations between risks, and 8 correlations between barriers and risks). 
As a consequence, the follow-up case study aimed at: 
- Verifying the above ERP barriers and risks selected based on the questionnaire 
findings; 
- Further exploring the causes and consequences of these barriers and risks; 
- Further exploring the correlations identified between ERP barriers and risks; 
Exploring other possible ERP post-implementation barriers and risks that may 
be important to SOEs. 
5.8.3 Identification of the case companies and interviewees 
At the end of the questionnaire, respondents were asked whether or not they would like 
to participate in the case study stage to further discuss ERP-related barriers and risks in 
their companies. From these volunteer companies, two SOEs, which had completed the 
questionnaire, were identified to participate in the follow-up case study. 
Additionally, it was considered that IT managers play a crucial role in ERP exploitation. 
Their perceptions and opinions on related ERP post-implementation issues were 
perceived to be highly valuable and meaningful to this study. IT managers of the case 
companies were hence selected to be interviewed. Moreover, CEOs or General 
Managers in Chinese SOEs hold very strong power in the firm. Their views and 
decisions can certainly affect the use and exploitation of ERP systems. CEOs of the 
case companies were thus also selected to be interviewed. In fact, for the two selected 
case companies, their IT managers and CEOs were also respondents to the questionnaire 
survey. Therefore, the purpose for interviewing them was also to seek further 
explanation on their answers provided in the survey. On the other hand, departmental 
managers and staff, who are key users of the ERP system, were also selected to be 
interviewed. In addition, as discussed in section 6.4.1, the researcher selected three 
business areas for studying operational and analytical risks of ERP, namely sales and 
marketing area, financial and accounting area, and purchasing and production area. 
Therefore, departmental managers and system users selected to be interviewed were all 
from one of these three business divisions. 
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Consequently, a set of semi-structured interviews was carried out with the CEOs, IT 
managers, and departmental managers and system users in diverse departments (i.e. 
sales, financial, production, and purchasing department) of the two case companies. 
5.8.4 Design of interview instruments 
An interview instrument is a list of themes and questions to be covered in the interview 
(Saunders et al., 2003 :246). It helps the researcher to focus on the key issues and 
themes that are intended to be explored when doing interviews (Yates, 2004:163). 
When designing the interview instrument, the first task of the researcher is to identify a 
possible range of themes to be covered (Yates, 2004:163). As mentioned above, a list 
of ERP issues to be covered and explored in the semi-structured interviews in the case 
study was identified and selected based on the questionnaire findings. As a 
consequence, these ERP areas and issues were used as the basis to construct the 
interview instruments (as specified in appendix 4). 
On the other hand, in order to explore these identified areas efficiently, the designed 
instruments consisted of four types of questions, namely initiating questions, follow-up 
questions, trigger questions, and closed questions: 
Initiating questions are open questions that are related with the predefined 
categories and issues and are used to direct the conversation (Yates, 2004:165). 
This type of question is used to open up a topic and is designed to encourage the 
interviewee to provide an extensive and developmental answer to reveal and 
describe attitudes, facts or events (Yates, 2004: 166; Saunders et al., 2003 :262). 
The initiating questions were often followed by a set of follow-up questions, 
which aim at encouraging the interviewees to "expand on their initial responses 
and to develop points without changing topic or asking a new initiating 
question" (Yates, 2004: 167). 
In addition, a set of trigger questions were also included in the instruments. 
Very often, interviewees may not be able to think of and give a proper and 
efficient response for a particular question. Trigger questions were used in this 
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situation in order to stimulate discussion and trigger interviewee's thinking 
(Anderson, 1990). Additionally, when conducting interviews, interviewees may 
sometimes unconsciously or consciously talk about something that may not be 
relevant to the topics being interested. In this situation, follow-up questions and 
trigger questions should be used to refocus the conversation and bring 
interviewees back to the topic. 
Closed questions are used to obtain specific information or to confirm a fact or 
opinion by restricting the interviewee to answer only yes or no (Saunders et al., 
2003:263). 
Consequently, four different interview scripts were developed in order to collect human 
insights respectively from the CEOs, IT managers, departmental managers and system 
users of the case companies. These four instruments had similar layout and structure, 
and each of these covered a specific set of ERP issues that were deemed to be relevant 
to the type of interviewee concerned. All ERP areas and issues listed above were 
covered in these four instruments. A brief description of these instruments is given 
below. 
(a) Interview instrument for IT managers 
The interview instrument for IT managers (appendix 8) focused on a number of 
organisational barriers, system barriers, organisation-wide risks and technical risks. A 
set of initiating question were designed to encourage the IT manager to talk freely about 
their perceptions on these barriers and risks. The initiating questions were followed by 
a set of follow-up and trigger questions in order to explore the manager's opinions on 
the causes and impacts of these factors/events. Closed questions were used where 
appropriate to check the researcher's understanding on the IT manager's responses. 
(b) Interview instrument for CEOs 
Diverse organisational barriers and organisation-wide risks were contained in the 
interview instrument for CEOs (appendix 6). Initiating questions were developed to 
explore CEO's perceptions on these barriers and risks from a senior management 
perspective. The instrument also contained a set of follow-up, trigger and closed 
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questions that were used to explore the causes and impacts of the barriers and risks 
concerned. 
(c) Interview instrument for departmental managers 
The interview instrument for departmental managers (appendix 7) covered a set of 
cultural barriers, organisational barriers, operational risks, and analytical risks. The 
researcher developed and used a variety of questions to explore the opinions of 
departmental managers on these ERP barriers and risks from the perspective of their 
own functional divisions. 
(d) Interview instrument for system users 
Interview instrument for system users (appendix 9) focused on a number of 
organisational barriers, system barriers, operational risks, analytical risks, organisation-
wide risks, and system risks. The instrument consisted of a set of initiating, follow-up, 
trigger and closed questions that were used for the same purposes as those of the other 
three instruments. 
Moreover, all interview instruments were originally developed in English and then 
translated to Chinese. The Chinese version of the interview instruments was one that 
being used in the interviews. Because any ambiguities that interviewees might have 
during the interview could be explained and clarified by the interviewer, the issue for 
translating interview instruments was not as significant as that of the questionnaire 
instruments. Due to this reason, the translation issue of interview instrument is not 
further discussed here, although the researcher would stress that careful attention was 
paid to translate the interview instruments and ensure each question of the instrument 
reflected its intended meaning. 
5.8.5 Interview administration 
The case study research was conducted in China in March 2008. The two case studies 
with the selected SOEs were carried out sequentially rather than simultaneously in order 
to avoid mixing up the data derived from different cases. 
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Before each case study started, the CEOs of both case companies wee contacted and 
been requested to arrange suitable staff (i.e. IT manager, departmental managers and 
users) to get involved in this case study. An introduction letter (appendix 5) was 
developed to explain briefly the purposes of the study, length of the interview, themes 
to be covered, how the collected data would be used, and confidentiality of the 
interview data. 20 copies of this letter were given to the CEO of each company, who 
was requested to pass this letter to selected interviewees before the interview day. It 
was perceived that this introduction letter would help to increase the interviewee's trust 
in the researcher, and thus may enable the interview to be carried out more smoothly. 
Each interview was carried out at the workplace of the interviewee and lasted for 40 
minutes to 1 hour. The interviews with the IT manager and the departmental managers 
of the case company were carried out first, and were followed by the interviews 
conducted with system users of the company in order to triangulate with the responses 
given by the managers. After all these interviews, the researcher was able to develop a 
sound knowledge on the company's current ERP usage status, and thus was ready to 
discuss related ERP issues with the CEO at a strategic level. Subsequently, the 
interview with the CEO of the firm was conducted. In addition, a maximum of three 
interviews were carried out per day in order to allow the researcher to have sufficient 
time to re-organise and make initial analysis on the data collected to identify new 
questions to be covered in the following interviews. 
When opening the interview, the researcher firstly thanked the interviewee for taking 
part in the study, and then restated the purposes of the research and current progress, 
and more importantly reassured that confidentiality of responses and data collected would 
always be protected through the anonymisation of both interviewees and their firms. 
The interview was conducted by following the established interview instruments and 
was recorded by using digital recorder with the permission of the interviewee. 
Additionally, it should be noted that, the flexible nature of semi-structured interview 
format adopted allowed that the researcher could modify the interview instruments to 
focus on particular areas of interest of the different managers interviewed and also to 
modify (and even exclude) questions that are found to be unproductive for the goals of 
the research in previous interviews. As a consequence, when the interview was in 
progress, the researcher may have omitted or added some questions and change the 
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orders of questions depending on the flow of the conversation in order to fully explore 
the views of the interviewee. 
On the other hand, many experienced researchers (e.g. Robson, 2002; Saunders et al., 
2003 :260) suggest that a full record of the interview should be compiled as soon as 
possible after it has taken place. Otherwise, "the exact nature of explanations provided 
may be lost [ ... and therefore may] lead to an issue about the trustworthiness of [ ... the 
collected] data" (Saunders et al., 2003:260). Due to this reason, the researcher had 
spent 4-5 hours in average on transcribing each digital and verbal record derived from 
the interview into a written transcription, soon (usually within two days) after the 
interview had been taken place. The transcription of each interview was also emailed to 
the associated interviewee to read through. This activity would help the researcher to 
test his understanding on the responses provided by the interviewee and thus allowed 
removal of bias or incomplete interpretation. Moreover, it provided an opportunity for 
interviewees to add any further points (Saunders et al., 2003 :260). 
By following these procedures, the researcher conducted a total of 25 semi-structured 
interviews with the CEOs, IT managers, departmental managers and system users of the 
two case companies. In April 2008, the researcher completed the multi-case study and 
came back to the UK with all interview transcriptions that were ready for analysis. 
5.9 Data analysis for the case study research 
5.9.1 Analysis of interview data 
The data collected from the 25 semi-structured interviews was analysed usmg a 
thematic analysis approach with a priori coding. Thematic analysis is "a method for 
identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data" (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). It is the process that involves the identification of themes through "careful 
reading and re-reading of the data" (Rice and Ezzy, 1999:258). This data-driven 
inductive approach however can also often be used together with a deductive priori 
coding, as proposed by Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006). As further explained by 
Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, this approach "complemented the research questions by 
allowing the tenets of social phenomenology to be integral to the process of deductive 
thematic analysis while allowing for themes to emerge direct from the data using 
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inductive coding". By following the principles given by Braun and Clarke (2006), the 
thematic analysis conducted in this study consisted of five stages: 
Stage 
1. Getting familiar with the data 
2. Coding the data 
3. Connecting codes and identifying 
themes 
4. Reviewing themes and developing 
concept maps 
Description of the process 
Getting known the data through the process of 
transcription, reading and re-reading the data. 
Developing the coding scheme by using priori codes 
and codes emerged from data, coding the textual 
data in a systematic fashion across the entire data 
set by using NVivo. 
Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all 
data relevant to each potential theme. 
Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded 
quotes and the entire data set, generating concept 
maps of the analysis. 
5. Reporting findings Final analysis of selected quotes, relating back of 
the analysis to the research question, questionnaire 
findings & literature, producing a chapter of findings. 
Table 5.2: The five stages for doing thematic analysis 
(modified from Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
Stage 1: Getting familiar with the data 
The process of transcription "while it may seen time-consuming, frustrating, and at 
times boring, can be an excellent way to start familiarizing yourself with the data" 
(Riessman, 1993). In particular, Braun and Clarke (2006) reinforce that "the time spent 
in transcription is not wasted, as it informs the early stages of analysis, and you will 
develop a far more thorough understanding of your data through having transcribed it". 
As a consequence, the researcher was able to develop a sound knowledge on the 
collected data through the process of transcription. Moreover, before conducting the 
actual data analysis, the researcher had read and re-read the full set of interview 
transcriptions in order to generate a more thorough and in-depth understanding about 
the data collected. Furthermore, any ideas for coding emerged at this stage were noted 
down in the memo. 
Stage 2: Coding the data 
After generating a thorough understanding on the data collected, the researcher began 
the second stage of the thematic analysis, which involved the generation of codes and 
then attaching the textual data into relevant codes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). A code is 
a label that refers to ''the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information 
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that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon" (Boyatzis, 
1998:63). A "good code" is one that captures the qualitative richness of the 
phenomenon (Boyatzis, 1998: 1 ). 
Allan (2003) suggests that researchers should avoid coding by microanalysis of the data, 
word-by-word and line-by-line, which is not just time-consuming but may also lead to 
confusion at times. In order to avoid coding every single sentence in the original text, 
Attride-Stirling (200 1) reinforces that the codes developed should be limited in scope 
and focus explicitly on the object of analysis (e.g. the established barrier and risk 
ontologies in this study). As a consequence, the identification of codes in this study 
focused particularly on texts related to ERP barriers and risks, as well as their causes 
and consequences, which were the main topics being studied in the interviews. The 25 
barriers and 24 risks covered in the interview instruments immediately presented to be a 
set of priori codes to be used in this process. Additionally, the researcher also aimed at 
exploring extra codes that were related with new ERP barriers and risks, which had not 
been identified at the previous stages of this project but emerged from the interview data. 
The data were revisited many times looking and re-looking for emerging codes. Some 
identified codes might have been deleted, merged or split, as appropriate. Consequently, 
an initial coding scheme was established to highlight all codes identified (appendix 10). 
In addition, the codes in the coding scheme "should have quite explicit boundaries 
(definitions), so that they are not interchangeable or redundant" (Attride-Stirling, 2001), 
and therefore can allow constant comparison to take place. Due to these reasons, each 
code identified in the coding scheme was given an explicit definition, as shown in 
appendix 1 0. 
Meanwhile, by working systematically through the entire data set, relevant pieces of the 
textual data were extracted and attached into the codes identified in the coding scheme. 
Each data extract might be uncoded, coded once, or coded many times, as relevant. In 
addition, NVivo, a data management program, was used to store all interview 
transcriptions, as well as to conduct the coding process. 
Stage 3: Connecting codes and identifying themes 
The third stage of the thematic analysis begins "when all data have been initially coded 
and collated, and you have a long list of the different codes that you have identified 
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across the data set" (Braun and Clarke, 2006). As specified by Braun and Clarke, this 
stage, "which re-focuses the analysis at the broader level of themes, rather than codes, 
involves sorting the different codes into potential themes, and collating all the relevant 
coded data extracts within the identified themes". A theme is a cluster of lined 
categories and codes that form a pattern or unit (Holloway, 1997: 152). 
By reading and re-reading the identified codes and the coded texts, two main themes 
were identified by the researcher, namely ERP barrier and ERP risk. In addition, the 
main theme of ERP barrier contained three sub-themes, namely cultural barrier, 
organisational barrier and system barrier. On the other hand, the main theme of ERP 
risk also involved four sub-themes, namely operational risk, analytical risk, 
organisation-wide risk and technical risk. It is obvious that, these sub-themes of ERP 
barrier and risk are actually priori themes that were identified in the theoretical barrier 
and risk ontology presented in chapter six. Subsequently, all identified codes and coded 
data extracts were sorted into relevant themes and sub-themes by using NVivo. 
Additionally, when a code is concerned with an ERP barrier/risk, it was linked with 
other codes that referred to as a cause or consequence of this barrier/risk, as exemplified 
in Figure 5.2. 
The initial coding scheme was reorganised into the final coding scheme (appendix 11) 
to highlight the hierarchical structure between the main themes, sub-themes and codes, 
as well as, to highlight the cross-relationships between the identified codes. The entire 
data set was revisited in order to identify any new quotes or data extracts that could be 
added to the identified codes by using the fmal coding scheme. 
Main theme Sub-theme 
1----1 Organisational 1---~ 
ERP Barrier Barriers 
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Stage 4: Reviewing themes and developing concept maps 
Stage 3 ended "with a collection of candidate themes, and sub-themes, and all extracts 
of data that have been coded in relation to them" (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The fourth 
stage of the thematic analysis aimed at "checking if the identified themes work in 
relation to the coded data extracts and the entire data set" (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
This stage contained three steps. 
Firstly, the researcher reviewed all the codes and the coded texts for each main theme 
and sub-theme, and examined "whether they appear to form a coherent pattern" (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). This process resulted in a number of changes to the codes and data 
extracts related with each identified theme. 
Secondly, the researcher drew a set of concept maps to represent the identified themes. 
These maps were used, "as they are useful exploratory tools and an efficient method to 
share, discuss and represent qualitative data" (Nunes et al, 2004). Two concept maps 
were initially considered to develop for the two identified main themes, i.e. ERP barrier 
and ERP risk. It was however recognised that, each of these two main themes contained 
a large amount of codes, and thus could not be clearly represented in a single concept 
map. Therefore, instead of creating a holistic but over-complicated diagram, the 
researcher established seven concept maps, of which each covered one sub-theme of 
ERP barrier and risk (i.e. cultural barrier, organisational barrier, system barrier, 
operational risk, analytical risk, organisation-wide risk and technical risk), as presented 
in appendix 12. An example of these concept maps is given in Figure 5.3 to illustrate 
the complexity of the findings and the richness of the interview responses. 
Finally, the researcher revisited the entire data set to examine the trustworthiness of the 
identified themes in relation to the data set, as well as to check whether the established 
concept maps 'accurately' reflected the meanings evident in the data set as a whole 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006). This process resulted in a number of revisions to the 









Figure 5.3 : Concept map for the theme of organisational barrier 
Stage 5: Reportingfindings 
The findings of the multi-case study were reported in chapter eight, by using the seven 
established concept maps as the infrastructure, and relevant quotes from the interviews 
as anecdotal evidence to support the argumentation. As highlighted by (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006), the process of reporting the findings was also the process of final 
analysis of selected quotes, relating back of the analysis to the research question, 
questionnaire findings and literature. This proved to be particularly valid for this study, 
as final decisions regarding which quotes to be used were only made in the process of 
reporting. Moreover, the researcher also linked the interview outcomes with findings of 
the questionnaire and the literature reviewed when reporting the results in chapter eight. 
Overall , the interview data was analysed by using the rigorous approach of thematic 
analysis with a priori coding. Nevertheless, as all interviews were conducted in Chinese 
with managers in China, there was a need to translate the qualitative data collected from 
Chinese into English in order for it to be used in the reporting of findings in this thesis . 
This translation issue is addressed in the next section. 
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5.9.2 Translation ofthe collected qualitative data 
In this multi-case study, the semi-structured interviews were conducted with all 
interviewees in Chinese. The data collected were thus originally in Chinese. As a 
consequence, the original Chinese data required to be translated to English in order for 
it to be quoted in the reporting of findings in this thesis and related publications. 
As discussed and exemplified in section 5.6.4.2, due to cultural differences the 
translation of instrument from one language to another is a complex and difficult 
process which requires extra attention. Similar difficulties are expected to occur when 
translating qualitative data (Twinn, 1997, 2000). It can even be argued that translating 
the data derived from a qualitative study may be much more difficult than translating an 
instrument, because the content of an instrument is limited whereas the amount of data 
collected from a qualitative study can be complex and considerable. Therefore, the 
translation of qualitative data should be treated carefully and earnestly (Twinn, 1997; 
Temple and Young, 2004). 
The first temptation of the researcher was to translate the full set of interview 
transcriptions from Chinese to English prior to data analysis. This however soon 
proved to be undesirable. In particular, Twinn (1997) argues that translating the full set 
of interview transcriptions can certainly be extremely time-consuming. More 
importantly, Twinn goes on to claim that the meaning underlying the original qualitative 
data may often be lost after such translation. In truth, by analysing the work presented 
by Twinn (1997) and Temple and Young (2004), the researcher identified a set of risk 
events that would often occur when translating interview transcriptions: 
- The researcher may not be able to find appropriate and equivalent words and 
terms in the target language to represent the data in the original language. In 
particular, finding appropriate English words to capture the meaning of the 
Chinese data has been reported as a continuing problem in the qualitative studies 
conducted by Twinn (1997; 2000). 
- As discussed in section 5.6.4.2, if the translation is done properly, conceptual 
equivalence rather than literal equivalence should be achieved. Different terms 
and words can be used in the translation as far as the meaning of the translated 
text is conceptually equivalent to the original one. This however may lead to a 
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significant risk that may affect the development of codes and categories in 
qualitative data analysis. As exemplified in the study of Twinn ( 1997), the three 
translators involved in the study came up with three different interpretations for 
the same piece of Chinese original data. These three interpretations had similar 
meanings but also involved the use of significantly different phrasings. Twinn 
(1997) argues that different codes and categories may be derived from these 
different interpretations. 
- If subjective interpretations and explanations of the translator are added and 
used in the translation, the original meaning of the qualitative data collected 
from the interviewees may often be changed after the translation process. 
The direct impact that may result from the occurrence of the above risk events is that, 
the original meaning of the data in the transcription may be relatively changed or lost 
after the translation, and therefore impacting the development of codes and themes from 
the data and also affecting the quality of data analysis (Twinn, 1997). As a consequence, 
in order to minimise the impact of these risks, the researcher decided not to translate the 
full set of transcriptions prior to data analysis. Instead, the researcher carried out the 
entire data analysis based on the original Chinese data. After the process of data 
analysis was completed, in other words, after all codes and themes were identified and 
all relevant pieces of the textual data were coded, the selected quotes were translated 
into English in order to be presented in the thesis. It was deemed that this approach 
could help to minimise errors and misrepresentations that might occur during the 
process of translation, and thus raise the quality of data analysis and enhance the 
trustworthiness of findings. 
5.9.3 Validity and reliability of the case study 
As argued by Lincoln and Guba (1985:290), the question of the trustworthiness of a 
piece of qualitative research must be addressed, in order to persuade audiences that the 
findings of an inquiry are meaningful and valuable. Lincoln and Guba suggest four key 
areas that should be considered when examining trustworthiness of a piece of 
qualitative research: 
- Credibility (also referred to as Internal validity); 
- Transferability (also referred to as External validity); 
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- Dependability (also referred to as Reliability); 
- Confirmability (also referred to as Objectivity). 
Among these areas, transferability refers to whether or not the findings can be 
generalised to other contexts. However, since the purpose for doing the follow-up case 
study in this project was not to produce generalisable findings, the issue of 
transferability was not particularly considered in this study. Consequently, the other 
three key areas, which can affect the trustworthiness of this case study, were considered 
and addressed: 
- Credibility requires that researchers concern themselves with the accuracy of 
description in a piece of qualitative research, and ensure that the findings derived 
from the analysis are clearly relevant to the specifics of the field. The establishment 
of the credibility of findings "entails both ensuring that research is carried out 
according to the canons of good practices and submitting research findings to the 
members of the social world who were studied for confirmation that the investigator 
has correctly understood that social world" (Bryman, 2004:275). In order to ensure 
high credibility of findings, the data collected was rigorously and systematically 
analyzed by using the approach ofthematic analysis as discussed in section 5.9.1. 
Moreover, the data collected were originally in Chinese, and thus were required to 
translate into English. In order to ensure the credibility of findings would not have 
been affected by inappropriate translation, the researcher carried out the entire data 
analysis based on the original Chinese data collected. After the process of data 
analysis was completed, the selected quotes were translated into English in order to 
be presented in the thesis. It was felt that this approach could help to minimise 
errors and misrepresentations that might occur during the process of translation, and 
thus enhance the credibility of findings. 
- Dependability relates to both the research methods used and the analysis of the data. 
It "entails ensuring that complete records are kept of all phases of the research 
process, e.g. problem formulation, selection of research participants, fieldwork notes, 
interview transcripts, data analysis decisions, and so on, in an accessible manner" 
(Bryman, 2004:275). So that peers and audiences would act as auditors to establish 
how far proper procedures are being and have been followed (Bryman, 2004:275). 
It is evident that, complete records of all phases and processes of this case study 
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have been kept, as reported and discussed intensively in section 5.8 and 5.9. It 
should be stressed that these processes had been followed strictly and consistently 
during the case study, in order to ensure high reliability of the findings generated. 
In truth, by making use ofthe same set of interview transcripts in all of the 25 semi-
structured interviews, it was deemed that a reasonably high degree of consistency 
and reliability should have been achieved. 
- Confirmability is concerned with the issue that, during qualitative data collection 
and analysis, bias may creep in as a researcher consciously or unconsciously 
imposes his or her own interpretations on the data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985:292; 
Bryman, 2004:276). In order to reduce potential researcher bias in this study, 
written transcriptions of interviews had been sent to related respondents to read 
through, as discussed in section 5.8.5. A number of corrections to written 
transcriptions were made based on the feed backs of respondents. 
5.10 Research design of this project 
So far, this chapter has discussed and explained the research methodology in terms of 
research strategies and data collection methods selected and used for this project. In 
conjunction with the literature review and the PEST analysis completed at the earlier 
stages of this study, the research design adopted for this project was presented as a 
rigorous approach to enable the researcher to achieve theory building, testing and 
extension, in answering the research questions. Figure 6.4 highlights all 
components/stages contained in this research design. 
As shown in Figure 5 .4, the research design of this project consists of seven 
components/stages. 
Stage 1: Identifying research questions. The first stage of this research was to identify a 
clear and reasonable research question. A set of sub-questions, the research aims and 



























Final Ontology of 
ERP Barriers and 
Risks 
Figure 5.4: Research design of this research project 
Stage 2: Literature review. The literature review aimed to generate sufficient 
background knowledge on the research subject by reviewing previous ISIERP studies 
and clarifying the concept, development history, functionality, benefits and issues of 
information systems in general and ERP system in particular. 
Stage 3: PEST analysis. In order to generate a profound understanding on the unique 
Chinese context, and refine and focus the research context by selecting a geographical 
region, an industrial sector and a type of company in China to base the study on, a PEST 
analysis was conducted at the third stage of this research. The researcher reviewed and 
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synthesised large amount of English and Chinese articles (including journal articles, 
books, official statistical reports, market research reports, news and online articles) and 
then used these literature as raw materials to construct arguments and standpoints for 
this analysis. The PEST analysis was considered an important analytical part where 
theory building of this project started. As concluded from the PEST analysis, SOEs in 
the electronic and telecommunication manufacturing industry in the Guangdong 
province in China were selected to study. Moreover, as the research context had been 
narrowed from all companies in China to a specific and feasible set of Chinese SOEs, 
the initial research question was refined to reflect this change of research context, as 
mentioned in chapter one. 
Stage 4, 5 and 6 are the main stages for building and testing theories in the context of 
selected Chinese SOEs. 
Stage 4: Building the initial ontology of ERP post-implementation barriers and risks. 
At the fifth stage, the researcher carried out a systematic review which focused on IS 
and business studies, theoretical papers and case studies. Through this systematic 
review, the researcher aimed at establishing an explicit IS lens to frame the study and 
guide the data collection process. As a result of the systematic review, a total of 29 
ERP barriers and 40 ERP risks were identified. A barrier and risk ontology was then 
established to highlight the identified ERP barriers and risks. This barrier and risk 
ontology served as the theoretical basis for constructing the questionnaire survey at the 
next stage. Nevertheless, it was considered that the 4 external barriers contained in the 
ontology were sensitive topics under China's bureaucratic environment. Consequently, 
these 4 external barriers were not further studied in the survey. In other words, 25 out 
of29 identified ERP barriers were involved in the questionnaire survey. 
Stage 5: Cross-sectional questionnaire survey. The questionnaire survey, which was the 
first data collection phase, was the sixth stage of the entire project, and aimed to 
examine the suitability of the theoretical ontology in the context of selected Chinese 
SOEs. Specifically, the questionnaire survey aimed to: 
- Explore whether, and to which extent, each of the 25 predefined ERP barriers exist 
in SOEs; 
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- Identify which of the 40 predefined risk events would be perceived by respondents 
as risks for ERP exploitation, as well as, to assess the importance of each identified 
risk according to its likelihood, impact and frequency of occurrence; 
- Explore the most crucial ERP barriers and risks to SOEs; 
- Explore the correlations between the barriers and risks identified. 
Stage 6: Exploratory case study. After the data collected from the survey was analysed, 
a multi-case study composed by a set of semi-structured interviews was carried out to 
further explore and validate a set of findings derived from the questionnaire findings. In 
particular, the follow-up case study aimed at: 
- Verifying a set of ERP barriers and risks identified and selected based on the 
questionnaire findings; 
- Further exploring the causes and consequences of these barriers and risks; 
- Further exploring correlations between the identified ERP barriers and risks; 
- Exploring other possible ERP post-implementation barriers and risks that may 
be important to SOEs. 
Stage 7: Theory extension. At the final stage of this research, the findings derived from 
the multi-case study were compared, triangulated and synthesised with the findings 
from the questionnaire survey and the literature reviewed, and therefore extended the 
theories built in previous stages of this project. In addition, the initial ERP barrier and 
risk ontology derived from the literature review was revised after the comparison and 
synthesis of the quantitative and qualitative findings. 
S.ll Conclusion 
In order to answer the research questions, a rigorous research design was adopted for 
this project. At the early stage of this study, a PEST analysis was conducted to focus 
the research context from the entire China to SOEs in the electronic and 
telecommunication manufacturing sector in Guangdong in China. Specific research 
strategies and data collection methods were selected in this chapter with the aim to 
collect a comprehensive set of data from the selected Chinese SOEs. After analysing 
and evaluating the applicability of various potential research strategies, the researcher 
selected the mixed-methods strategy to be used for this project. This mixed-method 
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strategy, which was based on a QUAN and qual design, consisted of two components, 
namely a quantitative survey at the first stage and an exploratory qualitative case study 
at the second stage. The quantitative survey aimed at the production of generalisable 
statements on barriers and risks that Chinese SOEs may encounter in ERP exploitation. 
The follow-up case study aimed at further clarifying and exploring the findings derived 
from the survey research. In addition, after further analysis, comparison and selection, 
questionnaire was used as the data collection method for the survey research, and semi-
structured interview was adopted as the data collection method for the case study 
research. In conclusion, the use of a mixed-methods strategy in this project enabled 
triangulation to take place and was considered as an adequate and feasible approach to 
produce comprehensive, meaningful and significant findings and to answer the 
established research questions. 
The next chapter presents and discusses the ERP barrier and risk ontology, which was 
used as IS lens to guide the data collection process. Subsequently, the findings derived 
from this study are presented and discussed in chapter seven, eight and nine. In 
particular, chapter seven focuses on findings derived from the questionnaire survey. 
Chapter eight reports the case study findings. An overall discussion of the most crucial 
outcomes derived from this study is given in chapter nine. 
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Chapter Six: Initial Identification of ERP Post-Adoption Barriers and 
risks 
6.1 Introduction 
In line with the overall deductive approach taken, before conducting the questionnaire 
survey in the selected Chinese SOEs, there was a need for the researcher to establish 
explicit IS lens to frame the study in order to generate meaningful and significant 
findings (as discussed in chapter five). Consequently, a critical literature review, which 
focused on IS and business research studies, case studies and theoretical papers, was 
conducted by the researcher. As a result of this critical literature review, the researcher 
established 29 ERP barriers and 40 ERP risks that Chinese companies might encounter 
in ERP exploitation. These 29 ERP barriers consisted of 7 Cultural Barriers, 9 
Organisational Barriers, 4 External Barriers and 9 System Barriers. On the other hand, 
the 40 identified risks contained 9 Operational Risks, 8 Analytical Risks, 16 
Organisation-Wide Risks and 7 Technical Risks. 
These ERP barriers and risks are presented and discussed extensively in this chapter. 
Subsequently, a barrier ontology and a risk ontology were developed to highlight these 
identified ERP barriers and risks. These ontologies were then used as the theoretical 
basis for constructing the questionnaire survey of this project. 
6.2 Barriers to ERP post-implementation 
6.2.1 The concept of barrier 
As discussed in chapter one, the concept of barrier is defined differently in the literature. 
For the purpose of this research, a barrier to ERP exploitation is defined as: 
"Any obstacle or factor that is inherent to the Chinese context or the ERP system itself; and can 
prevent companies from efficiently using, maintaining and improving the implemented system." 
Due to the size and complexity of an ERP system, identification of barrier in ERP post-
implementation may be a very complicated task. Nevertheless, it clearly emerged from 
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the PEST analysis that due to cultural characteristics, Chinese companies may often 
face diverse difficulties when using ERP systems, which are originally developed based 
on western culture and management philosophy. Therefore, when identifying barriers 
to ERP post-implementation in Chinese companies, the researcher firstly focused on 
potential cultural barriers that are associated with the unique Chinese culture. On the 
other hand, as pointed out by Polikoff et al. (2005), barriers to organisational activities 
may often exist within the internal and external business context. As a result, the 
researcher secondly looked at organisational barriers and external barriers, which are 
respectively inherent to the internal and external business context of Chinese firms. 
Finally, it was considered that, due to technical limitations and pitfalls related to the 
ERP system itself, a set of system barriers may also exist. Consequently, the researcher 
focused on four main areas for identification of ERP exploitation barriers, namely 
cultural barriers, organisational barriers, external barriers, and system barriers. 
Through the process of a systematic review, the researcher identified and established a 
total of 29 ERP post-implementation barriers. Each of these barriers is presented and 
discussed extensively below. 
6.2.2 Cultural barriers 
As discussed in the PEST analysis, the unique Chinese culture shapes the ways that 
Chinese people conduct organisational and business activities, and thus influencing the 
implementation and use of ISIERP in Chinese companies. 7 potential barriers, which 
are associated with the unique Chinese culture and may affect ERP post-implementation 
in Chinese companies, were identified and discussed below: 
- High context and implicit form of communication; 
- Unwilling to disclose problems, faults and failures due to preservation of 'face'; 
- Power centralisation and centralised decision-making due to high power distance; 
- Chinese employees do not use their critical thinking skills; 
- Less inclined to use systematic procedures and explicit information to tailor (e.g. 
sales and production) forecasts and plans; 
- Trust personal common sense rather than system data to make decisions; 
- Building inter-organisational relationships based on personal guanxi; 
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High context and implicit form of communication 
As discussed in the PEST analysis, westerners tend to use low context forms of 
communications which enable them to directly convey meaning of a message into 
explicit and elaborate codes (e.g. words and numbers) and therefore facilitate the use of 
MIS in western companies (Martinsons and Westwood, 1997). In contrast, due to 
cultural specific traits, Chinese people tend to use high context and implicit forms of 
communications. 
"Chinese messages are comparatively terse in words but rich in meaning. Subtle cues are used 
to enrich the explicit content. Audible clues, such as tone, dynamics and any hesitation in 
response, together with facial expressions and body language must be perceived and 
interpreted in order to fully understand the words being communicatecf' (Martinsons and 
Westwood, 1997). 
Therefore, Martinsons and Westwood (1997) argue that high context forms of 
communications make use of MIS in Chinese organisations both difficult and 
undesirable. More importantly, know-how and expertise developed in the ERP 
implementation and post-implementation stage may not be shared efficiently under high 
context forms of communications, and therefore can be lost if related specialists leave 
the company. As a result, IT staff that remained in the company may not have 
sufficient skills and expertise to enable continuous ERP improvement in the company in 
the long-term. 
Unwilling to disclose problems, faults and failures due to preservation of 'face ' 
Mianzi (also called 'face' or personal image) defines a person's place in his social 
network and is the most important measure of social worth in the Chinese society 
(Graham and Lam, 2004:48). 
"In Chinese business culture, a person's reputation and social standing rest on saving face[ ... ] 
Sources of face can be wealth, intelligence, attractiveness, skills, position, and, of course, good 
guanxi [ .. .}Face, like money, can be earned, lost, given, or taken away. "(Graham and Lam, 
2004:48-49) 
Case studies provided by Shu (200 1) show that, in order to maintain good reputation 
and social standing, Chinese people, as an individual, as a group or as an organisation, 
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tend to save face in any sense. As a result, Chinese people are traditionally less willing 
to disclose problems, faults and failures to the other people (e.g. colleagues, superiors 
and subordinates) or bodies (e.g. other departments, and business partners), which they 
considered will result in loss of face (Graham and Lam, 2004:48). They may hope that, 
if they do not disclose their faults or failures to the others, no one will recognise them. 
Such cultural behaviour can hide potential system operation and maintenance problems 
which otherwise can be avoided or solved proactively in an early stage. Shu (200 1) 
points out that lapses in operation and maintenance may often be revealed only when 
something goes seriously wrong in Chinese companies. In addition, in order to save 
face, system users may be less inclined to seek help when encountering system related 
problems/difficulties. This attitude may result in inefficient communication between 
users and IS staff, increase difficulty for IS staff to tailor suitable training scheme to 
help less-skilled users, and eventually lead to reduction of user satisfaction. In addition, 
if the company, as a whole, is unwilling to disclose internal problems to external bodies, 
it can reduce the chances for Chinese companies to receive suitable help and advice 
from system vendors and service consultants. 
Power centralisation and centralised decision-making due to high power distance 
As discussed in the PEST analysis, high power distance is one of the Chinese cultural 
features identified in Hofstede's study (1997). Power centralisation and centralised 
decision-making are direct results of high power distance, and have been identified as 
characteristics of Chinese firms for a long time (Martinsons and Westwood, 1997). 
In most Chinese companies, the power within the company is centrally held by a few 
people. Power centralization enables leaders of Chinese companies to make centralised 
decisions. As pointed out by Martinsons and W estwood ( 1997), Martinsons and 
Hempel (1998) and Shu (2001 :30), most important decisions of Chinese companies are 
made in private by a few people, normally the top managers. Martinsons and 
Westwood (1997) further state that, Chinese leaders may symbolically consult their 
subordinates but will rarely let them make a meaningful contribution to the decision-
making process. 
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As stated by Reimers (2002), power centralisation and centralized decision-making 
enables senior management to unilaterally change some parameters of the ERP project 
and increases the possibility for making mistakes. Without collecting and considering 
alternative ideas from a wider group of people, it may be difficult for top managers to 
identify potential problems and risks related to their decisions. More importantly, top 
managers may not have as much know-how on the ERP system as the IS specialists in 
the company. Consequently, top managers may make inappropriate decisions regarding 
system maintenance and enhancement in the ERP post-implementation stage. 
Chinese employees do not use their critical thinking skills 
As a consequence of power centralisation, staff in Chinese companies traditionally tend 
to follow the directives of their superiors rather than to critically question the suitability 
of decisions made for them (Martinsons and Hempel, 1998). Most Chinese workers, 
including many with considerable expertise and experience, are comparatively content 
to receive explicit instructions from their bosses, and are uncomfortable with the 
delegation of discretionary decisions and reluctant to assume the risks associated with 
independently initiated actions (Martinsons and Hempel, 1998). Pei (2005) reinforces 
that, Chinese employees generally accept works as assignments from their managers 
without knowing or thinking the reasons of doing so. In other words, Chinese 
employees are generally less inclined to use their critical thinking skills. 
In the ERP post-implementation stage, in-house IT staff and related specialists must 
continuously review and analyse the ERP system and utilise their expertise and 
experience to tailor the most suitable action plans for incremental ERP revision and 
enhancement in order to satisfy new requirements raised by the rapidly changing 
business context. Due to insufficient use of critical thinking skills, Chinese staff may 
not be able or willing to carry out these activities efficiently and continuously. 
Less inclined to use systematic procedures and explicit information to tailor forecasts 
and plans 
As discussed in the PEST analysis, low uncertainty avoidance is another feature of the 
Chinese culture as identified by Hofstede ( 1997), and results that Chinese people are 
more tolerant of uncertainty and unclear information, and tend to accept situations as 
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they are rather than to predict and control the situations (Martinsons and Westwood, 
1997). Thus, Chinese managers are less inclined to use systematic procedures and 
explicit information to tailor business plans and forecasts to predict the uncertain future 
(Martinsons and Westwood, 1997; Martinsons and Hempel, 1998; Xue et al., 2005). 
Martinsons and Westwood (1997) further point out that the IT investments in Chinese 
companies typically aim to automate, control and monitor the company's basic 
operations rather than to improve business planning and decision making. 
Since a major purpose for using ERP is to collect comprehensive sets of data to support 
business planning and decision making and thus increase operational and management 
efficiency, it can be argued that Chinese managers will not be able to fully utilise such 
data and thus underutilise the full power of their ERP systems. 
Trust personal common sense/intuition rather than system data to make decisions 
Instead of conducting a rational analysis of data related to a specific problem, Chinese 
managers are often inclined to make decisions based on subjective experience, common 
sense and intuition (Martinsons and Westwood, 1997; Zhang et al., 2005). Reimers 
(2002) points out that managers in Chinese companies do not trust neither data provided 
nor the suggestions made by their ERP systems, and tend to modify the (e.g. production 
and purchasing) quantities recommended by the system based on their own experiences. 
Lack of trust in the system can reduce utilisation of the ERP system and therefore 
reduce return of the ERP investment. In addition, making decisions based on subjective 
experience and common sense may lead to serious human mistakes, especially when the 
business context is complicated. 
Building inter-organisational relationships based on personal guanxi 
Trust is a critical factor in the development and maintenance of inter-organisational 
relationships on which knowledge sharing depends (Pardo et al., 2006). However, it is 
widely recognised that the level of trust between people in China depends mainly on 
their personal guanxi or relationship. As discussed in the PEST analysis, guanxi in 
China is the most important personal social asset (Fan, 2002). Individuals spend most 
of their time on building and maintaining their guanxi networks, especially with 
superiors, governmental officers or business partners, and utilise such personal assets in 
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finding solutions for business problems and acquiring additional resources for their 
companies (Fan, 2002; Martinsons and Hempel, 1998; Lowe, 2003: 12). 
As a consequence, the inter-organisational relationship between a Chinese company and 
a business partner may often be established based on personal guanxi networks of 
leaders from both sides. Nevertheless, because guanxi is a personal social asset that 
only belongs to a particular person rather than to the company, if the person working in 
either side of the partnership leaves the company, an inter-organisational relationship 
that is set up based on his/her personal guanxi network may also come to the end. 
Therefore, such type of inter-organisational relationship may be highly unstable. 
In the ERP post-implementation stage, the company should set up long-term and stable 
relationships with its system vendor and service consultants, who can therefore develop 
a rich understanding on the company's IS development and usage history. Dealing with 
a new system vendor or service consultant, which the company has never been working 
with, can always cause unnecessary hazards, conflicts and collaboration difficulties. 
Therefore, if Chinese companies establish inter-organisational relationships with system 
vendors or consultants based on personal guanxi networks of company leaders, the firm 
may face significant potential problems in the ERP post-implementation stage. 
6.2.3 Organisational barriers 
Organisational barriers refer to obstacles within the internal context of companies. By 
analysing the organisational context of Chinese companies, as well as reviewing the 
organisational barriers existing in western companies, 9 potential organisational barriers 
to ERP post-implementation in Chinese companies are identified, as discussed below: 
- Inefficient collaboration and communication between functional departments; 
- Fear of loss of power and loss of job; 
- Short-term behaviour of companies; 
- Lack of explicit IS development plan and strategy; 
- Lack of top management support; 
- Insufficient ERP post-implementation funds and resources; 
- Lack of in-house specialists; 
- Low involvement of employees; 
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- Low-skilled and ill-trained staff. 
Inefficient collaboration and communication between functional departments 
Chinese employees often consider information as a major personal asset, which is rarely 
broadcasted or made accessible to a large audience or across the whole organisation 
(Martinsons and Hempel, 1998; Martinsons and Westwood, 1997). On the other hand, 
relationships, trust and loyalties between people in Chinese companies are mainly 
vertical in direction under the hierarchical organisational structure (Shu, 2001 ). Due to 
these two reasons, Chinese companies typically face problems of horizontal 
collaboration and communication between different departments (Shu, 2001 ). 
Therefore, lack of collaboration and communication between functional departments is 
identified as a barrier to successful introduction of !Ss in western companies (Beatty 
and Gordon, 1988; Fletcher and Wright, 1995), but it seems to be a particular barrier to 
ERP post-implementation in Chinese organisations. Due to inefficient collaboration 
and communication between different working groups and departments, Chinese 
companies may find it difficult to form an efficient cross-functional team to conduct 
system review and tailor action plans to further improve the ERP system. In addition, 
data and process integration driven by ERP systems requires staff and managers in 
different departments to develop superior co-operative relationships and work closely 
with each other (Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003). As discussed in the case study of 
Scapens and Jazayeri (2003), when system users in different departments are less 
inclined to generate efficient collaboration and communication with each other, it can 
result in significant reduction in operational efficiency when using ERP systems. 
Fear of loss of power and loss ofjob 
Information may often be considered as a key indicator of power within an organisation 
(Damodaran and Olphert, 2000). Beatty and Gordon (1988), as quoted by Fletcher and 
Wright (1995), thus state that users may be afraid of losing power when !Ss are used to 
facilitate information sharing across the firm. It can be argued that this issue may be 
particularly relevant to Chinese companies, where most important information is 
traditionally kept by the leaders and the amount of information that employees can 
receive reflect the degree to which they are trusted by their superiors (Martinsons and 
Westwood, 1997). On the other hand, !Ss, especially ERP, can automate dozens of 
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traditional manual processes and thus can often result in job substitution. Therefore, 
Martinsons and Westwood ( 1997) point out that wide-spread IT usage does not serve 
the general interests of either Chinese managers or workers, because managers in China 
may worry that an MIS will reduce their discretionary power while workers may fear 
that labour substitution by IT will leave them without a job. Therefore, fear of loss of 
power and loss of job are expected to be key barriers to system acceptance and usage in 
Chinese companies. 
Short-term behaviour of companies 
Top managers of modem western companies generally strive to pursue long-term 
objectives in order to enable their companies to achieve continuous success. In contrast, 
face with the highly dynamic and rapidly changing market Chinese managers are 
typically driven by short-term behaviour cmwH-r~· in Chinese) and aim to achieve 
short-term results (Yuan and Ma, 2005). In its simplest form, short-term behaviour can 
be defined as the phenomenon that companies act to achieve short-term benefits while 
neglecting the associated impacts and problems that might occur in the long-term (Liu, 
2004). Short-term behaviour has been frequently reported (e.g. Yuan and Ma, 2005; 
Zhang, 2004) as a crucial barrier to survival and development of various types of 
domestic companies (e.g. private companies and SOEs) in China. 
From the IS perspective, it can be argued that due to short-term thinking, Chinese 
leaders may not provide sufficient support to ERP exploitation and may overlook ERP 
risks and problems that the company may encounter in the long term. In addition, as 
discussed in chapter three, many benefits, which ERP systems promise to bring to the 
company, may not be able to achieved or become apparent in the short-term. If Chinese 
managers focus only on short-term achievements, they may neglect potential 
opportunities to maximise the utilisation and return of the installed ERP. 
Lack of explicit ERP development plan and strategy 
Deficient strategic planning (e.g. business planning, IS development panning) which 
may not reflect the reality was identified as a barrier to the use of IT in western 
companies (Rucks and Ginter, 1982; Wright and Donaldson, 2002). In China, lack of 
explicit development plan and strategy may be a direct consequence of short-term 
behaviour and seems to exist in various types of Chinese companies. For instance, Xie 
172 
Chapter Six Initial Identification of ERP Post-Implementation Barriers and Risks 
(2005) states that Chinese SOEs typically spend little efforts on tailoring clear and 
detailed planning and development strategies. Thus, lack of explicit development 
planning and strategy is one of the most crucial factors obstructing the continuous 
development ofSOEs (Jiang, 2003). On the other hand, Liang (2001) and Wu and Tian 
(2000) argue that lack of strategic planning is also a common issue in Chinese private 
compantes. 
From an IS perspective, having a clear IS/ERP development plan and integrating the IS 
plan into business strategy will be crucial to ERP success in both system 
implementation and post-implementation stage. It can be argued that, without explicit 
development planning and strategies, Chinese companies may encounter many 
problems and risks in the ERP post-implementation stage, e.g. no clear direction for 
further ERP improvement, IS development plan may conflict with business strategy, 
ERP system fails to support long-term business goals, etc. 
Lack of top management support 
Top management support is a crucial factor to enable success in the use of IT in any 
companies. Lack of top management support was thus considered as a key barrier to 
continuous IS success in both western and Chinese companies (Wright and Donaldson, 
2002; Sherer and Alter, 2004; Tsai et al., 2005). Lack of support from top managers in 
the ERP post-implementation stage can result in low motivation of system users and in-
house specialists and lack of involvement in continuous system review and 
improvement. 
Insufficient ERP post-implementation funds and resources 
Implementing, maintaining, upgrading and revising the ERP systems require large 
amount of funds and resources from companies (Loh and Koh, 2004). Without 
sufficient funds and resources, companies will not be able to carry out system 
maintenance, upgrade and improvement properly in the ERP post-implementation stage. 
Therefore, insufficient ERP funds and resources could be a fundamental barrier to ERP 
post-implementation. 
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Lack of in-house specialists 
Western companies are keen to invest in human resource which they consider as the 
most valuable asset of the company (Re id and Adams, 200 I). Despite this fact, lack of 
in-house specialists (especially in-house IT specialists) has still been reported as a 
problem in western companies (Wright and Donaldson, 2002). The situation in China is 
worse. Zhang (2004) states that, in order to make good use of its talent, Chinese 
companies must continuously invest in their people by providing them with various 
training opportunities. However, contemporary Chinese companies typically make 
insufficient investment in their human resources (Zhang, 2004). As a result, Chinese 
employees may not be able to receive sufficient on-the-job training and thus may not be 
able to become real experts in their own area. On the other hand, due to insufficient 
investment in human resource and inefficient management and reward system, 
employee turnover in Chinese firms is generally very high (Shu, 2006; Ni, 2006; Zhang, 
2004; Jiang, 2003). 
From an IS perspective, success of ERP implementation and post-implementation relies 
on the collaboration and cooperation of various types of in-house specialists, e.g. 
project leaders, IT experts, and specialists in different functional divisions. It can 
therefore be argued that, due to lack of in-house experts, Chinese companies may not be 
able to maintain, monitor and improve the ERP system efficiently in the long-term. 
Low involvement of employees 
When employees are less willing to accept the changes caused by ERPs, they may have 
lower involvement in the implementation and use of the system. Low involvement of 
employees has been mentioned as a barrier to system implementation and usage in 
western companies (Namjae and Kiho, 2003; Wright and Donaldson, 2002). It is 
therefore to be expected that due to the existence of the set of cultural and 
organisational barriers identified above, involvement of Chinese employees in ERP 
post-implementation may also be low. Low involvement of employees can result in 
many problems to ERP exploitation, e.g. less willing to attend further user training, 
indifference in system problems, and low incentives to get involved towards system 
improvement, etc. 
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Low-skilled and ill-trained staff 
Low-skilled staff, who also often have low educational levels, may be less inclined to 
use computerised information systems (e.g. ERP) and can be less willing to change the 
current way that they do their job. This group of people must be carefully guided and 
trained during the cycle of ERP implementation. Otherwise, they may not be able to use 
the ERP system properly and thus lead to significant data errors and data quality issues 
in the system post-implementation stage. Low-skilled and ill-trained staff represent a 
crucial barrier to the use of ERP systems in modem companies (Wright and Donaldson, 
2002; Sherer and Alter, 2004). This barrier is also expected to exist in many Chinese 
companies, where staff often have relatively low educational level, as identified and 
discussed in the PEST analysis. 
6.2.4 External barriers 
External barriers refer to obstacles caused by the external environment of companies. 
By analysing the national environment in China and reviewing previous IS literature, 4 
external barriers to ERP post-implementation are identified as follow: 
- Government direct intervention; 
- Problematic legal system and increase of business and economic crimes; 
- Regional inequality; 
- Lack of accurate and reliable market statistical data. 
Government direct intervention 
In order to accelerate the process of SOE reform local government may often instruct 
profit-making SOEs to merge with or acquire smaller or loss-making SOEs (Cheung, 
2005). However, government officials sometimes may make such merger or acquisition 
instructions based on political needs without considering the actual situation of the 
company (Cheung, 2005). These mergers and acquisitions are therefore often fraught 
with risks and problems and can even lead to collapse of the firm (Cheung, 2005). It 
can be argued that internal organisational changes caused by inappropriate and 
unpredictable government intervention can cause problems to the use of ERP. In the 
case of business merger and acquisition, the merged company may face problems and 
difficulties in reconfiguring existing IS applications (e.g. ERP) to suit new business 
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processes and user needs. Nevertheless, due to the feature of low system flexibility of 
ERP, such reconfiguration may not be easy and sometimes may not be possible. In 
addition, staff of the company may neither be well-prepared for these changes nor be 
willing to engage with the new working environment. This may lead to significant user 
resistance to ERP adoption and use. 
Problematic legal system and increase of business and economic crimes 
Although numerous laws and regulations have been enacted during the last thirty years 
(Ji, 2005), China's current legal system is still fraught with problems. As discussed in 
chapter four, ":ff~~-f&, fA.~~?" (literally, the laws are not being followed, the 
enforcement of laws is not strict) has been the major issue existing in the current 
Chinese legal system (Jiang, 2006). Imperfect legal system and continuous economic 
development in China have resulted in rapid increase in the number of business and 
economic crimes (e.g. bribes, embezzlements and corruptions) in recent years (Potter, 
1999). It can thus be argued that this situation may significantly increase the probability 
of occurrence of information security and leakage risks in Chinese companies when 
using computerised ISs. 
Regional inequality 
As discussed in the PEST analysis, different reg1ons in China currently manifest 
significant inequality, especially in terms of economic development and use of IT. In 
fact, it clearly emerged from the PEST analysis that in contrast with inland regions, 
coastal regions in China generally contain a much better environment for ERP adoption 
and use. Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that Chinese companies with 
considerable size may often establish branches in different regions across the country in 
order to capture more sales opportunities in the national market. Due to regional 
inequality, it can be argued that ERP implementation in branches located in diverse 
regions may result in different outcomes. In particular, it can be expected that ERP 
implementation in coastal regions may lead to many successful stories. In contrast, 
ERP implementation in many inland regions may be fraught with challenges, as people 
in these regions may not currently be ready for using advanced computer technologies, 
such as ERP. Consequently, regional inequality may be an external barrier that may 
prevent Chinese firms from successfully implementing ERP in all their sites. 
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Lack of accurate and reliable market statistical data 
One of the purposes for companies to implement ERP systems is to improve sales 
forecast and thus have better ability to respond to customer demand fluctuations in a 
timely manner (Doshi and Campbell, 2003). On the other hand, market statistical data, 
which could be gathered from external authorities (e.g. industrial associations, national 
and local statistical bureau, and market research consultancies, etc ), is a crucial input for 
ERP systems to generate accurate sales forecasts. 
Companies in western countries may often retrieve useful and reliable market statistical 
information from the government or market research companies. In contrast, market 
statistical data, which is available in the industry in contemporary China, typically lacks 
accuracy, reliability and currency due to various reasons, e.g. inappropriate statistical 
standards and strict government control on information accessibility (Lv, 2006). 
Inaccurate and unreliable market statistical data thus raises significant forecasting issues 
to both foreign and domestic companies operating in China. For instance, the Foreign 
Vice President of a joint venture company in China blames that the publicly available 
market information that she could obtain was at least 2 years out of date and thus it is 
difficult for her to ascertain the true market size in China (Haley, 2003). 
It can therefore be argued that, due to inaccurate and unreliable market statistical data, 
Chinese companies may not be able to use their ERP systems to generate accurate sales 
forecasts, which can result in problems for production planning and difficulties to 
respond to high fluctuation of customer demand under the current market condition. 
6.2.5 System barriers 
System barriers refer to any obstacles and factors that can prevent the implemented ERP 
system from meeting its intended functions and performance requirements. By 
reviewing prior IS and ERP literature, 9 system barriers are identified as follows: 
- Insufficient supports and services from system vendors; 
- Inexperienced system consultants; 
- System inflexibility; 
- System incompatibility; 
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- High cost for add-ons and further system development; 
- Deficient design of the system; 
- Slow system response time; 
- Misfits between system functions and company requirements; 
- Poor data quality. 
Insufficient supports and services from system vendors 
Insufficient supports and services from system vendors is a common barrier to the use 
of ISs in western companies (Wright and Donaldson, 2002). In China, both domestic 
ERP vendors (e.g. UFIDA, Kingdee and LangChao Genersoft) and foreign ERP 
vendors (e.g. SAP and Oracle) are crucial players in the Chinese ERP market. However, 
researchers (e.g. Liang et al. , 2004; Liang and Xue, 2004) argue that, foreign ERP 
vendors are less familiar with the unique Chinese context and organisational 
requirements in Chinese companies, while consultant teams of domestic ERP vendors 
typically do not possess as much expertise and experiences as their foreign rivals. As a 
consequence, Chinese companies may not always be able to receive sufficient support 
and services from their ERP vendors. As a result of insufficient supports and services 
from system vendors, in-house staff may find it more difficult to maintain and revise the 
ERP system efficiently in the post-implementation stage. 
Inexperienced system consultants 
The development history of the modem management consulting industry can be traced 
back to the 1870s from the United States (Ma et al., 2003). With more than 100 years 
of development, the consulting industry in western countries has become highly mature, 
and can provide professional consulting support and advice for a wide range of business 
activities, e.g. strategy development, business review, staff training, and IS 
implementation and revision, etc (Ma et al., 2003). System consultants from consulting 
firms thus play a crucial role to facilitate ERP success in western companies. However, 
despite most of the world's leading management consulting firms have entered to the 
Chinese market since the 1990s, China's management consulting industry which has 20 
years of development history is still in its infant stage (Ma et al., 2003; AMT ERP 
Research Group, 2001 ). It is argued that, foreign consultants who are from western 
countries will often have less experience to deal with the unique issues of Chinese 
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companies, while domestic consultants who are fostered by either foreign or Chinese 
consulting firms in recent years still lack sufficient expertise and experience to provide 
critical advice to client companies (Ma et al., 2003; AMT ERP Research Group, 2001 ). 
As a consequence, Chinese companies may often not be able to receive sufficient 
support from their system consultants, which thus increasing difficulties for in-house 
staff to maintain and revise the ERP system in the post-implementation stage. 
System inflexibility 
ERP systems are standard IS packages, which are traditionally complicated and difficult 
to customise and modify. Thus, system inflexibility has been identified in many studies 
(e.g. Emst, 1989; Namjae and Kiho, 2003) as a barrier to successful introduction of 
ERP in companies. Due to system inflexibility, it is often difficult for user companies 
to revise and enhance their implemented ERP systems. As a result, when system 
requirements of companies have changed over time, the implemented ERP system that 
used to work efficiently may gradually become less effective. 
System incompatibility 
System incompatibility is a key barrier preventing data sharing and exchanging between 
ISs (Beatty and Gordon, 1988; Fletcher and Wright, 1995). In the use ofERP, system 
incompatibility can exist between the ERP system and the other IS applications (e. g. 
CRM, SCM, and CAD) in the company. This barrier may even exist between diverse 
modules of the ERP, if some functional units of ERP are provided by different system 
vendors. System incompatibility is a crucial barrier to data exchange and integration 
across the company. It can result in inefficient information flows between ERP 
modules or between ERP system and other IS applications, and therefore reduce both 
system efficiency and user satisfaction. 
High cost for add-ons and further system development 
In order to have better system functionality and achieve better system performance, it is 
important for companies to install add-ons and make further enhancements on their ERP 
systems in the post-implementation stage. Because ERP systems are large, complicated 
and inflexible software packages, the cost for add-ons and further development of the 
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ERP system can be very high. When companies have to spend a large amount of budget 
on system maintenance, they may not be willing or unable to provide sufficient funds 
for ERP add-ons and enhancement. High cost is a barrier that prevents companies from 
installing add-ons and making further improvements on their ISs (Fletcher and Wright, 
1995; Wright and Donaldson, 2002). 
Misfits between system functions and company requirements 
ISs that cannot meet user requirements will certainly have low value to system users. 
Although satisfying user requirements is a crucial target that all ERP implementation 
projects aim to achieve, the implemented ERP may not be able to meet all user needs 
due to system limitations or human mistakes occurred in the system implementation 
phase. In addition, when user requirements of companies are continuously changed 
under the highly dynamic market environment, the installed ERP that used to work well 
may not be able to fulfil new user needs occurred in system post-implementation. 
Misfits between system functions and company requirements can definitely be a 
significant barrier to acceptance and use of ERP in companies (Sherer and Alter, 2004 ). 
Deficient design of the system 
The world's leading ERP vendors (Sage, 2005) stress that the design of an ERP system 
should be rational and flexible enough in order to enable the system to handle any 
situation that may come up in its daily use (e.g. allow users to search and add inventory 
items while they are in the middle of creating a manufacturing order). Deficient design 
of the system is identified as a barrier to the use of ISs in companies (Damodaran and 
Olphert, 2000; Sage, 2005). As a consequence of deficient system design, users may 
find it uncomfortable to input and retrieve data and information from the system, and 
thus reducing system acceptance and usage. Deficient design, although temporarily 
associated with the implementation of the system, may have several implications in its 
use later on. 
Slow system response time 
Slow system response time would be a barrier preventing users from using ISs in 
companies (Damodaran and Olphert, 2000). Damodaran and Olphert (2000) reveal in 
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their research that, users want their IS to have fast response times and would get 
frustrated if the system cannot respond as quickly as they expect. 
Poor data quality 
Poor data quality is a crucial barrier to successful introduction of ISs in companies 
(Wright and Donaldson, 2002; Sherer and Alter, 2004). As pointed out by Redman 
(1998), poor data quality is a common issue in ISs of many modern companies. 
Redman (1998) argue that companies often encounter a wide range of data quality 
problems (e.g. problems associated with data accuracy, relevancy, consistency, currency, 
completeness and presentation, etc ). Poor data quality is an inevitable result of these 
problems (Redman, 1998). On the other hand, poor data quality can be caused by either 
technical pitfalls of ISs or human mistakes. From the technical side, inappropriate data 
flows within the system as well as system fragmentation are reported as the main causes 
for poor data quality (Loshin, 2001; Redman, 1998). From the human side, user errors 
due to negligence and insufficient training could result in significant data errors and 
data quality problems. Poor data quality can impact companies in many negative ways, 
e.g. low user satisfaction, increased operational costs, production and delivery failures, 
customer dissatisfaction, less effective decision making, and inappropriate strategy 
development (Redman, 1998). Poor data quality may even lead to a complete IS/ERP 
failure (Redman, 1998). 
6.2.6 Summary of barrier discussion 
The above sections present and discuss the 29 identified barriers that may prevent 
Chinese companies from succeeding in ERP post-implementation. Table 6.1 
summarises these barriers and their potential consequences, and further indicates the 
barriers that are also identified in western companies and the barriers that are predicted 
to be particularly relevant to the Chinese context. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of potential barriers to ERP post-implementation 
ID Barriers preYenting Chinese 
companies from succeeding in ERP 
post-implementation 
Potential consequences 








Power centralisation and centralised 
decision-making due to high power 
distance 
Unwilling to disclose problems, faults 
and failures due to preservation of 'face' 
High context and implicit form of 
communication 
Lack of critical thinking of employees 
Less inclined to use systematic 
procedures and explicit information to 
tailor (e.g. sales and production) 
forecasts and olans 
Trust personal common sense rather 
than system data to make decisions 
Building inter-organisational 
relationships based on personal guanxi 
- Top managers make decisions without considering 
alternative ideas and options, and thus increasing the 
possibility for top managers to make inappropriate 
decisions regarding system maintenance and 
improvement. 
- Hidden potential system operation and maintenance 
problems which otherwise could be avoided proactively 
or solved in an early stage; 
- Inefficient communication between users and IS staff; 
- Reduce the chances for Chinese companies to receive 
suitable help and advices from system vendors and 
service consultants. 
- Meaning of a message cannot be directly conveyed into 
codes and could be misrepresented when being stored 
in the system; 
- Valuable know-how and expertise cannot be shared 
efficiently and would be lost easily. 
- In-house IT staff and related specialists have less 
abilities and expertise to enable successful and 
continuous ERP improvement. 
- Unwilling to utilise the data collected and stored in the 
ERP system to tailor business forecasts and plans, and 
thus underutilise the full power of ERP system. 
- Reduce utilisation of the ERP system and therefore 
reduce return of the ERP investment; 
- Increase probability for making human mistakes. 
- Unstable relationships with ERP system vendors and 
consultants; 
- Unstable relationsh ips with suppliers and distributors. 
Frequently changing suppliers and distributors can 
increases difficulties in system data maintenance. 
Support in 
Literature 
Martlnsons and Hempel, 1998; 
Martinsons and Westwood, 1997; 
Reimers, 2002 
Graham and Lam, 2004; Shu, 2001 
Martinsons and Westwood, 1997; 
Martinsons and Martinsons, 1996 
Martinsons and Hempel, 1998; Pei, 
2005 
Martinsons and Westwood, 1997; 
Martinsons and Hempel, 1998; Xue 
et al., 2005 
Martinsons and Westwood, 1997; 
Zhang et al., 2005; Reimers, 2002 
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Organisational barriers (barriers caused by internal factors of companies) 
061 Inefficient collaboration and Difficult to form efficient cross-functional team to Beatty and Gordon, 1988; Fletcher 
communication between functional review and improve the ERP system; and Wrlght, 1995; Wrlght and I 
departments - Significant reduction in operational efficiency when 
Donaldson, 2002 
using ERP systems. 
062 Fear of loss of power and loss of job - Unwilling to share information with the others; Beatty and Gordon, 1988; Emst, 
- Resistance to system acceptance and usage from both 1989; Damodaran and Olphert, 
mangers and workers. 2000 
063 Short-term behaviour of companies Less inclined to provide long-term support to ERP post- Llu, 2004; Zhang, 2004 
implementation; .j I 
- Overlook risks and problems and neglect potential I 
opportunities when using the system in the long-term. 
OB4 Lack of explicit IS development plan and Lead to many problems and risks in the ERP post- Rucks and Glnter, 1982; Wrlght 
strategy implementation stage, i. e. no clear direction for and Donaldson, 2002 
further ERP enhancement, IS development plan misfits 
with business strategy, ERP system cannot be used to 
support long-term business goals, etc. 
065 Lack of top management support Low motivation of system users and in-house Namjae and Kiho, 2003; Wrlght 
specialists to involve in continuous system review and and Donaldson, 2002; Sherer and 
improvement. Alter, 2004 
OB6 Insufficient ERP post-implementation System maintenance, upgrade and improvement can Namjae and Kiho, 2003; Sherer 
funds and resources not be carried out properly. and Alter, 2004 
067 Lack of in-house specialists No sufficient in-house specialists to enable continuous Namjae and Kiho, 2003; Wright 
success in system maintenance, monitoring and and Donaldson, 2002; Sherer and 
enhancement in the post-implementation stage. Alter, 2004 
OB8 Low involvement of employees - Less willing to attend further user training; Namjae and Kiho, 2003; Wright 
- Indifference in system problems; and Donaldson, 2002; Sherer and 
- Low motivation to get involved in system Alter, 2004 
improvement. 
069 Low-skilled and ill-trained staff Not able to use the ERP system properly, and thus lead Wright and Donaldson, 2002; 
to operational problems or data errors; Sherer and Alter, 2004 
- Low system acceptance and usage. 
External barriers (barriers caused by external factors) 
EBl Government direct intervention Lead to undesirable organisational changes which may Cheung, 2005 
.j 
impact the use of ERP systems. 
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E62 Problematic legal system and increase of Increase probability of occurrence of information Ji, 2005; Jiang, 2006; Potter, 1999 
.J business and economic crimes security and leakage risks in Chinese companies when 
using ERP. 
E63 Regional inequality - Difficult to implement ERP in inland regions; China Internet Network Information 
.J 
- Staff in inland regions may not be ready to use new Center, 2006 
technologies such as ERP. 
E64 Lack of accurate and reliable market - Unable to generate accurate sales forecast, and thus Doshi and Campbell, 2003; Haley, 
.J 
statistical data results in issues for production planning; 2003 
- Difficult to respond to changes in customer demand. 
System barriers (barriers related to the ERP system) 
S61 Insufficient supports and services from - Increase difficulties for in-house staff to maintain and Wrlght and Donaldson, 2002; 
system vendors revise ERP in the post-implementation stage. Namjae and Kiho, 2003 
S62 Inexperienced system consultants Poor support from consultants, and thus increase Wright and Donaldson, 2002; 
difficulties for in-house staff to maintain and revise the Namjae and Klho, 2003 
ERP system. 
S63 System inflexibility - System revision and enhancement in the post- Emst, 1989; Namjae and Kiho, 
implementation stage would become very difficult. 2003 
S64 System incompatibility - Prevent data from being shared and exchanged Beatty and Gordon, 1988; Fletcher 
smoothly across information systems; and Wright, 1995 
- Reduce system efficiency and user satisfaction. 
S65 High cost for add-ons and further Companies might be unwilling or unable to provide Fletcher and Wright, 1995; Wrlght 
system development sufficient funds for ERP upgrade and improvement. and Donaldson, 2002 
S66 Deficient design of the system Users might find it uncomfortable to input and retrieve Damodaran and Olphert, 2000 
data and information from the system, and thus 
reduces system acceptance and usage. 
S67 Slow system response time - Time-consuming, reduce system acceptance & usage. Damodaran and Olphert, 2000 
S68 Misfits between system functions and The system would not be able to satisfy the needs of Sherer and Alter, 2004 
company requirements users in their daily jobs, and thus reduce system 
acceptance and usage. 
S69 Poor data quality - Users have less trust in the system, significantly Wright and Donaldson, 2002; 
reduce system acceptance and usage, and could lead Sherer and Alter, 2004 
to failure of the whole ERP system. 
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6.3 Risk and risk management 
The second part of this chapter addresses potential ERP post-implementation risks in 
Chinese companies. Before identifying and discussing these potential risks in section 
6.4, this section introduces the concept of risk, explains the differences between risk and 
barrier, and describes the theory of risk management and its application in this project. 
6.3.1 The concept of risk 
6.3 .1.1 Definition and characteristics of risk 
As presented in chapter one, a risk can be defined as the occurrence of an event that has 
consequences for, or impacts on a particular business process (Kleim and Ludin, 
2000:3). The researcher slightly modified the definition given by Kleim and Ludin to 
make it more relevant for this ERP post-implementation study. For the purpose of this 
research, a risk is thus defined as: 
"The occurrence of any event that has consequences or impacts on the use, maintenance and 
enhancement ofthe implemented ERP systems." 
In other words, any other business risks (e.g. property damage, business acquisition, 
owner's ability to continue the business, staff safety, employee compensation, etc.) that 
will not affect the exploitation of ERP systems were considered to be outside the study 
focus of this project and therefore were not covered in this research. 
Moreover, despite the term 'risk' is often used to describe adverse events, a risk can 
actually lead to either negative or positive consequences (Hillson, 2001; Tchanakova, 
2002), and raise either threats or opportunities to companies (Chapman and Ward, 1997: 
8-9). As a consequence, Kleim and Ludin (2000:5) define risks that can hinder the 
completion of a critical activity as negative risks, and define risks that will facilitate the 
completion of a critical activity as positive risks. Although the PhD researcher 
recognise the importance of both negative and positive risks, this project focused only 
on negative risks and their relationships with barriers, which may be considered as 
major risk factors. 
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6.3.1.2 Risk and risk factor 
A risk event must be caused by one or more factors (so called risk factors). For 
example, lack of top management support is a common risk factor identified in IS 
studies (e.g. Huang et al., 2004; Sherer and Alter, 2004), and can cause a set of risk 
events (e.g. in-house IT staff have low motivation to continuously review and revise the 
implemented ERP system, etc). In this example, lack of top management support is also 
a crucial barrier that prevents companies from efficiently using, maintaining and 
improving their ERP in the post-implementation phase. In other words, ERP barriers 
identified in this study can often be the cause of a set of ERP risks. 
6.3.2 Differences between risk and barrier 
As discussed in chapter one, the terms 'barrier' and 'risk' were often misused by 
authors. Nevertheless, these two concepts are in reality substantially different. 
Specifically, a barrier, unlike a risk, has no uncertainty associated to it. That is, a 
barrier is a factor that is inherent to a given context and thus has 100% probability of 
occurrence. Moreover, as discussed above, barriers are risk factors that can lead to the 
occurrence of potential risk events. These two terms must therefore be clearly 
distinguished and should not be used interchangeably. In truth, a clear understanding on 
the differences between risk and barrier is crucial to this study, because it can guide the 
researcher to separate ambiguous concepts into the category of either risk or barrier and 
avoid confusion. 
6.3.3 Risk management and its application in this project 
The essential purpose of risk management is to increase the chances of a business 
activity/process to be successfully carried out via systematic identification, assessment, 
and management of potential risks surrounding it. As discussed by Nunes and 
Annansingh (2002): 
"While we can never predict the future with certainty, we can apply structured risk 
management techniques to peek over the horizon at the traps that might be looming, and take 
actions to minimise the likelihood or impact of these potential problems." 
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Scholars propose a variety of frameworks to indicate the processes and phases to be 
involved in effective risk management, e.g.: 
"identification, assessment, actions" (Cadle and Yeates, 2001:200) 
"define, focus, identify, structure, ownership, estimate, evaluate, plan and manage" 
(Chapman and Ward, 1997:48) 
"identification, analysis, control and reporting" (Kleim and Ludin, 2000:8) 
Despite these frameworks manifest certain variance and overlap, they point out three 
fundamental phases to be involved in the risk management cycle, namely risk 
identification, risk assessment, and risk control: 
- Risk identification is concerned with conducting an in-depth analysis on the 
situation and context in order to identify and describe the possible risk events 
that might occur. All risk management frameworks involve the phase of risk 
identification (Chapman and Ward, 1997:55). As stated by Chapman and Ward 
(1997:55), "we would not be able to manage risk without identifying and 
knowing where and what risk events might arise". As a consequence, risk 
identification is the most important phase in the risk management cycle 
(Elkington and Smallman, 2002) and forms the basis for the remainder phases of 
risk management (Tchanakova, 2002). 
- After risk identification, the next phase of risk management is to conduct a risk 
assessment on the risk events identified. It is widely acknowledged that both 
probability of occurrence and impact are essential dimensions to assess the 
importance of a risk (Cadle and Yeates, 2001:231 ). It is obvious that, a risk 
event that has a high impact may not have a high probability of occurrence, and 
vice versa. For instance, when confidential business data stored in the system is 
stolen by unauthorised people, this may lead to significant impact to user 
companies. However, the probability of occurrence of this risk event may be 
low. Hence, managers typically tend to focus on risk events that have both high 
probability of occurrence and high impact (Cadle and Yeates, 2001; Chapman 
and Ward, 1997:139-141). Moreover, a risk event may occur not just once but 
repetitively within a given context. As a consequence, the frequency of 
occurrence of a risk event may often be considered as a further dimension in risk 
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assessment (Covello and Merkhofer, 2003). While probability refers to 'how 
likely' a risk event may occur, frequency refers to 'how often' this event may 
happen. It is apparent that, a risk event that has a high probability of occurrence 
may not be necessarily to have a high frequency of occurrence. For instance, if 
a firm experiences significant financial losses in a given year, there may be a 
high probability for it to go bankrupt. It is however obvious that this risk event 
(i.e. go bankrupt) can occur only once in any firms. 
- Risk control is concerned with tailoring action plans to manage the risk events 
that have been identified and assessed as significant. Two types of action plans 
could be established: avoidance action plans and mitigation action plans (Cadle 
and Yeates, 2001 :233-234). Avoidance action plans indicate actions to be taken 
to entirely prevent the risks from occurring. In the cases that avoidance actions 
fail, mitigation actions should be taken in order to reduce the probability of 
occurrence and negative impact of the risks. It is important to note that both 
types of action include risks in themselves. 
This study focuses on the aspects of risk identification and risk assessment: 
- The next section of this chapter identifies a wide range of potential risk events 
that may occur in ERP post-implementation in Chinese companies. An initial 
attempt is also made to discuss and analyse the causes and impact of these risk 
events. A risk ontology was subsequently established and served as the basis for 
constructing the questionnaire survey. 
- In the first data collection stage of this project, questionnaire survey was used to 
explore whether the risk events that are presented in this chapter would occur in 
selected Chinese SOEs, and collect a set of quantitative data to examine the 
importance of each identified risk according to its level of impact, probability of 
occurrence, and frequency of occurrence. In the second data collection stage, a 
multi-case study was conducted to seek qualitative evidence to further 
investigate the impact and causes of risk events that were identified as 
significant, and also to identify the correlations between these risk events. 
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6.4 Risks in ERP post-implementation 
As discussed in chapter three, ERP systems in theory can provide a wide range of 
benefits to companies. However, due to various internal and external reasons, a set of 
risk events may occur when companies actually use the system in the post-
implementation stage. These risk events may result in significant impact and negate the 
advantages that ERPs promise to bring to user companies. 
The 29 potential ERP barriers identified and discussed in section 6.5 were actually 
starting point of risk identification in this section. It was expected that these barriers 
could be the causes of diverse potential ERP risk events in Chinese companies. By 
drawing on the results of the analysis of ERP barriers, and also by reviewing previous 
IS and business studies, the researcher identified a set of potential risks that may occur 
during ERP post-implementation and can affect the use of ERP systems in Chinese 
firms. 
6.4.1 ERP areas of study for risk identification 
Due to the size and complexity of an ERP system, identification of risk in ERP post-
implementation is a very time-consuming and complicated task. In order to frame the 
study and generate meaningful and significant outcomes, the research project 
particularly looked at ERP post-implementation risks in the following four categories: 
- Operational Risk. ERP systems are designed to address the majority of the 
transaction processing activities (e.g. order processing, invoice generating, etc) 
involved in the daily operation of a company. Operational staff are thus key 
users of ERP systems. Operational risks refer to risks that may occur as 
operational staff use ERP systems to perform daily business activities. 
- Analytical Risk. Apart from operational functions, ERP systems also contain a 
number of analytical functions which can be used to analyse, model and evaluate 
data collected from daily operation of the company. Front-line managers will 
often use such analytical functions of ERP to generate plans and forecasts (e.g. 
production plan, sales forecast, etc) to predict and better manage the uncertain 
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future. Analytical risks refer to risks that may occur as managers use ERP 
systems to carry out analytical tasks. 
- Organisation-Wide Risk. When using and maintaining ERP systems in the post-
implementation stage, companies may encounter a set of risk events in relation 
to various internal (e.g. system users, in-house IT experts) and external factors 
(e.g. system vendor, system consultants). Such risks may have impact to the 
entire company and therefore are referred to as organisation-wide risks. 
- Technical Risk. A set of system and technical factors may result in risk events 
that can hinder the implemented ERP system to meet its intended functions and 
performance requirements. These risk events are identified as technical risks. 
Furthermore, it was considered that operational and analytical risks occur in different 
functional areas in a company and are therefore very different in nature. Their study 
needs to take into account diverse aspects and sometimes very disparate triggers. On 
the other hand, it emerges in the survey studies ofReimers (2001) and Tsai et al. (2005) 
that ERP systems are most frequently used in three business areas in Chinese firms, 
namely sales and marketing area, production and purchasing area, and financial and 
accounting area. Therefore, after identifying the operational and analytical risks in 
general, the researcher specifically selected and focused on these three business areas 
for identification of operational and analytical risks. Consequently, a total of 9 
operational risks and 8 analytical risks were identified. 
Additionally, the study also identified 16 organisation-wide risks and 7 technical risks. 
These organisation-wide risks and technical risks were further rearranged into different 
categories: the 16 organisation-wide risks were divided into five sub-categories, namely 
top management, ISIERP planning, in-house specialists, system users, and system 
vendors and consultants; the 7 technical risks were rearranged into three subsets, 
namely system integration, system faults, and system maintenance and revision. 
The following sections of this chapter present and discuss extensively these 40 
identified ERP exploitation risks. 
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6.4.2 Operational risks 
6.4.2.1 Generic risks 
Operational staff are reluctant to use the ERP system 
ERP systems are mainly designed to integrate and automate transaction processing 
activities of companies (Chou et al, 2005). Therefore, it is mainly operational staff in 
the shop floor, who use ERP extensively in their everyday work (Scapens and Jazayeri, 
2003). If operational staff, as the main system users, are reluctant to use the 
implemented ERP, this may result in significant impact on the company (e.g. reduction 
of staff motivation and performance, reduction of system acceptance and usage). 
This risk event may be caused by various factors, including psychological anxieties of 
staff (e.g. unwilling to change, unwilling to break down the traditional functional 
boundaries, and fear of loss of job), initial failures in system implementation (e.g. 
insufficient training), and system pitfalls (e.g. poor user interface, deficient design of the 
system, and poor data quality). These factors are frequently reported to exist in the use 
ofiSs (e.g. Beatty and Gordon, 1988; Damodaran and Olphert, 2000; Sherer and Alter, 
2004, etc ). Therefore, it was expected that the probability of occurrence of this risk 
could be high, especially in the initial period that the system was just go live. 
Operational staff input incorrect data into the system 
ERP systems require extremely high data accuracy to work effectively and efficiently 
(Koh et al., 2000; Zhou et al., 2005). All preliminary data of ERP is inputted by 
operational staff, who use the system extensively in their everyday work. Data entered 
to ERP will be stored in the central database and become available immediately to the 
whole company. Scapens and Jazayeri (2003) state that "The integrated data flowed so 
quickly through the system that there was little opportunity to track down mistakes 
before they showed up on everybody's screens". As a consequence, if one operational 
staff inputs incorrect data into the system, it will raise immediate impact and problems 
to the entire company and may disturb the operation of all functional divisions. 
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This risk event may be caused by human negligence. Because of insufficient training, 
operational staff may not recognise how significant it is to have accurate data in the 
ERP system, and thus pay less attention when entering data. Staff may also 
purposefully input incorrect data into the system in order to gain, by fraud, illegitimate 
benefits and resources from the company. Because operational staff are required to 
handle large amount of transaction data each day, the probability and frequency for 
them to enter incorrect data into the system was expected to be high. 
6.4.2.2 Sales and marketing risks 
Sales staff are not able to obtain data and information they need from the system 
A purpose for using ERP system is to enable sales personnel to retrieve relevant 
information of the company (e.g. product details, prices, order details and inventory 
records) whenever necessary to answer customer queries promptly (IBS, 2006). 
However, due to insufficient training, poor system interface, deficient system design or 
ill-defined requirement specification, sales staff may not be able to obtain relevant data 
and information from the system when they need it. If such a risk event occurs, sales 
staff will either not be able to answer customer requests or provide customers with 
incorrect information. It can thus lead to customer dissatisfaction and loss of 
competitive advantage. 
Fail to maintain up-to-date and comprehensive customer information files 
ERP systems can often help companies to maintain up-to-date and comprehensive 
customer information files. By analysing such customer files, modem companies can 
"ensure that relevant products and services are sold to the correct individual at the 
relevant point in their life" (Wright and Donaldson, 2002). As a consequence, failing to 
maintain up-to-date and comprehensive customer information files is a risk event that 
may lead to a set of undesirable outcomes, e.g. not be able to target on valuable 
customers, not be able to maintain customer loyalty and good customer relationship, 
and lose existing customers. 
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6.4.2.3 Production and purchasing risks 
System contains inaccurate supplier records 
Multi-national companies tend to build up long-term relationships with their suppliers 
and avoid frequent supplier changes. They can therefore reduce operational risks (e.g. 
inconsistent material quality, incoherent lead time, sudden increase in prices). On the 
other hand, they can avoid distortion of supplier and material records stored in the IS. 
However such a practice may not be adopted by many Chinese companies. 
As discussed in section 6.2.2, inter-organisational relationships between Chinese 
companies and business partners (e.g. suppliers) may often be established based on 
personal guanxi networks of leaders from both sides and are therefore unstable. Due to 
unstable relationships, suppliers of Chinese companies may be frequently changed. As 
a consequence, it may be difficult for Chinese companies to maintain accurate and up-
to-date records of suppliers and materials they supplied. Containing inaccurate supplier 
and material records was thus expected as a risk event that may result in significant 
problems, mistakes and delays in procurement and production in Chinese companies. 
System contains inaccurate or incomplete bill of materials 
ERP applications in material and production area typically follow the same logic as that 
of Material Requirements Planning (MRP) systems (Klaus et al, 2000). MRP is the 
former generation of ERP and now forms the core of most ERP applications (Klaus et al, 
2000). It tends to use three types of inputs (i.e. bill of material, inventory records and 
master production schedule) to calculate the net requirement plan of materials as outputs 
(Koh et al, 2000). The term 'material' used in manufacturing companies refers to any 
components (e.g. raw materials, parts, accessories and casings) required to use in the 
production of a product (Zhou et al., 2005:52). A bill of materials, as one of the most 
important inputs ofMRP, can be defmed as: 
"a list of the component parts required to make up the total package for a product or service 
together with information regarding their level in the product or component structure and the 
quantities of each component required" (Slack et al, 2004:770). 
193 
Chapter Six Initial Identification of ERP Post-Implementation Barriers and Risks 
The number of component parts required to make up a product can be varied from less 
than ten (e.g. a toy) to more than a thousand (e.g. an airplane). A bill of materials can 
therefore be the most complicated piece of information contained in the MRP/ERP 
system. In order to ensure that ERP systems work properly, the bill of materials must 
be accurate and complete. Otherwise, materials required in production may not arrive at 
the right time and in the right quantities (Zhou et al., 2005:53). This can lead to a set of 
serious outcomes, e.g. increase inventory and cost, reduce production efficiency, 
increase production lead time, and reduce customer satisfaction, etc (Zhou et al., 
2005:53). 
Therefore containing inaccurate or incomplete bill of materials was expected to be a 
crucial risk event faced by manufacturing companies. Producing a wide range of 
products with complicated structures and frequently launching new products can 
increase the probability and frequency of occurrence of this risk event. In addition, 
Zhou et al. (2005) state that different departments (engineering department and 
production department in particular) may modify the bill of materials, according to the 
actual design or production needs, without notifying the others. As a consequence, 
inconsistent and incomplete bill of materials may exist in the company. 
System contains inaccurate inventory records 
Inventory records are one of the most important inputs of MRP/ERP. Achieving over 
95% accuracy in inventory record is a prerequisite to enable ERP systems to work 
properly (Zhou et al., 2005:75). 95% here means that the match rate between inventory 
records in ERP and the actual inventory level in the warehouse, must be at least 95 
percent (Zhou et al., 2005:75). However due to human mistakes and/or frauds, 
inventory records stored in the ERP system may be inaccurate. Modem companies are 
also keen to store their stocks in third-party warehouses in order to reduce inventory 
cost, and this may potentially increase the difficulty for inventory management. As a 
result of inaccurate inventory record, sales staff may not be able to inform customers 
about crucial stock information and availability. Without knowing the exact content of 
warehouses, production staff may be unsure of production schedules and issuing of 
procurement orders. Finally, account staff may be misled in their calculations of the 
actual value of current inventories, procurement orders and production costs. In short, 
operation of the entire company may be disturbed. 
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6.4.2.4 Financial and accounting risks 
Account staff are unwilling to release accounting responsibility/power to non-account 
staff and Non-account staff are unwilling and incapable to take up accounting 
responsibilities 
ERP systems "integrate information and information-based processes within and across 
functional areas in an organization" (Kumar and Hillegersberg, 2000), and therefore 
break down the traditional boundaries between functional divisions. This diluting of 
divisional boundaries has impacts for the organisation as a whole, but is particularly 
noticeable in accounting divisions. With the adoption of ERP solutions, the accounting 
part of a company is no longer distinguished from the operational one and the 
traditional relationship between workers and accountants needs to be redefined (Caglio, 
2003). Specifically, traditional accounting responsibilities and activities (e.g. budgeting, 
cost recording, etc) are gradually passed down to non-account personnel in diverse 
functional divisions (Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003). Both Scapens and Jazayeri (2003) 
and Caglio (2003) therefore point out that, efficient communication and co-operation 
between departments is essential to success under such a new working environment. In 
particular, accountants need to provide persistent help and professional guidance to non-
account staff. In contrast, non-account staff should pass up-to-date financial 
information back to accountants. 
It was however expected that account staff in some cases may not be willing to release 
accounting responsibility/power to non-account staff. On the other hand, non-account 
staff may be unwilling and incapable to take up accounting responsibilities. Both risk 
events may result in conflicts and arguments between functional divisions, which have a 
direct impact on operational efficiency and staff performance. These two risk events 
were expected to have a high probability of occurrence, especially in the early period 
that the ERP system was just implemented. 
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6.4.3 Analytical risks 
6.4.3.1 Generic risks 
Front-line managers refuse to use the ERP system 
Ronald et al. (2000) state that, "in response to demands posed by the new global 
economy, managers on the front lines, where some say the real work is done", are 
assigned with a broader set of responsibilities and tasks (e.g. budgeting, planning, 
forecasting, quality management and benchmarking, etc). As a consequence, front-line 
managers should use ERP systems extensively in their jobs in order to make better 
planning and forecasting. However due to reluctance to change and insufficient training, 
front-line managers may refuse to use ERP in real practices. The situation in China 
may be worse, because Chinese managers are traditionally less inclined to use 
systematic procedures and explicit information to tailor plans and forecasts (Martinsons 
and Westwood, 1997). Additionally, Reimers (2002) reinforces that Chinese managers 
may not trust the data provided and the suggestions made by the ERP systems and tend 
to disregard the figures recommended by the system and replace these using their own 
experience. If front-line managers refuse to use ERP, they may not be able to use the 
system to improve planning and forecasting activities and thus underutilise the full 
potential of their ERP systems. 
Managers cannot retrieve relevant and needed information from the system 
It is generally accepted that, different managers often have different information needs 
according to their personal decision styles, contexts and actual situations (Lucas, 1975). 
Formats and contents of reports generated by ISs should therefore be flexibly changed 
and customised in accordance with the actual needs of managers (Sage, 2005). 
However not all I Ss available in the current market can be flexible enough to satisfy this 
user requirement. In addition, structures and content of reports generated in a particular 
national context (e.g. USA) may not easily be used or even translated to other national 
contexts (e.g. China). Therefore, foreign ERP systems may not suit the needs of local 
companies due to cultural and political differences (Soh et al, 2000). As a consequence, 
managers engaged in certain situations may not be able to retrieve needed information 
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from the system. The occurrence of this risk event may lead to poor decision making of 
managers and reduce system acceptance and usage. 
6.4.3.2 Sales and marketing risks 
Fail to use the system to generate accurate sales forecast 
Generating sales forecast has been traditionally considered as one of the biggest 
challenges faced by companies (Doshi and Camp bell, 2003; IBS, 2006). As stated by 
Ranard (1972), the generation of accurate sales forecast requires various types of inputs, 
e.g. historical sales data, sales force estimates, and external market information, etc. A 
main purpose for using ERP is thus to enable companies to better capture and process 
these internal and external information to generate more accurate sales forecasts. 
Nevertheless, capturing accurate external market information to tailor sales forecasts 
may be currently a difficult task for Chinese firms. It is often considered that, market 
statistical data, which is available in the industry in contemporary China, typically lacks 
accuracy, reliability and currency (Lv, 2006). This issue is caused by various national 
reasons, e.g. inappropriate statistical standards and strict government control on 
information accessibility (Lv, 2006). Inaccurate and unreliable market statistical data 
thus raises significant forecasting issues to both foreign and domestic companies 
operating in China. Inaccurate sales forecast can result in significant impact in 
companies, e.g. e.g. unreasonable sales quotas may be assigned to staff, and production 
plans and financial budgets set up by ERP may be inappropriate or infeasible (Zhou et 
al., 2005). 
Fail to predict the demands of new products 
Despite the support of ERP systems, launching a new product onto the market is a 
difficult task that should be carefully managed. Due to lack of past sales data, rapid 
changes in customer trends and insufficient market information, it may often be difficult 
for sales personnel to predict the actual demands of new products. Failing to forecast 
the demands of new products is a risk event that may lead to two alternative outcomes: 
in one scenario, companies may over produce what they actually need and the over-
produced good may never be sold in the market; conversely, the new product may be 
under-produced and therefore consumer demands may not be met. Both outcomes can 
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lead to financial loss and put the company at a disadvantage. Inaccurate demand 
forecast of new products may also disturb normal production of existing products, and 
distort production plans and financial budgets that are initially generated by the ERP 
system. 
System fails to support sales personnel to provide special sales offers and promotions to 
existing customers 
The integration of CRM and ERP can help companies to better manage and analyse the 
information of their existing customers. Companies, especially services companies, can 
therefore "increase customer retention, cross-sell, target sales and marketing activities 
[ ... and] ensure that relevant products and services are sold to the correct individual at 
the relevant point in their life" (Wright and Donaldson, 2002). However this may be a 
difficult task for many manufacturing companies in real practice. Specifically, products 
produced by manufacturing firms generally reached the end customers through local 
distributors and retailers (Wright and Donaldson, 2002). It may therefore be difficult 
for manufacturing companies to collect information directly from customers, while local 
distributors and retailers may be incapable or unwilling to capture and pass up-to-date 
sales information to original manufacturers. Without pertinent customer data, sales 
personnel may fail to provide suitable sales offers to existing customers at the right time. 
6.4.3.3 Production and purchasing risks 
System fails to generate appropriate master production schedule (MPS) 
A master production schedule (MPS) "specifies the quantity of each finished product 
required in each planning period; it is a set of time-phased requirements for end items" 
(Chen, 2001). MPS is ''the most important planning and control schedule in a business, 
and forms the main input to materials requirements planning" in ERP systems (Slack, 
2005:489). Inappropriate MPS can result in finished product shortages and/or overages, 
which directly impact costs, customer delivery lead time and customer satisfaction. The 
appropriateness of MPS depends on the accuracy of sales forecast. Zhou et al. 
(2005:101) state that sales forecasts are original input to generate production schedule 
and planning. It was therefore considered that, failing to generate appropriate MPS may 
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be a risk event that has a high probability of occurrence in companies that are incapable 
to make accurate sales forecasts. 
System fails to generate appropriate material net requirement plan (NRP) 
Net requirement plan (NRP) of materials is the main output generated by the MRP 
component of ERP. Companies launch material production and procurement orders 
based on their NRPs. Inappropriate NRP can therefore result in material shortage or 
over-ordering or producing, which may directly lead to delay and/or cease of production. 
The generation of appropriate NRP depends on the appropriateness and accuracy of 
MPS, bill of materials and inventory records. It is however discussed above that, 
having inaccurate MPS, bill of materials and inventory records may be risk events faced 
by many modem companies. Furthermore, an additional factor that can lead to 
inappropriate NRP is that, ERP systems use fixed lead time to plan for material 
purchase and product manufacture, and cannot flexibly respond to changes on lead time. 
Koh et al. (2000) argue that, "this ignores real life uncertainties of supply unavailability 
and variability of queue, set-up and run times on the shopfloor". Therefore it was 
expected that, failing to generate appropriate NRP can be a risk event that may have a 
high probability of occurrence in companies. 
6.4.3.4 Financial and Accounting risks 
Fail to generate appropriate financial budgets 
Financial budgets are crucial analytical outputs from the financial division of a company. 
Targets can be set for staff based on financial budgets in a period of time (e.g. annually, 
quarterly, and monthly). Top managers can therefore control and evaluate the 
performance of their staff (Ekholm and Wallin, 2000). The use of ERP systems, in 
theory, can help companies to generate better financial budgets. However, the 
appropriateness of financial budgets may be significantly affected by environmental 
changes in real practices. Rapid market growth, unpredictable changes in market 
conditions and inaccurate sales forecast may lead to significant variance between 
budgets and actual outcomes. As a result of inappropriate financial budgets, staff may 
be assigned with unreasonable targets, and important business areas (e.g. ERP upgrade 
and maintenance) may not be assigned with sufficient funds. 
199 
Chapter Six Initial Identification of ERP Post-Implementation Barriers and Risks 
6.4.4 Organisation-wide risks 
By drawing on the results of the analysis ofbarriers and the findings of previous IS/ERP 
studies, sixteen organisation-wide risks are identified and discussed in this section. 
These sixteen organisation-wide risks are further divided into five categories according 
to the specific organisational aspects, namely: top management, IS/ERP planning, in-
house specialists, system users, and system vendors and consultants. 
6.4.4.1 Top management risks 
Top managers make important IT decisions without consulting IT experts/system users 
Top managers are neither experts in IT/IS nor extensive users of the ERP system in their 
daily work. They therefore typically lack sufficient expertise and knowledge to make 
appropriate IT decisions on their own. Lientz and Larssen (2006: 116) states that 
"decisions being made [by top managers] without the advice or involvement of the IT 
managers" is a risk that may occur in IT projects. It is expected that, this risk event may 
have a high probability and frequency of occurrence in Chinese companies, where top 
managers are inclined to make centralised decisions without consulting the opinions of 
their subordinates. The occurrence of this risk event may lead to inappropriate IT 
decisions being made and reduce motivation of staff and in-house experts. 
Substantial personnel changes in the top management team 
Top managers, who are involved in ERP implementation, should have a better 
knowledge regarding the IS background and needs of the company and therefore be 
more willing to provide continuous support to the system post-implementation. 
However due to company policies or personal reasons, top managers may leave the 
company after a period of time. A substantial personnel change in the top management 
team is considered as a crucial risk event that may occur in IS implementation (Lientz 
and Larssen, 2006: 117). Because ERP post-implementation is a continuous and endless 
process, this risk event is predicted to have a high probability of occurrence in the 
system post-implementation phase. Substantial changes in the top management team 
may result in discontinuous top management support to ERP post-implementation and 
even changes in business and IS development direction. 
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Top managers do not provide sufficient support to ERP post-implementation 
The attitude of top managers "will affect not only the flow of funds and information to 
the [IS] project, but also the subordinates view the project" (Gargeya and Brady, 2005). 
Top management support is therefore frequently reported (e.g. Loh and Koh, 2004; 
Gargeya and Brady, 2005) as one of the most crucial factors affecting the success of 
ERP implementation in companies. It can be argued that this factor is also crucial to the 
success of ERP post-implementation. Lack of continuous support from top managers 
can be a significant risk event that may lead to a set of negative consequences in ERP 
post-implementation, e.g. conflicts and arguments in ERP post-implementation cannot 
be solved, IS development plan is missing or inappropriate, etc. In addition, as 
discussed in section 6.2.3 top managers in Chinese companies are typically driven by 
short-term behaviour and are keen to achieve short-term results. It was thus expected 
that there may be a high probability for Chinese managers to fail to provide sufficient 
support to ERP post-implementation in the long-term. 
6.4.4.2 IS/ERP planning risks 
ISIERP post-implementation development plan is ill-defined or misfit with business 
strategy 
The implemented ERP system has to be continuously reviewed, revised and improved 
in the post-implementation stage. A clear IS/ERP development plan is the prerequisite 
to enable these activities to be carried out successfully. The establishment of an 
efficient IS plan depends on the commitment of top managers and endeavour of in-
house experts. If the IS development plan of the company is ill-defined or presents a 
misfit with the business strategy (Lientz and Larssen, 2006:124-126), the company will 
not be able to retain a correct direction for further ERP development. As a consequence, 
the implemented ERP system may gradually become incapable to support business 
strategies and goals. 
Direction for forther ERP improvement and development is unclear 
Having unclear direction for further ERP improvement is a risk event that can be 
directly caused by inefficient ERP development plan. Without a clear and correct 
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development direction, system investments being made in ERP post-implementation 
may be inappropriate, the implemented ERP system may not be further improved to 
support long-term business goals. 
Budgets and funds assigned to ERP post-implementation are insufficient 
Insufficient budgets and funds can prevent the ERP implementation from progress and 
full completion (Loh and Koh, 2004; Lientz and Larssen, 2006:225), and can also 
disturb system maintenance, upgrade and revision in the post-implementation phase. 
Budgets and funds assigned to ERP post-implementation in the company may be 
insufficient due to various reasons, e.g. lack of top management support, lack of 
appropriate IS development plan, and post-implementation cost is insufferably high, etc. 
6.4.4.3 In-house specialists risks 
Fail to form an efficient cross-functional team to continuously review and revise ERP 
A cross-functional team, which should include members covering an adequate range of 
knowledge from both a technical perspective and the different operational perspectives 
of functional divisions in the company, is crucial to enable the success of ERP projects 
(Gargeya and Brady, 2005; Buckhout et al, 1999). It can be argued that, when an 
efficient cross-functional ERP team is missing, the organisation may neither properly 
revise ERP pitfalls resulted from the implementation cycle nor adapt the implemented 
ERP to emerging changes in the long run. However, forming these efficient cross-
functional teams is not an easy task (Loh and Koh, 2004; Sumner, 2000) and can often 
be very controversial inside the organisation. Specifically the company may not have as 
many specialists as required to form an efficient ERP team. Alternatively, in-house 
specialists may do not have sufficient skills and expertise to enable continuous ERP 
success. Moreover, team members may perceive their participation as an unwelcome 
deviation from their operational duties and therefore lack the motivation to participate 
fully. Or conversely, team members may volunteer to be part of this type of cross-
functional team for internal political or power grabbing reasons and then be equally 
motivated to provide a full contribution. Inefficient communication and collaboration 
between departments and lack of top management commitment can also significantly 
reduce efficiency of the ERP team. 
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Lose qualified ITIERP experts 
Recruiting and retaining qualified and high-skilled IT/ERP staff is crucial for system 
maintenance and revision in ERP post-implementation. However as discussed by 
Sumner (2000), due to high market demand of these professionals and inappropriate 
retention programme, it may be difficult for companies to retain high qualified ERP 
experts. Failing to retain qualified IT/ERP experts was thus expected as a risk event 
that could have high probability and frequency of occurrence in ERP post-
implementation. 
Loss ERP-related know-how and expertise accumulated over time 
In-house experts are actually able to accumulate a large set of know-how and expertise 
through ERP implementation and post-implementation. These know-how and expertise 
however may not be shared effectively throughout the organisation, especially in 
Chinese companies. Chinese staff are less willing to share information with others and 
are more inclined to use high context and implicit form of communication which does 
not facilitate knowledge sharing (Martinsons and Westwood, 1997). As a consequence, 
valuable ERP know-how and expertise accumulated over time may be lost when in-
house experts leave the company. 
6.4.4.4 System users risks 
Users (both staff and managers) do not receive sufficient and continuous training 
Staff should be adequately trained during the cycle of ERP implementation in order to 
enable them to have sufficient skill and knowledge to maximise their use of the system 
at 'go-live' (Gargeya and Brady, 2005). However, the ERP system will be constantly 
upgraded and improved during the system post-implementation stage. In order to 
ensure that staff can use any newly installed functions effectively, they should be 
provided with continuous training. Furthermore, Loh and Koh (2004) stress that 
sufficient training should not only be provided to staff who will use the system daily, 
but also to managers who can then facilitate and better control the changes taking place 
within the company. However, it is common knowledge that staff and managers of 
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many companies may not receive sufficient and continuous ERP training, usually due to 
lack of funds, resources and expert trainers. The occurrence of this risk event may lead 
to significant resistance to the use of ERP system in the company, as well as 
misunderstanding and use of newly implemented features and facilities. 
Users are uncomfortable to use the ERP system in their daily jobs 
Insufficient training can result in difficulties for users to use the ERP system. Also due 
to slow system response time (Damodaran and Olphert, 2000) and deficient system 
design (Sage, 2005), ERP users may find it uncomfortable to input and retrieve data 
from the system. The occurrence of this risk event may lead to user frustration and 
dissatisfaction, more human mistakes, and low operational efficiency. 
ERP-related problems are not reported promptly by system users 
Pitfalls and problems of the ERP system may not always be reported promptly by 
system users in the post-implementation phase, probably due to low user involvement 
and user indifference (Namjae and Kiho, 2003; Wright and Donaldson, 2002). As a 
result, it may be difficult for IT staff to identify system and user-related problems and 
take appropriate actions in the early stage. This issue may be particularly serious in 
Chinese companies, where people as discussed in section 6.2.2 are typically unwilling 
to disclose faults and failures to the others in order to save face (Shu, 2001 ). 
Data access right is authorised to inappropriate users 
It is important for companies to draw a clear policy to specify what types of data access 
rights can be given to users according to their departments and job functions (Loh and 
Koh, 2004). It is also crucial to clearly specify who should be responsible for 
authorising access to the system (Loh and Koh, 2004). Otherwise, data access right of 
the ERP system may not be allocated to appropriate system users. As a consequence of 
this risk event, system data may be accessed and modified by inappropriate users, which 
can result in data loss, errors and information leakage. Alternatively, users may not be 
granted sufficient data access right and thus cannot obtain necessary amount of 
information to fulfil daily job tasks. 
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Confidential data is accessed by unauthorised people 
Confidential data of the company should be stored in a secure place and carefully 
managed. If important and confidential information is accessed by unauthorised people, 
this may potentially lead to information leakage and business crisis (Yosha, 1995). The 
causes of this risk event may be poor data protection and access policy of the company 
and poor IT security (Wilding, 2003; Loh and Koh, 2004). Additionally, confidential 
information of the firm may also be disclosed to competitors and other unauthorised 
people by internal staff, who have low loyalty to the company (Wilding, 2003). 
6.4.4.5 System vendors and consultants risks 
Cannot receive sufficient technical support from system vendors 
Appropriate technical support from system vendors is crucial for companies to 
successfully maintain and upgrade their ERP system in the post-implementation phase. 
However, due to various issues (e.g. inadequate vendor performance, vendor withdraws 
from the market for commercial reasons or failures, vendor is acquired by another 
company etc ), user companies may not be able to receive sufficient and continuous 
technical support from their system vendors (Lientz and Larssen, 2006: 165-179; 
McDowall, 1993). When the ERP system is provided by multiple vendors, it becomes 
more difficult for the company to manage the relationships with these vendors and 
receive sufficient support from them. As a consequence, technical pitfalls of the 
implemented ERP system may not be solved speedily and properly. 
Cannot receive sufficient and proper consulting advice from system consultants 
In order to fill internal knowledge gaps, companies may often need to recruit external 
system consultants, who are expected to have extensively knowledge and experience in 
specific ERP applications (Surnner, 2000; Sage, 2005). However the recruited system 
consultants may not always be willing to share their knowledge freely with internal staff. 
Furthermore, system consultants can be recruited from different places (e.g. system 
providers, professional consulting firms), and thus may manifest poor collaboration and 
communication with each other. As a consequence, companies may face a risk for 
receiving inappropriate advice from their system consultants. In contrast with western 
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companies, this risk event may have a higher probability of occurrence in companies 
operating in China, due to a lack of highly qualified and experienced ERP consultant in 
the country at present, as discussed in section 6.2.5. Also, Chinese people are 
traditionally less inclined to disclose problems and failures to external bodies. This 
barrier may block effective communication between internal staff and system consultant. 
6.4.5 Technical risks 
Seven technical risks associated with ERP post-implementation are identified in this 
section and are further divided into three categories, namely system integration, system 
faults, and system maintenance and revision. 
6.4.5.1 System integration risks 
Different modules of the ERP system are not seamlessly integrated 
Modem companies can purchase suitable software modules from different system 
vendors to form their own version of ERP system, when no solution from a single ERP 
vendor can satisfy all their needs. This approach however may lead to an integration 
risk, that is, seamless integration may be difficult to be achieved between current ERP 
modules or between current and new ERP modules offered by different system vendors. 
Sage (2005), one of the world's leading ERP vendors, reinforces that even all modules 
of the ERP system is provided by the same vendor, it does not mean they can achieve 
solid integration. The occurrence of this risk event may lead to system fragmentation in 
the company, through the creation of technological islands which are very often totally 
isolated and non-communicant. 
Current ERP system is not able to seamlessly integrate with other IS applications 
ERP systems are frequently criticised for being difficult to integrate with legacy 
systems and to infirm from low compatibility (Beatty and Gordon, 1988; Fletcher and 
Wright, 1995). In fact, it is often difficult for ERPs to be seamlessly integrated with 
other IS applications (e.g. legacy system, system of the newly merged or acquired 
company). The occurrence of this risk event may lead to poor data and business process 
integration and the creation of the same insulated technological islands discussed above. 
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6.4.5.2 System failure risks 
Invalid data is not automatically detected when getting into the system 
A well-designed ERP system should contain the capability to detect invalid data, e.g. 
duplicate customers and vendors, incorrect item numbers, unreasonable amounts and 
dates, and unusually high quantities or unit prices, etc (Sage, 2005; Alter, 2002: 199). If 
invalid data cannot be automatically detected and prevented from getting into the 
system due to deficient system design, significant data errors and various data quality 
problems may arise. 
Hardware or software crashes 
Hardware or software crash can happen at any time when using a computerised IS. It is 
therefore a risk event that can occur during ERP post-implementation. The occurrence 
of this risk event may inevitably result in system to be out-of-work for a period of time 
and thus disturb normal operation of the organisation (Sherer, 2004). System users and 
in-house IT experts should ensure appropriate system use, monitoring and maintenance 
in order to reduce the frequency of occurrence of this risk event (Sherer, 2004). 
6.4.5.3 System maintenance and revision risks 
System is not properly modified to meet new business requirements 
User requirements of the company may be constantly changed under the highly 
dynamic market environment. The implemented ERP system should therefore be 
continuously reviewed and modified in the post-implementation phase in order to meet 
new user requirements. However, this task may not always be carried out properly in 
many companies due to low flexibility of the ERP system, high reconfiguration cost, 
lack of in-house experts and insufficient support from system vendors and consultants. 
If this risk event occurs, the system may gradually become less efficient to support user 
needs, which may impact business operational efficiency. 
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Technical bugs of the system cannot be speedily overcome 
Technical errors, usually known as bugs, may exist in the ERP system due to poor 
system design or technical mistakes being made in the cycle of implementation and 
even post-implementation (Sherer, 2004). These technical bugs may not be able to be 
overcome easily and speedily due to various ERP barriers and risks discussed above, e.g. 
insufficient user feedback, low system flexibility for modification, insufficient fund, and 
insufficient support from system vendors. It can therefore impact system performance 
and business operational efficiency (Sherer, 2004). 
Outdated and duplicated data is not properly discarded 
Loh and Koh (2004) state that "arranging, purgmg and updating the data are 
fundamental to ensuring the highest level of accuracy possible". They further point out 
that companies should develop and retain good system maintenance discipline to ensure 
data in the ERP system can be purged regularly. It can be argued that if outdated and/or 
duplicated data of the ERP system is not discarded properly, it may lead to low data 
accuracy, reduce speed of data search and increase data storage space and cost. 
6.4.6 Summary of risk discussion 
The above sections present and discuss 40 potential risk events that may occur in ERP 
post-implementation. Table 6.2 summarises these identified risk events associated with 
their potential causes and consequences. 
6.5 Initial ontology of ERP post-implementation barriers and risks 
6.5.1 What is an ontology? 
Conceptualization refers to the objects, concepts and other entities that are assumed to 
exist in a domain of interest and the relationships that these hold among them (Gruber, 
1993). Whereas a conceptualization is an abstract and simplified view of the world that 
we wish to represent for some purposes, an ontology is an explicit specification of a 
conceptualization (Gruber, 1993). Therefore, an ontology can be seen as: 
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Table 6.2: Summary of potential risk events in ERP post-implementation 
Operational Risk (OR) 
In General (OR1) Operational staff are Reluctant to change; Reduce staff motivation and Chou et al., 2005; 
reluctant to use the Fear of loss of job; performance; Scapens and 
ERP system Insufficient training; Reduce system acceptance and Jazayeri, 2003 
Deficient system design; usage. 
Poor data quality. 
OR1.2 I Operational staff Insufficient training; Poor data accuracy and quality; Scapens and 
input incorrect data Lack of experience; One user's mistake can raise Jazayeri, 2003; 
into the system Human negligence; immediate impact and problems to Fisher and Kingma, 
Human fraud, etc. the entire company and disturb 2001; Vosburg and 
I I 
normal operation. Kumar, 2001. 
Sales and Marketing I OR2.1 I Sales staff are not Insufficient training; Not able to respond to customer Wright and 
area (OR2) able to obtain data Poor system interface; requests (e.g. order-related issues, Donaldson, 2002 
and information they Irrational system design; after-sales service) speedily; 
need from the Misfits between system 
system functions and user 
requirements. 
OR2.2 I Customer files Inappropriate system usage Fail to target on valuable customers; Vosburg and Kumar, 
contained in ERP are due to sufficient user Fail to maintain customer loyalty and 2001; Wright and 
out-of-date or training; good customer relationship; Donaldson, 2002. 
incomplete Deficient system design. Lose existing customers. 
l 
Production and OR3.1 System contains Large number of suppliers Result in significant problems, I Zhou et al., 2005 
Purchasing area inaccurate supplier for wide range of material; mistakes and delays in procurement 
(OR3) records Frequently changing and production. 
suppliers due to unstable 
relationship; 
Human mistake. 
OR3.2 I System contains Human mistake; Materials required in production Klaus et al., 2000; 
inaccurate or Different and inconsistent cannot be arrived at the right time Koh et al., 2000; 
incomplete bill of BOM exist in the company. and in the right quantities; Zhou et al., 2005 
materials Lead to a set of serious outcomes, 
e.g. increase inventory cost, reduce 
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OR3.3 System contains Human mistake; Disturb operation of the entire Zhou et al., 2005; 
inaccurate inventory Fraud/thief; company (e.g. inappropriate Umble et al., 2003; 
records Record of stocks stored in procurement and production orders, Chen et al., 2001 
third-party warehouse is not and miscalculate the value of current 
up-to-date. inventory, etc). 
Financial and OR4.1 Account staff are ERP systems enable and Conflicts and arguments between Kumar and 
accounting area unwilling to release require account information functional departments; Hillegersberg, 2000; 
(OR4) accounting to be used and handled by Poor operational efficiency and Caglio, 2003; 
responsibility /power non-account staff across the performance. Scapens and 
to non-account staff company; Jazayeri, 2003 
OR4.2 Non-account staff are Inefficient communication 
unwilling and and collaboration between 
incapable to take up departments. 
accounting 
responsibilities 
Analytical Risk (AR) AR 
In General (AR1) AR1.1 Front-line managers Reluctant to change; Low system acceptance and usage; Scapens and 
refuse to use the ERP Insufficient training; Underutilise the full potential of ERP Jazayeri, 2003; 
system Poor data quality; systems. Ronald et al., 2000 
Less inclined to use 
systematic procedures and 
explicit information to tailor 
forecasts and plans; 
Trust personal common 
sense rather than system 
data to make decisions. 
I 
AR1.2 Managers cannot Formats and contents of Poor decision making; Lucas, 1975; Sage, 
retrieve relevant and reports provided by the Reduce system acceptance and 2005; Soh et al, 
needed information system are inappropriate usage. 2000 
from the system and cannot be flexibly 
I changed and customised; 
Misfits between system 
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Sales and Marketing AR2.1 Fail to use the Rapid market growth and Sales staff are not assigned with Doshi and Campbell, 
area (AR2) system to generate changes in customer needs; reasonable sales quotas; 2003; Ranard, 1972; 
accurate sales Lack of accurate and Inappropriate production plan and Zhou et al., 2005 
forecast reliable market statistical financial budget. 
data; 
AR2.2 Fail to predict the Lack of past sales data; Lead to financial loss and put Wright and 
demands of new Rapid changes in customer companies at a disadvantage; Donaldson, 2002 
products trends; Disturb the production of existing 
Insufficient market products and distort production 
information; plans and financial budgets 
Frequent launch of new generated by the ERP system. 
products. 
AR2.3 System fails to Lack of up-to-date customer Reduce competitive advantage; Wright and 
support sales info file; Reduce customer retention; Donaldson, 2002 
personnel to provide Lack of fast and up-to-date Lose potential cross-selling and up-
special sales offers sales information from local selling opportunities. 
and promotion to retailers. 
existing customers 
Production and AR3.1 System fails to Inaccurate sales forecast. Result in finished product shortages Chen, 2001; Slack, 
Purchasing area generate appropriate and/or overages, which directly 2005; Zhou et al. 
(AR3) master production impact costs, customer delivery lead 2005 
schedule time and customer satisfaction. 
I 
AR3.2 ERP fails to generate Inappropriate master Material or component shortage or Chen, 2001; Koh et I 
appropriate material production schedule; over-ordering/producing; al, 2000; Musselman 
1 
net requirement plan Inaccurate BOM; Production of end product is delayed et al., 2002. 
Inaccurate inventory or ceased. 
records. 
Financial and AR4.1 Fail to generate Rapid market growth and Staff are assigned with unreasonable Ekholm and Wallin, 
accounting area appropriate financial changes in market targets; 2000 
(AR4) budgets conditions (e. g. customer Important business areas (e.g. ERP 
needs, material prices); upgrade and maintenance) may not 
Inaccurate sales forecast. be assigned with sufficient funds. 
- -- ···--- - -- --- ----- -- - - --- ----- -~ 
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Organisation-Wide OWR 
Risk {OWR) 
Top management OWRl.l Top managers make Power centralization and Inappropriate decision making; Lientz and Larssen, 
{OWRl) important IT centralised decision making. Reduce involvement and motivation 2006 
decisions without of staff. 
consulting IT experts 
and system users 
OWR1.2 Substantial personnel Company policies; Personal New managers do not provide Lientz and Larssen, 
changes in the top reasons. sufficient support to ERP; 2006 
management team Changes in business direction and 
goals. 
OWR1.3 Top managers do not Short-term thinking; Low employee involvement; Gargeya and Brady, 
provide sufficient Lack of awareness. Conflicts and arguments related to 2005; Sherer and 
support to ERP post- ERP cannot be solved smoothly; Alter, 2004; Tsai et 
implementation Insufficient ERP fund. al., 2005; Zhang, 
2004. 
IS/ERP planning OWR2.1 IS/ERP post- Short-term behaviour; Unclear direction for further IS Willis and Willis-
{OWR2) implementation Lack of top management development; Brown, 2002; Lientz 
development plan is commitment; IS cannot support business and Larssen, 2006 
missing, ill-defined or Lack of IT experts; strategies and goals. 
misfit with business Changes in business 
strategy strategy and direction. 
OWR2.2 Direction for further Lack of efficient IS ERP system cannot be further Lientz and Larssen, 
ERP improvement development plan. improved to support long-term 2006 
and development is business goals; 
unclear Inappropriate system investment. 
OWR2.3 Budgets and funds Short-term behaviour; System maintenance, upgrade and Loh and Koh, 2004; 
assigned to ERP Lack of top management improvement cannot be carried out Lientz and Larssen, 
post-implementation support; properly. 2006 
are insufficient Lack of appropriate IS 
development plan; 
Post-implementation cost is 
too expensive. I 
-- - --- -·- -·---- ---
I 
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In-house specialists OWR3.1 Fail to form an Lack of in-house experts; System pitfalls cannot be properly Gargeya and Brady, I 
(OWR3) efficient cross- In-house staff lack critical overcome; 2005; Buckhout et , 
functional team to thinking skills; Goals of post-implementation al, 1999; Loh and 
I 
continuously review Inefficient communication projects cannot be met; Koh, 2004; Sumner, 
and revise the ERP and collaboration across System may not be able to improve 2000 
system departments; to satisfy new business 
Lack of top management requirements. i 
commitment; 
Team members are 
assigned with too many ! 
responsibilities. 
I 
OWR3.2 Lose qualified IT /ERP High market demand of Lack of in-house IT experts to lead Sumner, 2000; 
experts skilled IT/ERP experts; ERP review and revision Burrows et al., 2005 
Poor retention programme 
of the company. 
OWR3.3 Lose ERP-related High context and implicit Loss of important intangible asset. Scott and Vessey, 
know-how and form of communication; 2000; 
expertise Staff are unwilling to share 
accumulated over information freely; 
time In-house specialists leave 
the company. 
System users OWR4.1 Users (both staff and Poor training programmes Do not have sufficient skills to use Gargeya and Brady, 
(OWR4) managers) do not for existing and new the system; 2005; Loh and Koh, 
receive sufficient and employees; Employees and managers are 2004 
continuous training Insufficient resources and reluctant to change; 
funds allocated. User frustration and dissatisfaction. 
OWR4.2 Users are Insufficient training; User frustration and dissatisfaction; Damodaran and 
uncomfortable to use Slow system response time; More human mistakes; Olphert, 2000 
the ERP system in Irrational and inflexible Time-wasting. 
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OWR4.3 ERP-related problems Low involvement of staff; Difficult for IT staff to identify Namjae and Kiho, 
are not reported Unwilling to disclose system issues and areas for revision 2003; Wright and 
promptly by system problems, faults and failures and enhancement. Donaldson, 2002 
users due to preservation of 
'face'. 
OWR4.4 Data access right is The company lacks clear System data can not be accessed Loh and Koh, 2004 
authorised to and suitable data access and modified by appropriate users, 
inappropriate users policies. which may result in data loss, errors 
and information leakage. 
OWR4.5 Confidential data is Poor data protection and Information leakage; Yosha, 1995; 
accessed by access policy; Financial loss; Wilding, 2003; Loh 
unauthorised people Business crimes. Business crisis. and Koh, 2004. 
System vendors and OWRS.l Cannot receive Various vendor issues (e.g. Increase difficulties for companies to Lientz and Larssen, 
consultants (OWR5) sufficient technical inadequate vendor maintain and upgrade their systems; 2006 
support from system performance, withdrawal Technical pitfalls of the system may 
vendors from the market, vendor is not be solved speedily and properly. 
acquired by another 
company, etc). 
OWR5.2 Cannot receive Inexperienced consultants; Increase difficulties for companies to Sumner, 2000 
sufficient and proper Staff of user companies are revise and improve their systems. 
consulting advice unwilling to disclose 
from system problems. 
consultants 
Technical Risk (TR) TR 
System integration TRl.l Current modules or Poor system design; Poor data and business process Currie, 2003; Brehm 
(TRl) current and new ERP system consists of integration; and G6mez, 2005 
modules of the ERP modules provided by System fragmentation. 
system can not be different system vendors. 
perfectly integrated 
I 
-- -- -- -- - - - -- --- -- ----
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TR1.2 Current ERP system Low system compatibility. Poor data and business process Fletcher and Wright, 
is not able to integration; 1995 
seamlessly integrate System and data fragmentation. 
with other 
information systems 
(e.g. legacy systems, 
systems of the newly 
merged companies) 
System faults (TR2) TR2.1 Invalid data is not Poor detection capability of Data errors (e.g. duplicated, Sage, 2005; Alter, 
automatically invalid data outdated, incorrect and 2002 
detected when unreasonable data). 
getting into the 
svstem 
TR2.2 Hardware or software Inappropriate system System has to be out of work for a Sherer, 2004 
crashes operation & maintenance; period; 
Poor system quality. Disturb normal operation. 
System maintenance TR3.1 Technical bugs of the Insufficient user feedback; Poor system performance; Sherer, 2004 
and revision (TR3) system cannot be Low system flexibility; Reduce business operational 
speedily overcome Insufficient budget; efficiency; 
Insufficient support from User dissatisfaction. 
system vendors and 
consultants. 
TR3.2 Outdated and Invalid data cannot be Reduce data accuracy and speed of Loh and Koh, 2004 
duplicated data is not detected; data search; 
properly discarded Inappropriate system Increase data storage space and 
maintenance discipline. cost. 
TR3.3 System is not Low system flexibility; Poor system performance; Cabrera et al., 2001; 
properly modified to High reconfiguration cost; Reduce business operational Willis and Willis-
meet new business Lack of in-house and efficiency; Brown, 2002 
requirements external experts. User needs cannot be satisfied. 
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"a diagrammatic model and a knowledge base that defines a common vocabulary for 
researchers who need to share information in a domain. It includes [ ... ] interpretable 
definitions of basic concepts in the domain and relations among them." (Noy and 
McGuinness, 200 I) 
Ontology is a tool that has been commonly used in computer sciences and programming, 
and is increasingly adopted by social science researchers to highlight and share key 
concepts and ideas in their study (Peng and Nunes, 2007a). There are three reasons why 
an ontology is worth developing in research studies (Noy and McGuinness, 2001): 
An ontology allows researchers to highlight and share common and novel 
concepts in their subject domain more easily and efficiently. 
Other researchers can reuse the domain knowledge presented in the ontology 
and make further extension and development. 
Concepts and assumptions made in the ontology can be easily changed and 
extended in accordance with changes of the researcher's knowledge about the 
subject domain. 
Despite the fact that procedures for developing an ontology in different subject domains 
may vary, two tasks lay at the core of ontology development: first, defining concepts to 
be covered in the ontology; second, organising these concepts into a taxonomic 
(subclass-superclass) hierarchy, in which upper level contains general concepts and 
lower level covers more specific concepts (Noy and McGuinness, 2001 ). By following 
these principles, a barrier ontology and a risk ontology were developed to highlight the 
identified ERP exploitation barriers and risks, as shown in the following sections. 
6.5.2 Initial ontology of ERP post-implementation barrier 
The barrier ontology shown in Figure 6.1 highlights the identified ERP exploitation 
barriers in this chapter. This barrier ontology consists of two hierarchical levels ranging 
from general barrier categories (e.g. organizational barrier) to specific barrier items (e.g. 
lack of top management support). The suitability of this barrier ontology in the context 
of selected Chinese SOEs was examined through a questionnaire survey at the next 
stage of this project, as discussed in chapter seven. 
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Moreover, it emerged from the discussion made in section 6.2 that, an ERP barrier may 
often be the cause or consequence of other barriers. The barrier ontology thus also 
highlights a number of potential causal relationships that may exist between the 
identified ERP barriers based on discussion made in section 6.2, and thus provides some 
initial ideas for the researcher to explore correlations between ERP barriers in the 
selected context at the next stage of this study. 
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Figure 6.1: Ontology ofERP post-implementation barriers 
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The risk ontology shown in Figure 6.2 highlights the identified ERP risk events in this 
chapter. This risk ontology consists of three hierarchical levels ranging from general 
risk categories (e.g. operational risks) to specific risk items (e.g. operational staff are 
reluctant to use ERP). The suitability of this risk ontology within the context of 
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selected Chinese SOEs was examined through a questionnaire survey at the next stage 
of this project. 
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In addition, it emerged from the discussion made in section 6.4 that, the occurrence of 
an ERP risk may often be related to the occurrence of other risks. This ontology thus 
also highlights a number of potential causal relationships that may exist between the 
identified ERP risks based on discussion made in section 6.4, and thus provides some 
initial directions for the researcher to explore correlations between ERP risks in the 
selected context at the next stage of this study. 
6.5.4 Potential correlations between barriers and risks 
As clearly emerged from section 6.2 and 6.4, an ERP barrier may often lead to the 
occurrence of a set of ERP risks. Based on discussion and analysis made in this chapter, 
Figure 6.3 highlights a number of potential causal relationships that may exist between 
the identified ERP barriers and risks. This figure provides some initial directions for the 
researcher to explore correlations between ERP barriers and risks in the selected context 
at the next stage of this research. 
BARRIER 
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Through the process of a critical literature review, the researcher established 29 barriers 
and 40 risks, which Chinese companies might encounter during ERP exploitation. As 
concluded in chapter two, problems associated with ERP post-implementation will not 
be limited to technical dimensions (e.g. software, ICT infrastructure), but more 
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importantly can also potentially be found in various human and organisational aspects. 
The ERP barriers and risks identified and discussed in this chapter echoed this original 
expectation. Specifically, the 29 identified ERP barriers consisted of 7 cultural barriers, 
9 organisational barriers, 4 external barriers, and 9 system barriers. On the other hand, 
the 40 identified ERP risks contained 9 operational risks, 8 analytical risks, 16 
organisation-wide risks and 7 technical risks. 
Moreover, two ontologies were developed to highlight respectively the identified ERP 
barriers and risks. These established ERP barrier and risk ontologies are an explicit IS 
lens, which enabled the researcher to frame the study and generate data collection tools. 
In order to examine the suitability of the established theoretical ontology in the context 
of selected Chinese SOEs, a cross-sectional survey was designed and conducted in this 
project and discussed in the next chapter. Please note that because the 4 external 
barriers identified were concerned with relatively sensitive topics under the current 
Chinese context, they were not included in the questionnaire as discussed in chapter five 
(section 5.6.3). 
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Chapter Seven: Results and Findings of the Questionnaire Survey 
7.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapter five, after the questionnaire survey was administrated and 
completed, all collected data were inputted into SPSS for analysis. The analysis of the 
quantitative data comprised four main parts in accordance with the structure of the 
questionnaire (appendix 2 & 3): 
- The first part of the analysis was concerned with questions involved in the first 
section of the questionnaire. It aimed at generating a descriptive analysis about the 
characteristics of the respondents and SOEs that participated in the survey. 
- The second part of the analysis involved both a univariate analysis and a bivariate 
analysis of the barrier items that were listed in the second section of the 
questionnaire, and aimed at identifying a set of ERP barriers that were crucial to 
SOEs as well as exploring the correlations between the identified barriers. 
- The third part of the analysis contained a univariate analysis as well as a bivariate 
analysis of the risk items that were listed in the third section of the questionnaire. It 
aimed at identifying a set of risks that were significant to ERP post-implementation 
in SOEs and exploring the correlations between the identified risks. 
- The final part of the analysis included a bivariate analysis which aimed at exploring 
the correlations between the identified ERP barriers and risks. 
This chapter thus presents, describes and discusses the findings derived from each of 
these components of the data analysis. 
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7.2 Descriptive analysis of the respondent sample 
Job titles of respondents in the company 
As discussed in chapter five, two questionnaires were designed in this study in order to 
obtain perspectives from both business managers and ICT experts. Specifically, 
questionnaire A was expected to be filled in by the operation manager of the company 
or one that had sufficient knowledge on the company's operation. On the other hand, 
questionnaire B was expected to be completed by the IT manager of the firm or one that 
had extensive knowledge on ISs or ERP. The two designed questionnaires were then 
sent to 118 SOEs in Guangdong. As presented in chapter five, 42 SOEs (2*42 = 84 
respondents) completed and returned the questionnaires, which represented a response 
rate of 35.6%. 
As shown in figure 7.1, the vast majority of the respondents of questionnaire A held 
managerial positions in the company, i.e. operation manager, general manager or CEO, 
manager m the general management team and IT manager. On the other side, 
respondents of questionnaire B held IT or managerial positions in the firm. 















Figure 7 .I: Job titles of respondents 








As identified in the PEST analysis, Chinese companies m the electronic and 
telecommunication manufacturing sector should have achieved high level of 
informatization development. It was therefore expected that the majority of SOEs 
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studied should have adopted ERPs. This original expectation proved to be true. As 
shown in Table 7.1, ERP has been implemented in 37 (88.1%) out of 42 respondent 
SOEs. It therefore seems that a study of ERP post-implementation in Chinese SOEs 
may not just be timely but actually highly adequate. 
Whether the SCE 
has ERP Frequency Percent 
Yes 37 88.1 
No 5 11.9 
Total 42 100.0 
Table 7.1: Whether the SOE has ERP 
Whether the respondent SOE is using foreign or domestic ERP 
In addition, among the 37 SOEs that have ERP, 6 of them are using foreign ERP 
systems, 27 of them have adopted domestic ERP packages, and 4 of them combined the 
use of ERP components provided by both foreign and domestic vendors (Table 7.2). 
This result echoed the findings of the literature review (as discussed in the PEST 
analysis), which identified that local ERP vendors currently hold a stronger position and 
possessed a larger portion of the market share than their foreign rivals in the Chinese 
ERP market. 
SOE has ERP 
Type of ERP vendor Foreign vendor 6 
Domestic vendor 27 
Both 4 
Total 37 
Table 7.2: Type ofERP vendor 
Time for ERP implementation 
As identified in the PEST analysis, the use of ERP systems has become prevalent in 
China since 2000. ERP was thus expected to be used in Chinese SOEs for a number of 
years. This was confirmed in the findings. In particular, as shown in table 7.3, among 
the 37 respondent SOEs that have adopted ERP, the majority (83.8%) of them have 
been using ERP for 2 to 6 years. 
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How long has ERP been 
implemented Frequency Percent 
Less than 2 years 2 5.4 
2 to 4 years 25 67.6 
5 to 6 years 6 16.2 
7 to 9 years 2 5.4 
1 0 years or more 2 5.4 
Total 37 100.0 
Table 7.3: How long has the ERP system been implemented 
Reasons for not using ERP currently 
Furthermore, the 10 respondents, from the 5 SOEs that had not adopted ERP, 
highlighted a number of reasons why ERP was not currently used (table 7.4). These 
reasons included: they do not have sufficient knowledge about ERP ( 40% ); they do not 
have sufficient fund to implement ERP ( 40% ); the ERP implementation project involves 
too many risks (30% ); there is no need to adopt ERP since the firm has many legacy 
systems (20% ); and they may implement ERP in the future but now it is not the right 
time (70%). 
Frequency 
Reasons for not using ERP (Total= 10) 
Do not have sufficient knowledge about ERP 4 
Do not have sufficient fund to implement ERP 4 
The ERP implementation project involves too many risks 3 
Have many legacy systems and no need to use ERP 2 
May implement ERP in the future but now it is not the right time 7 
Table 7.4: Reasons for not usmg ERP 
In sum, the two questionnaires were completed and returned by respondents from 42 out 
of the 118 SOEs. 37 (88.1%) of the 42 respondent SOEs have implemented ERP 
systems. Among these, 31 (83.8%) have been using ERPs for 2 to 6 years. Although 5 
respondent SOEs have not adopted ERP, 70% of the respondents from these SOEs 
stated that they would consider implementing ERP in the future. These results prove 
that a research study on ERP post-implementation may not just be significant but may 
also be highly desirable, in order to help SOEs to identify and tackle possible ERP 
exploitation issues. 
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7.3 Analysis of ERP barriers 
This section presents and discusses the findings derived from the univariate and 
bivariate analysis of the barrier variables examined in the questionnaire. In addition, 
these findings were discussed and interpreted in relation to previous IS and ERP 
literature as relevant. 
7.3.1 Univariate analysis ofbarrier items 
As presented in chapter five, univariate analysis of the barrier items refers to the 
descriptive analysis of the ERP barriers examined. Frequency table is used to present to 
which degree respondents agreed or disagreed with these barrier items. 
7.3.1.1 Cultural barriers 
7 cultural barriers to successful ERP exploitation were identified from the critical 
literature review, as presented in chapter six. Table 7.5 summarises the questionnaire 
findings associated with these cultural barriers. 
Strongly Strongly 
Cultural Barriers N=42 Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree 
F % F % F % F % F % 
CB1 Power centralisation of top management 12 28.6 12 28.6 2 4.8 15 35.7 1 2.4 
CB2 Unwilling to disclose problems, faults and 12 28.6 25 59.5 4 9.5 1 2.4 0 0 
failures 
CB3 High context and implicit form of 15 35.7 19 45.2 6 14.3 2 4.8 0 0 
communication 
CB4 Staff do not use critical thinking skills 18 42.9 14 33.3 6 14.3 3 7.1 1 2.4 
CB5 Less inclined to use explicit procedures 6 14.3 27 64.3 6 14.3 3 7.1 0 0 
and info to tailor forecasts and plans 
CB6 Trust personal common sense/intuition 8 19 22 52.4 4 9.5 8 19.1 0 0 
rather than system data to make decisions 
C87 Building inter-organisational relationships 26 61 .9 7 16.7 7 16.7 2 4.8 0 0 
based on personal guanxi 
F = Frequency 
Table 7.5: Frequency table for cultural barriers 
As shown in the table, only ' power centralisation of top managers' was perceived by a 
significant amount (38.1 %) of the respondents as a barrier to ERP exploitation. This 
finding seemed to confirm that top managers in a considerable number of SOEs would 
often hold strong and centralised power in the firm. As argued by Reimers (2002), the 
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existence of this barrier may result in Chinese leaders to make centralised decisions on 
important IS issues without collecting and considering alternative ideas from a wider 
group of people. This could be particularly dangerous, since top managers may 
typically lack sufficient experience of operational situations and lack technical 
knowledge to make appropriate ERP post-adoption decisions on their own. 
On the other hand, the remainder 6 cultural barriers examined were not considered by 
the majority of the respondents as problems that they encountered during ERP 
exploitation. More specifically, 72% - 88% of the respondents disagreed with the 
barrier statements given. In fact, it is reasonable to argue that the recent SOE reform (as 
discussed in the PEST analysis) and the adoption of ERP systems may actually help 
SOEs to improve some of these traditional cultural issues. For instance, it was expected 
that Chinese staff may be traditionally 'reluctant to disclose problems, faults and 
failures to their colleagues' in order to preserve personal images (Shu, 2001). However, 
the finding of the survey was different from this original expectation. It is possible that, 
after experiencing economic and SOE reform, modern SOEs may provide a more open 
climate to facilitate staff to talk about their problems and failures in order to gain 
advices and help from each other. More importantly, this internal change may actually 
be a consequence of the use of ERP systems. In particular, business processes of the 
firm will often become more integrated and transparent after using ERP (Scapens and 
Jazayeri, 2003; Alien, 2005). As a result, staff in SOEs may be more willing to report 
problems they encountered at an early stage rather than attempting to hide their 
mistakes, which can now be identified by the others easily and can also result in 
significant impacts on other's work. 
Overall, the questionnaire findings showed that, among the cultural barriers studied, 
only 'power centralisation of top managers' was identified as an important ERP 
exploitation issue by a considerable number of the respondents. 
7.3 .1.2 Organisational barriers 
A set of 9 organisational barriers were initially identified and presented in chapter six. 
Table 7.6 presents the questionnaire results associated with these ERP barriers. 
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Strongly Strongly 
Organisational Barriers N =42 Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree 
F % F % F % F % F % 
081 Inefficient collaboration & communication 18 42.9 13 31 4 9.5 7 16.7 0 0 
between functional departments 
082 Fearofpowerandjobloss 17 40.5 19 45.2 4 9.5 2 4.8 0 0 
083 Short-term behaviour of companies 24 57.1 8 19.1 5 11.9 4 9.5 1 2.4 
084 Lack of explicit business and IS 11 26.2 14 33.3 11 26.2 6 14.3 0 0 
development plan and strategy 
085 Lack of top management support 23 54.8 13 31 3 7.1 3 7.1 0 0 
086 Insufficient ERP exploitation funds and 10 23.8 15 35.7 11 26.2 6 14.3 0 0 
resources 
087 Lack of in-house experts 10 23.8 14 33.3 5 11 .9 13 31 0 0 
088 Low involvement of employees 8 19.1 21 50 9 21 .4 3 7.1 1 2.4 
089 Low-skilled and ill-trained staff 11 26.2 22 52.4 4 9.5 5 11 .9 0 0 
F = Frequency 
Table 7.6: Frequency table for organisational barriers 
It clearly emerged from this table that, among the organisational barriers examined, only 
'lack of in-house experts' was perceived to be important by a significant amount (31 %) 
of the respondents. As discussed in chapter six, success of ERP implementation and 
post-implementation is dependent on the collaboration and cooperation of various types 
of in-house experts, e.g. project leaders, IT experts, and specialists in different 
functional divisions. The existence of this barrier may prevent Chinese SOEs from 
effectively maintaining, monitoring and improving their ERP systems in the long-term. 
On the other hand, the other 8 organisational barriers were not perceived by the majority 
of the respondents to be important. As shown in the table, 60% - 85% of the 
respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statements associated with these 
barriers. In truth, it can be argued that the adoption and use of ERPs may help SOEs to 
remove some of these organisational barriers. For instance, ERP systems can often help 
user companies to break down departmental boundaries, and thus encourage cross-
functional integration and cooperation (Sia et al. , 2002; Alien, 2005). This can 
potentially improve 'collaboration and communication between functional divisions ' . 
Moreover, it may also be argued that some of these organisational barriers (e.g. fear of 
losing power and job) may be more likely to exist when the ERP system just goes live. 
However, as discussed above, the majority of the respondent SOEs have been using 
ERP for 2 - 6 years. These SOEs thus may get more used to the ERP environment and 
have less organisational problems towards ERP usage. 
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In sum, the findings showed that, among the 9 organisational barriers studied, only ' lack 
of in-house experts ' was identified by a significant number of the respondents as an 
important ERP exploitation barrier. 
7.3.1.3 System barriers 
It was also expected that user companies may often be confronted with a number of 
system barriers in ERP post-implementation. Table 7.7 presents the findings associated 
with the 9 system barriers initially grounded from the critical review process. 
Strongly Strongly 
System Barriers N = 42 Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree 
F % F % F % F % F % 
SB1 Insufficient support & service from ERP 3 7.1 14 33.3 9 21.4 14 33.3 2 4.8 
vendors 
SB2 Inexperienced and low-qualified system 4 9.5 15 35.7 13 31 10 23.8 0 0 
consultants 
SB3 System inflexibility 2 4.8 18 42.9 8 19.1 14 33.3 0 0 
SB4 System incompatibility 2 4.8 17 40.5 8 19.1 15 35.7 0 0 
SB5 High cost for add-ons and further system 6 14.3 19 45.2 7 16.7 10 23.8 0 0 
development 
SB6 Deficient design of the system 3 7.1 18 42.9 7 16.7 14 33.3 0 0 
SB7 Slow system response time 1 2.4 17 40.5 13 31 11 26.2 0 0 
SB8 Misfits between system functions and 2 4.8 27 64.3 10 23.8 2 4.8 1 2.4 
company requirements 
SB9 Poor data quality 4 9.5 26 61 .9 7 16.7 5 11 .9 0 0 
F =Frequency 
Table 7.7: Frequency table for system barriers 
Investigating this frequency table, it became apparent that about 70% of the respondents 
disagreed with the statements related to 'misfits between system functions and user 
requirements ' and ' poor data quality'. These two system barriers thus did not seem to 
be current ERP issues faced by SOEs. Nevertheless, the remainder 7 system barriers 
examined were perceived by a significant amount (23.8% - 38%) of respondents to be 
important ERP exploitation issues. These barriers should therefore receive particular 
attention from SOE managers. 
Overall , the questionnaire findings presented so far showed that, most system barriers 
were perceived by respondents to be important to SOEs, while only 1 cultural barrier 
and I organisational barrier were identified to be important ERP issues in these firms. 
In other words, respondents of the survey seemed to perceive system barriers to be more 
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critical than cultural and organisational ones. This issue is further analysed and 
discussed in section 7.3.3. 
7.3.2 Bivariate analysis of barrier items 
The study also aimed at investigating if the existence of a particular ERP barrier was 
related to the existence of other barriers. A set of potential relationships between the 
identified barriers were initially grounded from the critical literature review process, and 
were highlighted in the barrier ontology presented in section 6.5.2. 
In order to examine these potential barrier correlations in the context of Chinese SOEs, 
a bivariate analysis was conducted. As justified in chapter five, Spearman's rho (rs) and 
one-tailed test was used in this bivariate analysis. By following this approach, the 
researcher identified a set of statistically significant relationships between the identified 
ERP barriers, as presented below. 
Short-term thinking and lack of top management support 
As discussed in chapter six, when top managers in the firm value short-term results 
more than long-term achievement (Yuan and Ma, 2005), they may fail to provide 
continuous support to ERP exploitation. In other words, 'lack of top management 
support to ERP post-implementation' may be directly related with 'short-term 
behaviour' in the firm. Spearman's correlation was thus used to measure the 
relationship between these barrier variables. The output in table 7.8 shows that, these 
two variables are positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .584, 
and this correlation is significant at p < .001. It can thus be concluded that, as top 
managers are more likely to have short-term behaviour, it is more likely for them to 
provide insufficient and discontinuous support to ERP exploitation. 
Lack of top Short-term 
management support ! behaviour 
Spearman's Lack of top Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .584(**) 
rho management support 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.000 
N 42 42 
- Correlation IS s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-ta•led). 
Table 7.8: Correlation between top management support and short-term behaviour 
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Lack of ERP plan, management behaviour and IT experts 
It was considered that the absence of a clear ERP plan could be a result of insufficient 
top management support, short-term behaviour of top managers and/or lack of in-house 
experts. Spearman's correlation was thereby used to measure the relationship between 
these four barrier variables. The output in table 7.9 shows a number of correlations 
between these variables. 
Lack of top Short- Lack of 
Lack ofERP management term in-house 
plan support behaviour experts 
Spearman's Correlation 1.000 .517(**) .446(**) .507(**) 
rho Lack of ERP plan Coefficient 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.000 .002 .000 
N 42 42 42 42 
** Correlation IS s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.9: Correlation between lack ofERP plan, lack oftop management support, short-term behaviour 
and lack of expert 
Firstly the variables 'lack of ERP plan' and 'lack of top management support' are 
positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .517, and this 
relationship is statistically significant (p < .001). It thus can be concluded that, as top 
management support is more likely to be insufficient, the firm is more likely to lack an 
explicit ERP plan. Moreover the output also shows that, the variables 'lack of ERP 
plan' and 'short-term behaviour' are positively related with a Spearman correlation 
coefficient of r = .446, and this relationship is significant at p = .002. It can be 
concluded that, as top managers of the company are more likely to have short-term 
behaviour, an explicit IS plan is more likely to be missing. Finally, the variables 'lack 
of ERP plan' and 'lack of in-house experts' are positively related with a Spearman 
correlation coefficient of r = .507, and this relationship is significant at p < .00 1. Strong 
statistical evidence thereby proves that, as the company are more likely to have 
insufficient in-house experts, an explicit IS plan is more likely to be missing in the firm. 
Lack of ERP fund, top management support and ERP plan 
It was expected in chapter six that 'insufficient ERP fund' may be a result of 
'insufficient top management support' and 'absence of an effective ERP development 
plan'. In order to prove this initial expectation, Spearman 's correlation was used. 
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The output in table 7.10 shows that, the variables 'lack of ERP fund' and 'lack of top 
management support' are positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r 
= .505, and this relationship is significant at p < .001. It is thus concluded that, as top 
management to ERP is more likely to be insufficient, the firm is more likely to assign 
insufficient fund to ERP exploitation. 
Additionally, the variables 'lack ofERP fund' and 'lack ofERP plan' are also positively 
related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .696, and this relationship is 
significant at p < .001. It thus can be concluded that, as the firm is more likely to lack 
an explicit IS plan, the fund assigned to ERP is more likely to be insufficient. 
Lack of top management Lack of ERP 
Sl!lm_Ort _Qian 
Spearman's rho Lack of ERP Correlation 
.505 (**) .696(**) fund Coefficient 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.000 .000 
N 42 42 
** Correlation IS s1gmficant at the 0.011evel (1-talled). 
Table 7.10: Correlation between lack ofERP plan, lack of top manager support and lack of ERP fund 
User involvement, staff training and fear ofjob loss 
In addition, statistical evidence was found in this study to prove that 'low user 
involvement' could be a result of 'low-skilled and ill-trained staff and 'fear of losing 
power/job'. As shown in table 7.11, Spearman's correlation was used to measure the 
relationship between these variables. 
Low-skilled 
and ill- Fear of loss 
trained staff of power/job 
Spearman's rho Low user Correlation Coefficient 
.542(**) .371(**) involvement 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.000 .008 
N 42 42 
** Correlation IS s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.11: Correlation between low-quality staff and low user involvement 
The output shows that, the variables 'low user involvement' and 'low-skilled and ill-
trained staff are positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .542, 
and this relationship is significant at p < .001. It thus can be concluded that, as staff in 
the firm were more likely to be low-qualified and receive insufficient ERP training, user 
involvement in the firm was more likely to be low. The output also shows that, the 
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variables 'low user involvement' and 'fear of loss of power/job' are positively related 
with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .371. Asp = .008 this relationship is 
statistically significant. It thereby can be concluded that, as staff in the firm are more 
likely to fear that the use of ERP can result in power or job losing, user involvement in 
using ERP is correspondingly low. 
ERP fund and vendor support 
It was expected that if user companies do not have sufficient ERP fund to pay for the 
maintenance fee, they may not be able to receive continuous support from their system 
vendors during ERP exploitation. As shown in table 7.12, Spearman's correlation was 
used to measure the relationship between the variables 'insufficient ERP fund' and 
'insufficient vendor support'. The output shows that, these two variables are positively 
related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .439, and this relationship is 
significant at p < .001. It can thus be concluded that, as ERP exploitation fund is more 
likely to be insufficient, support provided by system vendors in ERP exploitation is 
more likely to be insufficient. 
Insufficient Insufficient 
vendor support ERP fund 
Spearman's rho Insufficient Correlation 1.000 I .439(**) 
vendor support Coefficient I 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.002 
N 42 42 
** Correlation 1s Significant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.12: Correlation between low-quality staff and low user involvement 
ERP flexibility and compatibility 
Because ERP systems were often inflexible (Emst, 1989; Namjae and Kiho, 2003), it 
may often be difficult for user companies to modify their ERP systems and then 
integrate ERP seamlessly with other IS applications. In other words, low compatibility 
of ERP may be a result of low flexibility of the system. Bivariate analysis was thereby 
carried out to measure the correlation between the variables 'system flexibility' and 
'system compatibility'. The output in table 7.13 shows that, these two variables are 
positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .474, and this 
relationship is significant at p = .00 1. It can thus be concluded that, if system flexibility 
of the ERP system is low, compatibility of the system will be correspondingly low. 
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System System 
flexibility compatibility_ 
Spearman's rho System flexibility Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .474(**) 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.001 
N 42 42 
** Correlation IS s1gn1ficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.13: Correlation between system flexibility and system compatibility 
System inflexibility and high enhancement cost 
As discussed in chapter six, low system flexibility of ERP may be an essential reason 
that leads to high system enhancement cost. Spearman's correlation was thus used to 
measure the correlation between the variables 'System inflexibility' and 'High 
enhancement cost'. 
System High cost for ERP 
inflexibility enhancement 
Spearman's rho System inflexibility Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .622(**) 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.000 
N 42 42 
** Correlation 1s s1gn1ficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.14: Correlation between system flexibility and cost ofERP enhancement 
The output in table 7.14 shows that, these two variables are positively related with a 
Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .622, and this relationship is significant at p 
< .001. It can thus be concluded that, if the ERP systems are more likely to be 
inflexible, costs for ERP add-ons and enhancements are more likely to be high. 
System speed and data quality 
It was expected that a large amount of redundant, outdated and irrelevant data stored in 
the system can significantly slow down system response time. In other words, slow 
system response time may be a result of poor data quality. Spearman's correlation was 
used to explore the relationship between the variables 'system response time' and 'data 
quality'. The output in table 7.15 shows that, these variables are positively related with 
a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .352. As p = .004, this relationship is 
statistically significant. It can be concluded that, when data quality of the system is low, 
system response time ofERP is more likely to be slow. 
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System 
response time Data quality 
Spearman's rho System Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .400(**) response time 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.004 
N 42 42 
** Correlation IS s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.15: Correlation between system response time and data quality 
ERP fund, high enhancement cost and system misfit 
It can be argued that, when cost for ERP enhancement is high, or when ERP fund is 
insufficient, the firm may not be able to continuously revise and enhance the installed 
ERP system, and thus resulting in misfits between ERP functions and user requirements. 
Spearman's correlation was used to measure the correlation between the variables 
'system function misfit', 'cost for ERP enhancement' and 'ERP fund'. 
The output in table 7.16 show that, the variables 'system function misfit' and 'cost for 
ERP enhancement' are positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r 
= .312, and this relationship is statistically significant (p = .022). It thus can be 
concluded that, when ERP enhancement cost is high, misfit between ERP and user 
needs is more likely to exist. The output also shows that, the variables 'system function 
misfit' and 'ERP fund' are also positively related with a Spearman correlation 
coefficient of r = .352, and this relationship is significant at p = .011. It is thereby 
concluded that, as the company assigns less fund to ERP exploitation, misfit between 
system functions and user requirements is more likely to occur. 
System function Cost ofERP 
misfit enhancement ERP fund 
Spearman's System function Correlation 1.000 .312(*) .352(*) 
rho misfit Coefficient 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.022 .011 
N 42 42 42 
• Correlation 1s s1gmficant at the 0.051evel (1-talled). 
Table 7.16: Correlation between system function misfit and cost ofERP enhancement and ERP funds 
Data quality, system compatibility, user involvement and in-house experts 
Poor data quality may be the result of low system compatibility, which can often lead to 
poor data and system integration (Loshin, 2001; Redman, 1998). Additionally, it was 
considered that, users with low involvement in using ERP may make human mistakes 
frequently. Lack of in-house experts may also result in difficulties in system and data 
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maintenance. Speannan's correlation was thereby used to measure the correlation 
between the variables 'Data quality', 'System compatibility', 'User involvement' and 
'In-house experts'. The output in table 7.17 shows a number of correlations between 
these variables. 
System User In-house 
Data Quality compatibility involvement expert 
Spearman's Data quality Correlation 1.000 .282(*) .384(**) .396(**) 
rho Coefficient 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.035 .006 .005 
N 42 42 42 42 
• Correlation IS s1gmficant at the 0.051evel (1-talled). ** Correlation 1s s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.17: Correlation between data quality, system compatibility, user involvement and in-house expert 
First, 'Data quality' and 'System compatibility' are positively related with a Spearman 
correlation coefficient of r = .282, and this relationship is statistically significant (p 
= .035). It thus can be concluded that, as system compatibility of ERP is low, data 
quality of the system is more likely to be low. Second, the variables 'Data quality' and 
'User involvement' are also positively related with a Speannan correlation coefficient 
of r = .384, and this relationship is significant at p = .006. It thereby can be concluded 
that, as user involvement to ERP is low, data quality of the system can be 
correspondingly low. Finally, the output also shows that the variables 'Data quality' 
and 'in-house experts' are positively related with a correlation coefficient of r = .396, 
and this relationship is significant at p = .005. It is thereby concluded that, as the 
company is more likely to lack sufficient in-house expert, data quality of the system can 
be relatively low. 
7.3.3 Discussion of findings and ranking of barriers 
The results derived from the questionnaire survey for the barrier variables have been 
presented and discussed in above sections. This section provides an overall discussion 
on the questionnaire findings identified so far. 
The mean was used in order to provide a summary of responses regarding the barrier 
statements. As justified in chapter five, the mean is often considered the most efficient 
method for summarising a distribution of values (Bryman and Cramer, 2005:101). 
Therefore, the means of the barrier variables were calculated by using SPSS, as 
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presented in table 7.18 below. The standard deviation was also shown in the table to 
reflect the degree to which the values of each barrier variable differed from the mean. 
Category Barrier N=42 Mean S.D. 
Cultural CB1 Power centralisation of top management 2.55 1.31 
Barrier {CB) CB2 Unwilling to disclose problems, faults and failures 1.86 .683 
CB3 High context and implicit form of communication 1.88 .832 
CB4 Lack of critical thinking of employees 1.93 1.045 
CB5 Less inclined to use explicit procedures and 2.14 .751 
information to tailor forecasts and plans 
CB6 Trust personal common sense/intuition rather 2.29 .995 
than system data to make decisions 
CB7 Building inter-organisational relationships based 1.64 .932 
on personal guanxi 
Organisational OB1 Inefficient collaboration and communication 2.00 1.104 
Barrier {OB) between functional departments 
OB2 Fearofpowerandjobloss 1.79 .813 
OB3 Short-term behaviour of companies 1.81 1.131 
OB4 Lack of explicit and detailed IS development plan 2.29 1.019 and strategy 
OB5 Lack of top management support 1.67 .902 
OB6 Insufficient ERP exploitation funds and resources 2.31 1 
OB7 Lack of in-house specialists 2.50 1.174 
OB8 Low involvement of employees 2.24 .932 
OB9 Low-skilled and ill-trained staff 2.07 .921 
System Barrier SB1 Insufficient support & service from ERP vendors 2.95 1.081 
{SB) SB2 Inexperienced and low-qualified system 2.69 .950 
consultants 
SB3 System inflexibility 2.81 .969 
SB4 System incompatibility 2.86 .977 
SB5 High cost for add-ons and further system 2.50 1.018 
development 
SB6 Irrational and inflexible design of the system 2.76 1.008 
SB7 Slow system response time 2.81 .862 
SB8 Misfits between system functions and company 2.36 .759 
requirements 
SB9 Poor data quality 2.31 .811 
Table 7.18: Total scores of the 25 ERP barner variables 
In table 7.19, the researcher rearranged and prioritised the barrier items based on their 
means. It emerged from this table that, the top 9 ERP barriers listed seemed to be 
particularly critical for SOEs. As presented in above sections, a significant amount 
(38%-24%) of respondents perceived these 9 barriers as important issues to ERP 
exploitation in their companies. It should be noted that 7 of these top 9 ERP barriers 
relate to one category, namely the system category. Therefore, it was apparent from the 
analysis of the questionnaire that the respondents of the survey identified organisational 
and cultural barriers as less important in their companies. 
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Rank Barrier N=42 Mean 
1 SB1 lnsuflicient supports and services from system vendors 2.95 
2 SB4 System incompatibility 2.86 
3 SB7 Slow system response time 2.81 
3 SB3 System inflexibility 2.81 
5 SB6 Irrational and inflexible design of the system 2.76 
6 SB2 Inexperienced and low-qualified system consultants 2.69 
7 C81 Power centralisation of top managers 2.55 
8 087 Lack of irHlouse specialists 2.50 
8 SBS High cost for add-ons and further system development 
-
2.50 
10 SB8 Misfits between system functions and company requirements 2.36 
11 086 Insufficient ERP post-implementation funds and resources 2.31 
11 SB9 Poor data quality 2.31 
13 CB6 
Trust personal common sense/intuition rather than system data to 2.29 
make decisions 
13 084 Lack of explicit and detailed IS development plan and strategy 2.29 
15 088 Low involvement of employees 2.24 
16 CB5 Less inclined to use systematic procedures and explicit information to 
2.14 
tailor forecasts and plans 
17 089 Low-skilled and ill-trained staff 2.07 
18 081 Inefficient collaboration and communication between functional 2.00 departments 
19 CB4 Lack of critical thinking of employees 1.93 
20 CB3 High context and implicit form of communication 1.88 
21 CB2 Unwilling to disclose problems, faults and failures 1.86 
22 083 Short-term behaviour of companies 1.81 
23 082 Fear of loss of power and loss of job 1.79 
24 085 Lack of top management support 1.67 
25 CB7 Buildill!l inter-omanisational relationshiPS based on oersonal ouanxi 1.64 
CB = Cultural Barrier, OB = Organisational Barrier, SB = System Barrier 
Table 7.19: Rankmg of the 25 ERP barriers by total scores 
A possible explanation to these findings is that, as a result of China's economic reform 
and corresponding very recent changes in SOE structures, management and culture, the 
organisational mechanism of modem SOEs has been gradually but surely transformed 
from the traditional Chinese centralised style to a more modem and flexible Western 
management style (Gamaut, et al, 2005). As a consequence, reformed SOEs, which had 
to adopt a modem management system, will have a more appropriate environment for 
ERP adoption than traditional Chinese firms (Reimers, 2002; Zhang et al. , 2005). As a 
result of these organisational improvements, many cultural and organisational barriers, 
that were expected to exist in traditional Chinese firms, might have been substantially 
resolved in SOEs. 
Nevertheless Fletcher and Wright (1995) point out that in IS studies, despite other types 
of barriers (e.g. organisational barriers) are in fact more important than the systems ones, 
respondents may not often perceive this to be the case. It is possible that these types of 
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barriers may actually not be an issue in a particular context. Alternatively, these 
barriers may not be perceived as an issue by respondents, who may indeed 
underestimate these factors due to a lack of realisation about the existence and 
importance of these barriers (Fletcher and Wright, 1995). Additionally, it could also be 
argued that the Chinese managers involved in the survey might not be willing to 
disclose these issues to the researcher. Overall, it was possible that the cultural and 
organisational barriers studied in the survey might be, to a certain degree, understated 
by respondents due to a lack of understanding and awareness. In fact, the findings 
derived from the bivariate analysis in this study confirmed that organisational barriers 
were in reality as important as system barriers. 
Specifically, through the bivariate analysis, the researcher identified a set of statistically 
significant relationships between the identified barriers (as presented in section 7.3 .2). 
Figure 7.2 presents a summary of these correlations. A full description for each of these 
correlations is presented in Table 7.20. 
r = .446 (' ') R4 
r = .507 ( " ) 
Figure 7.2 : Correlations between the identified ERP barriers 
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Correlation 
RI When top managers are more likely to focus on short-term results, it is more likely for them to 
provide insufficient and discontinuous support to ERP exploitation. 
R2 When top managers are more likely to focus on short-term results, it is more likely for the 
firm to lack a detailed plan to guide future ERP development and exploitation. 
R3 As top management support to ERP is more likely to be insufficient, the firm is more likely to 
lack an explicit ERP exploitation plan. 
R4 As the company are more likely to have insufficient in-house IT experts, a detailed and 
feasible ERP exploitation plan is more likely to be missing 
R5 As the firm is more likely to lack an ERP plan, ERP fund is more likely to be insufficient. 
R6 As top management support to ERP is more likely to be insufficient, the fund assigned to ERP 
exploitation is more likely to be insufficient. 
R7 As ERP exploitation fund is more likely to be insufficient, support provided by system 
vendors in ERP exploitation is more likely to be insufficient. 
R8 As ERP is more likely to be inflexible, cost for ERP add-ons will be correspondingly high. 
R9 As ERP is more likely to be inflexible and difficult to customise, the system is more likely to 
have low compatibility with other IS application. 
RIO When ERP is more likely to have low compatibility with other IS applications, data quality of 
the system is more likely to be affected. 
R 11 As the firm is more likely to lack IT experts, data quality of ERP is more likely to be affected. 
R12 As user involvement to ERP is low, data quality of the system is more likely to be low. 
R 13 As data quality of the system is poor, system response time of ERP is more likely to be slow. 
R 14 As system users are more likely to fear that ERP can result in power or job losing, user 
involvement towards ERP is correspondingly low. 
R 15 As system users are more likely to be low-qualified and receive insufficient ERP training, 
user involvement is more likely to be low. 
Rl6 As cost for ERP enhancements is more likely to be high, it is more likely that functions of the 
installed ERP may not be continuously enhanced to meet emergent user needs. 
Rl7 As ERP exploitation fund is more likely to be insufficient, it is more likely that functions of 
the installed ERP may not be continuously enhanced to meet emergent user needs. 
• Correlation is significant at the 0.051evel (1-tailed); 
•• Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
Table 7.20: Correlations between the identified ERP barriers 
Coefficient 
.584 ( .. ) 
.696 ( .. ) 





.396 ( .. ) 
.384 ( .. ) 





The findings of the bivariate analysis were quite illuminating. Investigating both the list 
of significant correlations and the correlation diagram, it became apparent that the 
correlations occurred not only between system barriers but also between organisational 
barriers. Actually, from the correlation diagram it is immediately apparent that the 
organisational barriers are the main triggers for other barriers, including system barriers. 
For instance, 'slow system response time', which is one of the top ERP barriers 
identified, is caused by 'poor data quality' which is in turn originated by 'insufficient IT 
experts' and 'low user involvement', etc. Moreover, the study clearly shows that it is 
exactly because these organisational and system barriers seem to be interwoven and 
closely related with each other, that they are so difficult to manage and remove. For 
example, in order to ensure sufficient ERP funds, SOEs may need to address a set of 
issues related to top managers, IT experts and internal IS policies. As a consequence, 
potential failure of ERP systems cannot be conveniently attributed to system aspects, 
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such as the software package and the ICT infrastructure. Other types of barriers (e.g. 
organisational barriers) should in reality be as important as the technical ones. 
Overall, the findings in this section showed that most system barriers examined were 
perceived by respondents as crucial ERP barriers in their firms. Therefore, there was a 
need to further explore the causes and consequences of these crucial system barriers in 
the follow-up case study. On the other hand, the analysis of the data showed that 
respondents of the survey identified organisational and cultural barriers as less 
important in their companies. However, the bivariate analysis conducted in this study 
indicated that other types of barriers (e.g. organisational barriers) should in reality be as 
important as the system ones. It was thus evident that the cultural and organisational 
barriers studied in the questionnaire were underestimated by respondents, probably due 
to a lack of understanding and awareness, as further discussed in chapter eight and nine. 
Due to this reason, it was considered necessary to further investigate these cultural and 
organisational barriers in the exploratory case study. Consequently, the researcher 
selected all of the 25 ERP barriers to be further studied and explored in the follow-up 
case study, which also aimed at validating the 17 correlations identified between these 
ERP barriers. 
7.4 Analysis of ERP risks 
This section presents and discusses the findings derived from the univariate and 
bivariate analysis of the risk items examined in the questionnaire. It aims at identifying 
a set of ERP risks that was crucial to SOEs, as well as exploring potential correlations 
between these risks. Findings derived from the critical literature review in chapter six 
were used, as relevant, to compare with and interpret the questionnaire results. 
7.4.1 Univariate analysis of risk items 
As discussed in chapter five, univariate analysis of the risk items refers to the 
descriptive analysis of the ERP risk events examined. For each risk event, four 
variables were generated, including whether this event can be perceived as an ERP 
exploitation risk, its probability of occurrence, level of impact, and frequency of 
occurrence. As such, a total of 160 variables were generated for the 40 ERP risks 
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studied. Frequency table or mean is used in this section to summarise the values for 
each of these variables. 
7 .4.1.1 Operational risks 
Through the critical literature review, the researcher established 9 operational risks 
around sales, production and accounting areas. The questionnaire results associated 
with these operational risks are presented in table 7 .21. 
In chapter six, it was identified that 'account staff in some cases may not be willing to 
release accounting responsibility/power to non-account staff. On the other hand, 'non-
account staff may be unwilling or incapable to take up accounting responsibilities'. 
However, the questionnaire findings showed that these two risk events were not 
particular issues to many SOEs. Specifically, more than 40% of the respondents did not 
perceive these two events to be ERP post-adoption risks in their firms. Moreover, more 
than 53% of the respondents considered the probability of occurrence of these two risk 
events to be low. Therefore, these two risk events seemed to be less crucial to SOEs. 
On the other hand, 55% and 90% of the respondents respectively perceived that there 
was a low probability and frequency for their operational staff to 'be unwilling to use 
the ERP system' and 'input incorrect data into ERP'. However, the vast majority (i.e. 
more than 80%) of the respondents stated that the occurrence of these two risk events 
could lead to a high to medium impact. In other words, the findings showed that these 
two events are typical risk events that have low probability of occurrence but critical 
impact. The occurrence of these risk events is thus unacceptable. 
Finally, the remainder operational risks examined (i.e. OR2.1, OR2.2, OR3.1, OR3.2 
and OR3.3) were perceived by more than 90% of the respondents to be ERP risks in 
their firms. Moreover, the questionnaire results presented in table 7.21 showed that, 
these operational risks did not just have a relatively high probability of occurrence, but 
more importantly could also lead to a significant impact. They should therefore receive 
substantial attention from SOE managers. 
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Operational Risks (OR) This is a risk Probability Impact Frequency • 
event(%) Low(%) Med (%) High(%) Low(%) Med (%) High(%) Mean S.D. 
Generic risks (OR1) 
OR1.1 Operational staff are unwilling to use the ERP 35 (83.3) 22 (55) 18 (45) 0 (0) 8 (20) 23 (57.5) 9 (22.5) 2.03 0.92 
system 
OR1.2 Operational staff input incorrect data into the 34 (81) 37 (90.2) 3 (7.3) 1 (2.4) 6 (14.6) 15 (36.6) 20 (48.8) 1.61 0.997 
system 
Sales & marketing risks (OR2) 
OR2.1 Sales staff are not able to obtain needed data 39 (92.9) 13 (31 .7) 27 (65.9) 1 (2.4) 3 (7.3) 35 (85.4) 3 (7.3) 2.44 0.95 
and information from ERP 
OR2.2 Customer info files contained in ERP are out- 38 (90.5) 7(17.5) 31 (77.5) 2 (5) 3 (7.5) 28 (70) 9 (22.5) 2.35 0.70 
of-date or incomplete 
Production & purchasing risks (OR3) 
OR3.1 ERP system contains inaccurate supplier 38 (90.5) 11 (26.8) 27 (65.9) 3 (7.3) 5 (12.2) 30 (73.2) 6 (14.6) 2.41 0.921 
records 
OR3.2 ERP system contains inaccurate or incomplete 38 (90.5) 10 (25) 27 (67.5) 3 (7.5) 5 (12.5) 19 (47.5) 16 (40) 2.15 0.77 
bill of materials 
OR3.3 ERP system contains inaccurate inventory 39 (92.9) 8 (19.5) 28 (68.3) 5 (12.2) 4 (9.8) 22 (53.7) 15 (36.6) 2.49 0.978 
records 
Financial & accounting risks (OR4) 
OR4.1 Account staff are unwilling to release 29 (69) 20 (54.1) 17 (45.9) 0 (0) 8 (21.6) 28 (75.7) 1 (2. 7) 2.11 0.658 
accounting power to non-account staff 
OR4.2 Non-account staff are unwilling/incapable to 23 (54.8) 17 (53.1) 14 (43.8) 1 (3.1) 10 (31 .3) 19(59.4) 3 (9.4) 2.06 0.801 
take up accounting responsibilities 
* From 1 (very rarely) to 5 (very often) 
Table 7.21: Frequency table for operational risks 
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7 .4.1.2 Analytical risks 
Table 7.22 presents the questionnaire findings associated with a set of analytical risks, 
which were initially established and discussed in chapter six. 
Among the 8 analytical risks examined, AR1.1 and AR 2.3 were found to have 
relatively low probability of occurrence and low level of impact. These two risk events 
thus seemed to be acceptable risks to Chinese SOEs. 
On the other hand, it was expected that 'managers may not always be able to retrieve 
needed information from their ERPs', probably due to deficient system design (Sage, 
2005) and cultural misfits (Soh et al, 2000). This original expectation was confirmed to 
be true by the majority of the respondents, who perceived the probability of occurrence 
of this risk event as medium (85% ). Furthermore, because the occurrence of this risk 
event may often affect decision making of managers, it was perceived to have a medium 
impact by 87.5% of respondents. This risk event thus needs to be handled carefully by 
SOE managers. 
More importantly, the remainder analytical risks (i.e. AR2.1, AR2.2, AR3.1, AR3.2 and 
AR4.1) were perceived by the majority of the respondents to have both relatively high 
probability and impact. Specifically, it was identified in chapter six that market 
statistical data, which is available in the industry in contemporary China, typically lacks 
accuracy, reliability and currency (Lv, 2006). Inaccurate and unreliable market 
statistics can raise many forecasting problems and risks (Ranard, 1972), e.g. 'inaccurate 
sales forecast' and 'difficulty in predicting new product demand'. 78% - 87% of the 
respondents confirmed that the likelihood for these risk events to occur was medium to 
high. The occurrence of these risk events could also lead to significant impact to SOEs, 
as confirmed by more than 87% of the respondents. In addition, inaccurate sales 
forecast may in turn increase the probability for ERPs to generate 'inappropriate master 
production plans', 'inadequate material requirement plans' and 'inappropriate financial 
budgets' (Zhou et al, 2005:101). A vast majority (more than 88%) of the respondents 
perceived these later risk events could lead to a critical impact in their firms. Overall, 
since these analytical risks are both critical and frequent, they need to be addressed with 
high priority. 
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Analytical Risks {AR) This is a risk Probability Impact Frequency • 
event{%) Low(%) Med (%) High (%) Low(%) Med (%) High (%) Mean S.D. 
Generic risks (AR1) 
AR1 .1 Front-line managers refuse to use the ERP 33 (78.6) 27 (67.5) 12 (30) 1 (2.5) 12 (30) 22 (55) 6 (15) 1.75 0.809 
system 
AR1 .2 Managers cannot retrieve relevant and needed 38 (90.5) 4 (10) 34 (85) 2 (5) 3 (7.5) 35 (87.5) 2 (5) 2.48 0.933 
information from the system 
Sales & marketing risks (AR2) 
AR2.1 Sales forecast is inaccurate and inappropriate 39 (92 .9) 9 (22) 29 (70.7) 3 (7.3) 4 (9.8) 26 (63.4) 11 (26.8) 2.29 0.716 
AR2.2 Fail to predict actual demands of new products 37 (88.1) 5 (12.5) 33 (82.5) 2 (5) 5 (12.5) 26 (65) 9 (22.5) 2.38 0.705 
AR2.3 Fail to provide special sales offers and 38 (90.5) 14 (34.1) 24 (58.5) 3 (7.3) 21 (51 .2) 17(41.4) 3 (7.3) 2.1 0 0.995 
promotion to existing customers 
Production & purchasing risks (AR3) 
AR3.1 Master production schedule generated by the 36 (85.7) 11 (26.8) 27 (65.9) 3 (7.3) 3 (7.3) 24 (58.5) 14 (34.1) 2.34 0.938 
ERP system is inappropriate 
AR3.2 System fails to generate appropriate material 37(88.1) 8 (20) 30 (75) 2 (5) 1 (2.5) 26 (65) 13 (32.5) 2.33 0.888 
net requirement plan 
Financial & accounting risks (AR4) 
AR4.1 Fail to use the system to generate appropriate 38 (90.5) 7 (17.1) 30 (73.2) 4 (9.8) 5 (12.2) 27 (65.9) 9 (22) 2.32 0.82 
financial budgets 
* From 1 (very rarely) to 5 (very often) 
Table 7.22: Frequency table for analytical risks 
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7 .4.1.3 Organisation-wide risks 
A critical review of the literature in the previous chapter identified a set of organisation-
wide risks, which were related to diverse aspects of top managers, ERP planning, 
system users, in-house IT experts, and system vendors. Table 7.23 presents the 
questionnaire findings associated with these risk events. 
As clearly shown in this table, all of the established organisation-wide risks were 
perceived by the majority (76% or more) of the respondents to be risk events to ERP 
post-implementation. However, perceptions of probability, frequency and impact of 
these risk events varied. 
Specifically, more than 73.8% of the respondents perceived that there was a very low 
probability and frequency that 'data access right was assigned to inadequate users', and 
that 'confidential data of the system is accessed by unauthorised people'. However, 
because the occurrence of these risk events could often lead to information leakage and 
even direct financial loss (Y osha, 1995), they could result in critical impact as 
confirmed by more than 73% of the respondents. Therefore, these critical risks, even if 
they only occur very infrequently, may be considered as un-acceptable risks to take. 
Furthermore, for another 6 organisation-wide risks examined (i.e. OWRl.l, OWR1.3, 
OWR2.3, OWR3.1, OWR4.2 and OWR4.3), more than half of the respondents 
perceived their probability of occurrence to be low. However, another 40% of the 
respondents stated that the likelihood for these events to occur was medium. More 
importantly, these organisation-wide risks were considered by more than 80% of the 
respondents to have a high to medium impact. Therefore, these ERP risks should 
receive substantial attention from managers in SOEs. 
Finally, the remainder organisation-wide risks (i.e. OWR 1.2, OWR2.1, OWR2.2, 
OWR3.2, OWR3.3, OWR4.1, OWR, 5.1 and OWR5.2) were perceived by the majority 
(65% - 95%) of the respondents to have medium to high probability and impact. 
Because these risks seem to be both critical and frequent, they need to be addressed with 
a high priority in SOEs. 
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Organisation-Wide Risks (OWR) This is a risk Probability Impact Frequency* 
event(%) Low(%) Med (%) High(%) Low(%) Med (%) High(%) Mean S.D. 
Top management risks (OWR1) 
OWR1 .1 Top managers make centralised IT decisions 40 (95.2) 23 {56.1) 17 {41.5) 1 {2.4) 6 {14.6) 18 (43.9) 17 {41 .5) 1.90 1.02 
OWR1.2 Personnel changes in top management team 33 (78.6) 5 {13.5) 31 (83.8) 1 (2.4) 7 (18.9) 27 (73) 3 (8.1) 2.53 0.603 
OWR1 .3 Support from top managers to ERP post- 42 {100) 21 {50) 17 (40.5) 4 {9.5) 8 (19) 24 (57.1) 10 (23.8) 2.12 0.861 
implementation is insufficient 
ISIERP planning risks (OWR2) 
OWR2.1 IS/ERP development plan is ill-defined or 37 (88.1) 11 (27.5) 25 (62.5) 4 (10) 3 (7.5) 27 (67.5) 10 (25) 2.45 0.986 
misfit with business strategy 
OWR2.2 Direction for ERP improvement and further 36 (85.7) 10 (25) 26 (65) 4 (10) 2 {5) 33 (82.5) 5 (12.5) 2.65 0.864 
development is unclear 
OWR2.3 Insufficient funds are assigned to ERP 41 (97.6) 21 (50) 19 (45) 2 (5) 8 (19) 29 (69) 5 (11 .9) 2.43 0.966 
In-house IT expert risks (OWR3) 
OWR3.1 Fail to form an efficient cross-functional team 36 (85.7) 19 (50) 14 (36.7) 5 (13.3) 3 (7.7) 32 (82.3) 4 (10) 2.59 0.966 
to review and revise the system 
OWR3.2 Lose qualified ITIERP experts 36 (85.7) 10 (23.5) 29 (69) 3 (7.5) 7 (16.7) 26 (61.9) 9 (21.4) 2.57 0.831 
OWR3.3 Lose ERP-related know-how accumulated 39 (92.9) 5 (11 .9) 36 (85.7) 1 (2.4) 3 (7.1) 32 (76.2) 7 (16.7) 2.43 0.737 
System users risks (OWR4) 
OWR4.1 Users do not receive sufficient training 37 (88.1) 9 (22) 32 (78) 0 (0) 7 (17.1) 34 (82.9) 0 {0) 2.59 0.865 
OWR4.2 Users are uncomfortable to use the ERP 32 (76.2) 20 (52.6) 16 (42.1) 2 (5.3) 9 (23.7) 27(71 .1) 2 (5.3) 2.53 0.797 
system in their daily jobs 
OWR4.3 ERP-related problems are not reported 37 (88.1) 22 (55) 16 (40) 2 (5) 5 (12.5) 31 (77.5) 4 (10) 2.50 0.784 
promptly by system users 
OWR4.4 Data access right is given to inadequate users 37 (88.1) 32 (78) 8 (19.6) 1 (2.4) 11 (26.9) 14 (34.1) 16 (39) 1.76 0.969 
OWR4.5 Confidential data of the system is accessed by 38 (90.5) 31 (73.8) 10 (23.8) 1 (2.4) 10 (23.8) 13 (31) 19 (45.2) 1.64 1.10 
unauthorised people 
System vendors and consultants risks (OWR5) 
OWR5.1 Cannot receive enough technical support from 36 {85.7) 3 (7.3) 35 (85.4} 3 {7.3) 5 {12.2} 29 (70.7) 7(17.1) 2.59 0.836 
system vendors 
OWR5.2 Cannot receive sufficient/proper consulting 35 (83.3) 6 (14.6) 31 (75.6} 4 {9.8} 5 {12.2) 32 (78) 4 (9.8) 2.46 0.809 
advice from system consultants 
-
*From 1 (very rarely) to 5 (very often) 
Table 7.23 : Frequency table for organisation-wide risks 
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7.4.1.4 Technical risks 
Finally, a number of prevalent technical risks were also identified and included in the 
risk ontology, as presented in chapter SIX. The following table presents the 
questionnaire results related to these risks. 
This is Probability Impact Frequency* 
Technical Risks (TR) a risk Low Med High Low Med High 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Mean S.D 
System integration risks (TR1) 
TR1 .1 Seamless integration is not achieved ~8 ~ 36 1 3 33 5 2.41 0.774 
between modules of the ERP system 90.5) 9.8) (87.8) (2.4) 7.3) (80.5) (12.2) 
TR1 .2 ERP system is not able to seamlessly ~7 ~ 33 3 2 35 3 ~.48 0.847 
integrate with other information systems 88.1) 10) (82.5) (7.5) (5) (87.5) (7.5) 
System failure risks (TR2) 
~6 ~ 4 ~ .28 TR2.1 Invalid data is not automatically detected 31 1 33 3 0.816 
when getting into the system 85.7) 20) (77.5) (2.4) 10) (82.5) (7.5) 
TR2.2 Hardware or software crashes ~6 ~ 31 2 5 28 7 ~ . 33 0.797 
85.7) 17.5) (77.5) (5) 12.5) (70) (17.5) 
System maintenance and revision risks (TR3) 
TR3.1 Technical bugs of our ERP system is not 38 5 35 1 p 32 4 2.44 0.709 
speedily overcome 90.5) 12.2) (85.4) (2.4) (12.2) (78) (9.8) 
TR3.2 Outdated and duplicated data of our ~6 5 33 3 ~ 36 2 2.46 0.745 
ERP system is not properly discarded 85.7) 12.2) (80.5) (7.3) (7.3) (87.8) (4.9) 
TR3.3 ERP is not properly modified to meet ~5 5 34 2 ~ 33 4 2.32 0.687 
new business requirements 83.3) 12.2) (82.9) (4.9) ~9.8) (80.5) (9.8) 
* From 1 (very rarely) to 5 (very often) 
Table 7.24: Frequency table for technical risks 
Investigating table 7.24, it became apparent that all of the predefined technical risks 
were perceived by the majority (83% or more) of the respondents to be risk events to 
ERP post-implementation. The respondents thus seemed to recognise the importance of 
these technical issues. Moreover, the majority (70% - 87.8%) of the respondents 
perceived all of the established technical risks to have both medium likelihood and 
impact in their firms. Therefore, there seems to be a need of a number of risk 
management mechanisms in place to help SOEs to both mitigate and resolve these 
potential technical issues. 
7 .4.2 Bivariate analysis of risk items 
The study aimed at also investigating potential correlations between the identified ERP 
risks. Specifically, this study used bivariate analysis to explore if the probability of 
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occurrence of a particular risk was related to the increase of the probability of 
occurrence of other risks. A set of potential relationships between the identified risks 
were initially grounded from the critical literature review process, and were highlighted 
in the risk ontology presented in section 6.5.3. 
In order to examine these potential risk correlations in the context ofSOEs, Spearman's 
rho (rs) and one-tailed test was used, as justified in section 5.7.2. By following this 
approach, the researcher identified a set of statistically significant correlations between 
the identified ERP risks, as presented below. 
Inventory record, master production schedule and material requirements plan 
As discussed in chapter six, inventory records and master production schedules are two 
main inputs used to calculate material requirements plans (Koh et al, 2000). Thus, it 
was expected that having 'inaccurate inventory record' or 'inadequate master 
production schedule' may increase the probability for having 'inappropriate material 
requirements plans'. Spearman's correlation was used to examine the relationships 
between these risk items. 
Prob. to have Prob. to have Prob. to have 
inappropriate inaccurate irrelevant master 
material inventory production 
requirements plan records schedule 
Spearrnan's Prob. to have Correlation 
rho inappropriate Coefficient 




.002 .000 tailed) 
N 40 41 40 
** Correlation 1s s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.25: Correlations between material requirements plan and master production schedule and 
inventory records 
The output in table 7.25 shows that the variables, that are concerned with the probability 
of having inaccurate inventory record and inappropriate material requirements plan, are 
positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .439. This relationship 
is significant at p = .002. It can therefore be concluded that, as the probability of having 
inaccurate inventory record increases, the probability of having inappropriate material 
requirements plan increases. 
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The output also shows that the variables, associated with the probability of having 
inappropriate production schedule and inappropriate material requirements plan, are 
positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .573. This relationship 
is significant at p < .00 1. It thus can be concluded that, as the probability of having 
inappropriate production schedule increases, the probability of having inappropriate 
material requirements plan correspondingly increases. 
Changes in top management team and insufficient top management support 
It was expected that substantial changes in the top management team may increase the 
probability for having insufficient top management support to ERP (Lientz and Larssen, 
2006). Spearman's correlation was thereby used to examine the relationship between 
these two risk items. The output in table 7.26 shows that these risk variables are 
positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .276. This relationship 
is relatively significant asp= .049. Some statistical evidence are thus found to prove 
that, as the probability of having personnel changes in the top management team 
increases, the probability of having insufficient top management support to ERP may 
correspondingly increase. 
Prob. to lack top Prob. to personnel change 
manager support in top manaaement team 
Spearman's Prob. to lack top Correlation 1.000 .276(*) 
rho manager support Coefficient 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.049 
N 37 37 
* Correlation IS s1gmficant at the 0.05 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.26: Correlation between top management support and personnel change in top management term 
Top management support and ERP plan 
As discussed in chapter six, top managers play an important role in establishing, 
implementing and sustaining an efficient ERP exploitation plan. It was thus expected 
that, insufficient top management support may increase the probability of having 
inappropriate and ill-defined ERP plans. Spearman's correlation was used to examine 
the relationship between these two risk items. The output in table 7.27 shows that these 
risk variables are positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .402. 
This relationship is significant at p = .005. It thus can be concluded that, as the 
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probability of having insufficient top management support increases, the probability of 
having inappropriate and ill-defined IS plan increases. 
Prob. to have Prob. to lack top 
inappropriate ERP plan manager support 
Spearman's Prob. to have Correlation 1.000 .402(**) 
rho inappropriate ERP plan Coefficient 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.005 
N 40 40 
- Correlation 1s s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.27: Correlation between top management support and ERP development plan 
ERP plan and ERP development direction 
It was considered that, inappropriate and ill-defined ERP plan may increase the 
probability of having unclear ERP development direction. Spearman's correlation was 
thus used to examine the relationship between these risk items. The output in table 7.28 
shows that the two risk variables examined are positively related with a Spearman 
correlation coefficient of r = .795. This relationship is significant at p < .001. 
Therefore, strong statistical evidence are found to prove that, as the probability of 
having inappropriate and ill-defined ERP plan increases, the probability of having 
unclear ERP development direction correspondingly increases. 
Prob. to have unclear Prob. to have 
ERP development inappropriate ERP 
direction _Qian 
Spearman' Prob. to have unclear Correlation 




N 39 40 
- Correlation IS s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.28: Correlation between ERP development direction and ERP plan 
ERP fund, top management support, ERP plan and budget 
As discussed in chapter six, the occurrence of insufficient ERP fund may be the result 
of the occurrence of a set of other ERP risks, e.g. insufficient top management support, 
inappropriate and ill-defined ERP plan, and inappropriate financial budget. In order to 
verify this expectation, Spearman's correlation was used to examine the relationship 
between these risk items. The output in table 7.29 shows three correlations between 
insufficient ERP fund and the other three risk items measured. 
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Prob. To have insufficient 
top management support 
Prob. To Correlation 
.373(**) have Coefficient 
insufficient Sig. (1-tailed) 
ERP fund . 008 
N 42 
** Correlation 1s s1gn1ficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
• Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
Prob. to have Prob. to have 
inappropriate inappropriate financial 
ERP plan budget 
.71 0(**) .324(*) 
.000 .019 
40 42 
Table 7.29: Correlation between insufficient ERP fund and other ERP risks 
Firstly the risk variables, that are concerned with insufficient top management support 
and insufficient ERP fund, are positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient 
of r = .373. This relationship is significant at p = .008. Strong statistical evidence are 
thus found to prove that, as the probability of having insufficient top management 
support is higher, the probability ofhaving insufficient ERP fund will be higher. 
Secondly the risk variables, that are concerned with inappropriate ERP plan and 
insufficient ERP fund, are positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r 
= .710. This relationship is statistically significant, since p < .001. Strong statistical 
evidence are thus found to prove that, as the probability of having inappropriate and ill-
defined ERP plan is higher, the probability of having insufficient ERP fund will be 
correspondingly higher. 
Finally the risk variables, that are concerned with inappropriate financial budget and 
insufficient ERP fund, are positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r 
= .324. This relationship is significant at p = .019. It can thus be concluded that, as the 
probability of having inappropriate financial budget increases, the probability of having 
insufficient ERP fund will correspondingly increase. 
Data accessibility 
Confidential data stored in ERP should be carefully handled and managed. However, as 
discussed before, when data access right is assigned to irrelevant users, it may increase 
the probability for unauthorised people to access to sensitive data stored in the system 
(Wilding, 2003). Spearman's correlation was thus used to examine the relationship 
between these two risk items. 
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Prob. that data is Prob. that data access 
accessed by right is given to 
unauthorised people irrelevant user 
Spearman's Prob. that data is Correlation 1.000 .464(**) 
rho accessed by Coefficient 
unauthorised people Sig. (1-tailed) 
.001 
N 42 41 
** Correlation 1s s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.30: Correlation between information leakage and problematic data access right 
The output in table 7.30 shows that the examined risk variables are positively related 
with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .464. This relationship is significant at p 
= .001. Strong statistical evidence are hence found to prove that, as the probability that 
data access right is assigned to irrelevant user increases, the probability of having 
unauthorised people to access to sensitive system data will increase. 
ERP fund and ERP enhancement 
The implemented ERP system has to be continuously reviewed and enhanced in the 
post-implementation phase (Willis and Willis-Brown, 2002), in order to meet emergent 
user needs. However, it was considered that having insufficient ERP fund may increase 
the probability that the implemented ERP may not be continuously and adequately 
enhanced. Spearman's correlation was thus used to examine the relationship between 
these risk items. 
Prob. that ERP cannot Prob. to have 
be modified to meet insufficient 
new reauirement ERP fund 
Spearman's Prob. that ERP cannot be Correlation 




N 42 42 
• Correlation 1s s1gmficant at the 0.051evel (1-talled). 
Table 7.31: Correlation between ERP enhancement and ERP fund 
The output in table 7.31 shows that the two examined risk variables are positively 
related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .348. This relationship is 
significant at p = .013. Statistical evidence are thus found to prove that, as the 
probability of having insufficient ERP fund increases, the probability that the 
implemented system cannot be continuously modified will increase. 
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7 .4.3 Discussion of findings and ranking of risks 
The questionnaire results associated with ERP post-implementation risks were 
presented above. This section provides an overall discussion of this part of 
questionnaire findings. 
In general, the findings show that all of the 40 events, which were pre-defined in the 
theoretical risk ontology, were confirmed by the majority (e.g. 80% or more) of 
respondents as risk events to ERP exploitation. However, perceptions of impact, 
probability of occurrence, and frequency of occurrence varied somewhat. 
The survey asked respondents to assess the importance of each risk from three 
independent aspects, namely probability of occurrence, impact, and frequency of 
occurrence. As discussed and exemplified in chapter five (section 5.6.3), a risk event 
that had a high probability of occurrence may not have a high impact or a high 
frequency of occurrence. It is thus necessary to take into account these three risk 
aspects, when evaluating the overall importance of each of the identified ERP risks. In 
order to do so, the following formula was developed and used to calculate the risk score 
for each ERP risk event: 
Risk score of each ERP risk event= L [W*(Probability +Impact+ Frequency)] 
The interpretation and justification of this formula were given in detail in section 5. 7 .l. 
In brief, this formula enabled the researcher to calculate the risk score to show the 
importance of each identified risk event by taking into consideration its probability of 
occurrence, impact and frequency of occurrence. By using this formula, the researcher 
calculated the risk scores for all of the identified ERP risk events, as presented in Table 
7.32. 
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Table 7.32: Risks scores of the 40 identified ERP risks 
Lewt 1 a.tegory Level 2 c~egory Level 3 RISk Item N=42 Risk score 
Operational RisK (OR) Generic risk (OR1 ) OR1 .1 Operatimal staff are Lnwilling to use the ERP system 196 
OR12 Operatimal staff iflll.( incorrect Oata into the system 182 
Sales ana marketing risk OR2.1 Sales staff are not able to ooain oata ana informatiOn they neeo from the system 241 
(OR2) OR22 Customer info ftles contained in the ERP system o:r-e out-of-date or incomplete 246 
Pro<1Jction ana pure ha sing OR3.1 ERP system contains i naccu~ate suppier recoros 238 
risk(OR3) OR32 ERP system contains i naccu~ate or incomplete bill of materials 243 
OR3.3 ERP system contains i naccu~ate inventory records 263 
Fln. & ace. risk (OR4) OR4.1 ACCOLnt staff are Lnwi lling to release accoonting responsibil ity and power to non-accoonl stall 166 
OR42 Non-accolJ11 staff are Lnwilling ard incapable to take up accoLnting responsibil ities 131 
Analytical RiSk (AR) Generic risk (AR1) AR1 .1 Front-line managers refuse to use the ERP system 163 
AR1 .2 Managers camot retrieve relevant and neeoeo information from the system 247 
Sales ana marketing risk AR2.1 Sales forecast is naccurate and inappropriate 2W 
(AR2) AR2.2 Fail to predict actual oemamt; c:1 new pro<1Jc1S 238 
AR2.3 Fail to provide special sales offers ana promotion to existing customers 213 
Pro<1Jction and pure ha sing AR3.1 Master production schedue generated by the ERP system is inappropriate 237 
risk(AR3) AR3.2 System fails to generate appropriate material net re~iremenl plan 240 
Fln. & ace . risk (OR4) AR4.1 Fail to use the system to generate awropriate finandal bUdgets 247 
Organisation-Wide Top management risK OWR1 .1 Top managers make important IT Oecisims will-out cmsuting IT experts or system users 223 
Risk(OWR) (OWR1) OWR12 Substantial personnel changes in the top management team 209 
OWR1 .3 Support from top managers toERP post~mplementation is insLtficient 242 
IS!ERP plaming risK OWR2.1 ISIERP develo!Jllent pan is rrissing, ill-deftned or misfit with business strategy 240 
(OWR2) OWR22 Directim ~r ERP improvemeri ana further develo!Jllent is unclear 238 
OWR2.3 1 nsllfident resoortes ana fLnds are assign ea to ERP trairing, mai..-enance ana emancement 242 
In-house IT experiS risk OWR3.1 Fail to form an effiCient cross..fLnctional team to continuously review and rel.1se tne ERP system 235 
(CM'R3) OWR32 Lose ~alified ITIERP experts 233 
OWR3.3 Lose ERP-related know.no.v accunuated overtime 252 
System users risk (OVVR4) OWR4.1 ERP users (both stalls and managers) do not receive suffiCient ana cortiruous training 233 
OWR42 Users are Lncombrtable to use the ERP system in their daily joos 209 
O\"vR4.3 ERP-related problems are not repated promp11y tJf system users 235 
OVVR4.4 Data access right to ERP is autnorised to inawropriate users 192 
ONR4.5 Confidential data c:1 the system is accessed by unauthoriseo peope 197 : 
System venaors and OWR5.1 Camot receive enough techrical support from system vendors 238 ' 
consunant risk (CM'R5) O.\o'R52 camot receive su11icient and p-oper consul1ing advice from system consutanls 228 i 
Technical RiSk (TR) System i1tegratl>n risk TR1.1 Seamless irtegciion is nd acheved behveen modues of tne ERP system 243 
(TR1) TR1.2 ERP system is not able to seamlessly irtegale with otter information systems 244 
System taill.f'e riSK (TR2) TR21 Invalid data is net aJ1omaUcally <lE~ected when getting into the ERP system 223 
TR22 Haroware or scttware crasnes 232 I 
System maintenance and TR3.1 Techrical bugs ofol.f' ERP s:f31em is nd speedity overtome 240 
revision risk (TR3) TR3.2 Outdated ard d~lic cied data a oor ERP system is not property ascartled 233 
TR:L3 fRP is not prooenv modfied to meet new business reauremerts 223 
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Subsequently, the researcher prioritised the 40 identified ERP risk events based on their 
risk scores, as presented in table 7.33. The top 15 risk events, ofwhich the risk scores 
are above 240, are highlighted in this table. 
Rank Risk item 
Risk 
Score 
1 OR3.3 ERP system contains inaccurate inventory reoords 263 
2 OWR3.3 Lose ERP-related know-how accumulated over time 252 
3 AR2.1 Sales forecast is inaccurate and inappropriate 250 
4 AR1.2 Managers cannot retrieve relevant and needed information from the system 247 
4 AR4.1 Fail to use the system to generate appropriate financial budgets 247 
6 OR2.2 Customer files contained in the ERP system are out-of-date or incomplete 246 
7 TR1.2 ERP is not able to seamlessly integrate with other IS applications 244 
8 TR1 .1 Seamless integration is not achieved between modules of the ERP system 243 
8 OR3.2 ERP system contains inaccurate or incomplete bill of materials 243 
10 OWR1 .3 Support from top managers to ERP post-implementation is insufficient 242 
10 OWR2.3 Insufficient resources and funds are assigned to ERP exploitation 242 
12 OR2.1 Sales staff are not able to obtain data and information they need from ERP 241 
13 OWR2.1 ERP development plan is ill-defined or misfit with business strategy 240 
13 AR3.2 System fails to generate appropriate material net requirement plan 240 
13 TR3.1 Technical bugs of ERP system is not speedily overcome 240 
16 AR2.2 Fail to predict actual demands of new products 238 
16 OWR2.2 Direction for ERP improvement and further development is unclear 238 
16 OR3.1 ERP system contains inaccurate supplier records 238 
16 OWR5.1 Cannot receive enough technical support from system vendors 238 
20 AR3.1 Master production schedule generated by the ERP system is inappropriate 237 
21 OWR4.3 ERP-related problems are not reported promptly by system users 235 
21 OWR3.1 Fail to form an efficient cross-functional team for ERP exploitation 235 
23 OWR3.2 Lose qualified IT/ERP experts 233 
23 OWR4.1 ERP users (both staff and managers) do not receive sufficient ERP training 233 
23 TR3.2 Outdated and duplicated data of our ERP system is not properly discarded 233 
26 TR2.2 Hardware or software crashes 232 
27 OWR5.2 Cannot receive sufficient and proper support from system consultants 228 
28 TR2.1 Invalid data is not automatically detected when getting into the ERP system 223 
28 OWR1 .1 Top managers make important IT decisions without consulting the others 223 
28 TR3.3 ERP is not properly modified to meet new business requirements 223 
31 AR2.3 Fail to provide special sales offers and promotion to existing customers 213 
32 OWR1 .2 Substantial personnel changes in the top management team 209 
32 OWR4.2 Users are uncomfortable to use the ERP system in their daily jobs 209 
34 OWR4.5 Confidential data of the system is accessed by unauthorised people 197 
35 OR1 .1 Operational staff are unwilling to use the ERP system 196 
36 OWR4.4 Data access right to ERP is authorised to inappropriate users 192 
37 OR1 .2 Operational staff input incorrect data into the system 182 
38 OR4.1 Account staff are unwilling to release accounting responsibility to other staff 166 
39 AR1 .1 Front-line managers refuse to use the ERP system 163 
40 OR4.2 Non-account staff are unwilling and incapable to take up accounting duties 131 
Table 7.33: Rankmg of the 40 tdentdied ERP nsks based on nsk scores 
In table 7.34 below, the researcher further rearranges the top 15 risks according to their 
main categories. 
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Category Top 15 ERP risk items Risk Rank 
score 
Operational OR2.1 Sales staff cannot obtain data & information they need from 241 12 
risks ERP 
OR2.2 Customer info files contained in ERP are out-of-date or 246 6 
incomplete 
OR3.2 ERP contains inaccurate or incomplete bill of materials 243 8 
OR3.3 ERP system contains inaccurate inventory records 263 1 
Analytical AR1.2 Managers cannot retrieve needed information from ERP 247 4 
risks AR2.1 Sales forecast generated by ERP is inaccurate and 250 3 
inappropriate 
AR3.2 System fails to generate appropriate material net 240 13 
requirement plan 
AR4.1 Fail to use ERP to generate appropriate financial budgets 247 4 
Organisation OWR1.3 Support from top managers to ERP post-implementation is 242 10 
-wide risks insufficient 
OWR2.1 ERP plan is ill-defined or misfit with business strategy 240 13 
OWR2.3 Insufficient resources and funds are assigned to ERP 242 10 
training, maintenance and enhancement 
OWR3.3 Lose ERP-related know-how accumulated over time 252 2 
Technical TR1.1 Seamless integration is not achieved between modules of 243 8 
risks ERP system 
TR1.2 ERP is not able to seamlessly integrate with other 244 7 
information systems 
TR3.1 Technical bugs of ERP system is not speedily overcome 240 13 
Table 7.34: Top 15 ERP exploitation nsks 
As clearly emerged in table 7 .34, these top ERP risks did not cluster around a specific 
subset of the main categories. This means that top risks seem to be found across the 
organisational processes and not conveniently localised around one category, namely 
not around the technical category. Therefore, this study seemed to confirm that failure 
of ERP systems may not just be conveniently related to the technical infrastructures and 
software packages. Actually, what this study confirms is that it is in operational, 
management and strategic thinking areas that the majority of critical and important risks 
may be identified. 
In addition, a bivariate analysis was also conducted in this study to investigate the 
correlations between the identified ERP risks. A set of statistically significant 
relationships between the identified risks were thus identified, as presented and 
discussed above. Figure 7.3 presents a conceptual map to summarise and represent 
these correlations. A full description of each of these correlations is presented in table 
7.35 below. 
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Figure 7.3: Correlations between the identified ERP risks 
Correlation 
R1 As the probability of having inaccurate inventory record increases, the probability of 
having inappropriate material requirements plan increases. 
R2 As the probability of having inappropriate production schedule increases, the 
probability of having inappropriate material requirements plan correspondingly 
increases. 
R3 As the probability that data access right is assigned to irrelevant user increases, the 
probability of having unauthorised people to access to sensitive system data will 
increase. 
R4 As the probability of having personnel changes in the top management team 
increases, the probability of having insufficient top management support increases. 
R5 As the probability of having insufficient top management support increases, the 
probability of having inappropriate and ill-defined IS plan increases. 
R6 As the probability of having inappropriate and ill-defined IS plan increases, the 
probability of having unclear IS development direction correspondingly increases. 
R7 As the probability of having insufficient top management support is higher, the 
probability of having insufficient ERP fund will be higher. 
R8 As the probability of having inappropriate and ill-defined IS plan is higher, the 
probability of having insufficient ERP fund will be correspondingly higher. 
R9 As the probability of having inappropriate financial budget increases, the probability 
of having insufficient ERP fund will correspondingly increase. 
R10 As the probability of having insufficient ERP fund increases, the probability that the 












Correlation IS s1gn1ficant at the 0.05 level (1-ta1led);** Correlation 1s s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1 -talled) . 
Table 7.35: Correlations between the identified ERP risks 
The findings of the bivariate analysis were again quite illuminating. Investigating both 
the list of significant correlations and the correlation map, it becomes apparent that the 
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majority of the correlations occurred between analytical and organisation-wide risks. 
This points out to a clear break with the traditional view of ERP failure. It is clear from 
the bivariate analysis, that the impact of analytical and organisational-wide risks plays a 
fundamental in potential failure of ERP due to the potential causal effects between risks. 
For instance, the problem that 'ERP is not properly modified to meet emergent user 
needs' is originated by a set of organisation-wide risks (e.g. do not have sufficient top 
management support and ERP funds) and analytical risks (e.g. inappropriate financial 
budgets). Technical risks, that are very often seen as the main perpetrators in ERP 
failure, seem to be important but not strictly related to other risks. On the other hand, 
analytical and organisation-wide risks seemed to be interwoven and closely related with 
other similar risks. Consequently, the occurrence of these risks is much more difficult 
to manage, mitigate and contain. 
Overall, the questionnaire findings reported in this section confirmed that all predefined 
risk events were perceived by respondents as ERP exploitation risks in their firms. 
Among the list of risks, the top 15 risks were identified as the most crucial to SOEs. 
These top risks were thus selected to be further explored in the follow-up case study. In 
addition, 10 significant correlations were found between the identified ERP risks. It 
emerged from the correlation map presented in Figure 7.3 that, 6 ERP risks (i.e. AR3.1, 
OWR1.2, OWR2.2, OWR4.4, OWR4.5, and TR3.3) shown in the diagram were not 
included in the list of top ERP risks. In order to further explore the identified ERP risk 
correlations, these 6 ERP risks were also selected to be further investigated in the 
interviews. Consequently, 21 (i.e. 15 + 6) ERP risks were selected to be further 
validated and studied in the follow-up case study. 
7.5 Bivariate analysis: correlations between barriers and risks 
The final part of the analysis of the questionnaire data included a bivariate analysis, 
which aimed at exploring potential correlations between the barriers and risks identified. 
Specifically, this bivariate analysis attempted to explore if the existence of an ERP 
barrier could increase the probability of occurrence of certain ERP risks. Spearman's 
correlation and one-tailed test were used as the ideal approach to explore the 
relationships between these ordinal variables. A total of eight correlations between 
barriers and risks was thereby identified, as presented below. 
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7.5.1 Individual correlation between barriers and risks 
Power centralisation and centralised IT decision 
Due to the cultural barrier of power centralisation and centralised decision-making, 
Chinese managers may rarely involve their subordinates in the process of decision 
making, and may be less inclined to collect and consider alternative ideas from a wider 
group of people (Martinsons and Westwood, 1997; Reimers, 2002). It was therefore 
expected that, the existence of this cultural barrier might increase the probability of the 
risk that top managers make important IT decisions without consulting the opinions of 
IT experts or system users. 
Power centralisation Prob. that top 
and centralised managers make 
decision-making centralised IT decision 




N 41 41 
** Correlation 1s s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.36: Correlation between power centralisation and centralised IT decision 
The output in table 7.36 shows that the two examined variables are positively related 
with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .445. This relationship is significant at p 
= .002. Strong statistical evidence are thereby found to prove that, as the barrier of 
power centralisation is more likely to exit in the firm, the probability for top managers 
to make centralised IT decisions is higher. 
Short-term behaviour and probability to have insufficient top management support 
Chinese managers are often accused of focusing too much on achieving short-term 
business results when neglecting associated long-term effects and issues (e.g. Yuan and 
Ma, 2005; Zhang, 2004; Liu, 2004). It was thereby considered that, this organisational 
barrier might increase the probability that top managers did not provide sufficient and 
long-term support to ERP exploitation. 
The output in table 7.37 shows that the two examined variables are positively related 
with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .381. This relationship is significant at p 
= .006. Strong statistical evidence are thus found to prove that, as the barrier of short-
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term behaviour is more likely to exit in the firm, the probability of the risk that top 
managers fail to provide sufficient and continuous support to ERP is higher. 
Prob. to have 
Short-term insufficient top 
behaviour manaaement support 
Spearman's rho Short-term Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .381 (**) behaviour 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.006 
N 42 42 
** Correlation IS s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.37: Correlation between short-term behaviour and insufficient top management support 
Lack of ERP plan, unclear ERP development direction and insufficient ERP fund 
Lack of explicit IS or ERP plan is a barrier to the use of information systems. It was 
considered that, the existence of this barrier might increase the probability for the 
company to have 'unclear ERP development direction' and 'insufficient ERP fund'. 
The output in table 7.38 shows that the variables 'lack of ERP plan' and 'probability to 
have unclear ERP development direction' are positively related with a Spearman 
correlation coefficient of r = .419. This relationship is significant at p = .004. The 
conclusion that can be drawn is that, as the firm is more likely to lack an explicit 
IS/ERP plan, the probability of the risk that the firm has unclear ERP enhancement 
direction is higher. 
The output also shows that the variables 'lack of IS plan' and 'probability to have 
insufficient ERP fund' are positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of 
r = .327. This relationship is significant atp = .017. It can hence be concluded that, as 
the firm is more likely to lack a detailed IS and ERP plan, the probability of having 
insufficient ERP fund is higher. 
Prob. to have Prob. To 
Lack of explicit unclear direction have for ERP insufficient ERP plan enhancement ERP fund 
Spearman's Lack of explicit ERP Correlation 1.000 .419(**) .327(*) rho plan Coefficient 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.004 .017 
N 42 40 42 
** * Correlation 1s s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). Correlation 1s s1gmficant at the 0.05 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.38: Correlation between ERP plan, ERP development direction and ERP fund 
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In-house expert and efficient ERP plan 
Establishing an efficient ERP plan may often rely on the contribution of a large group of 
in-house experts. It was thus expected that lack of in-house experts, as an 
organisational barrier, might increase the probability that an efficient ERP plan is 
missing or ill-defined. The output in table 7.39 shows that the two examined variables 
are positively related with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .303, and this 
relationship is significant at p = .029. It thereby proved that, as the firm is more likely 
to lack in-house experts, the probability for the firm to have inefficient and ill-defined 
ERP plan is higher. 
Lack of in- Prob. that an efficient 
house experts ERP plan is missing or ill-defined 
Spearman's rho Lack of in- Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .303(*) house expert 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.029 
N 42 40 
* Correlation 1s s1gmficant at the 0.051evel (1-talled). 
Table 7.39: Correlation between In-house expert and efficient ERP plan 
Low-skilled staff and resistance to use ERP 
Low-skilled and ill-trained staff is a barrier to introduction and use of ERP systems 
(Wright and Donaldson, 2002; Sherer and Alter, 2004). It was expected that, the 
existence of this organisational barrier might increase the probability for operational 
staff and managers to be reluctant to use ERP. 
Prob. That Prob. that front-
Low-skilled and operational staff line managers 
ill-trained staff are reluctant to refuse to use 
use ERP ERP 
Spearman' Low-skilled and Correlation 1.000 .320(*) .31 0(*) 
s rho ill-trained staff Coefficient 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.022 .026 
N 42 40 40 
• Correlation IS srgmficant at the 0.051evel (1-talled). 
Table 7.40: Correlation between low-skilled staff and user resistance 
The output in table 7.40 shows that, the variables 'low-skilled and ill-trained staff and 
'probability that operational staff are reluctant to use ERP' are positively related with a 
Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .320. This relationship is significant at p = .022. 
Thus, the conclusion to be drawn is that, as staff in the firm are more likely to be low-
261 
Chapter Seven Results and Findings of the Questionnaire Survey 
skilled and ill-trained, the probability for operational staff to be reluctant to use ERP 
increases. The output also shows that the variables 'low-skilled and ill-trained staff 
and 'probability that managers refuse to use ERP' are positively related with a 
Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .31 0. This relationship is significant at p = .026. 
It thereby seemed that, as staff in the firm are more likely to be low-skilled and ill-
trained, the probability for managers to refuse to use ERP rises. 
System response time and user acceptance of the system 
System users often want the IS to have fast response time and will get irritated if the 
system cannot respond as quickly as they expected (Damodaran and Olphert, 2000). 
Slow system response time is thus a barrier to the use of ERP. It was expected that, the 
existence of this system barrier might increase the probability for staff to be reluctant to 
use the ERP system. 
The output in table 7.41 shows that the two examined variables are positively related 
with a Spearman correlation coefficient of r = .385. This relationship is significant at p 
= .007. Strong statistical evidence are thereby found to prove that, as the ERP system is 
more likely to have slow response time, the probability for staff to be reluctant to use it 
increases. 
Slow system Prob. that staff are 
response reluctant to use 
time ERP 
Spearman's rho Slow system Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .385(**) response time 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.007 
N 42 40 
** Correlation IS s1gmficant at the 0.01 level (1-talled). 
Table 7.41: Correlation between system response time and user acceptance 
7.5.2 Summary of correlations between barriers and risks 
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Figure 7.4: Correlations between identified ERP barriers and risks 
It clearly emerged from this correlation diagram that, the majority of correlations 
occurred between organisational barriers and various types of risks, including 
operational risks, analytical risks and organisation-wide risks. Cultural and system 
barriers seemed to be important, but they did not prove to be the main triggers of ERP 
risks. As a consequently, it is evident from this diagram that organisational barriers are 
the most crucial type of ERP barrier that needed to be carefully handled in order to 
prevent the occurrence of potential ERP risks. 
In addition, 3 risks (i.e. OR I. I, ARI.l, and OWRI.l) contained in the diagram have not 
been included in the 21 ERP risks that were selected to be further explored in the case 
study, as discussed in section 7.4.5. Consequently, in order to further explore the 
identified barrier-risk correlations in interview, these 3 ERP risks were added to the list, 
whjch resulting in a total of 24 ERP risk events to be selected for further investigation 
in the follow-up case study. 
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7.6 Further discussion and conclusions 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings derived from the questionnaire survey, 
which is the first data collection stage of the mixed-method research design adopted for 
this project. The analysis of the quantitative data collected has led to a set of significant 
findings and conclusions. 
In particular, the survey results confirmed that ERP system is of interest and importance 
to the vast majority of SOEs. As such 37 out of 42 respondent SOEs have adopted ERP. 
3 of the 5 respondent SOEs, that have not currently adopted ERP, stated they were 
scheduling to implement ERP in the future. 
Furthermore, the findings on ERP barriers showed that most system barriers predefined 
from an extensive literature review were identified by respondents as major problems to 
ERP exploitation. In contrast, due to China's rapid economic development and reform 
and also because of organisational improvements resulted by the use of ERP, many 
cultural and organisational ERP barriers, which were predefined and expected to exist in 
traditional Chinese firms, were not identified as critical issues in SOEs. However, it 
seems that these later barriers were understated by respondents, who may have 
minimized the existence and impact of these barriers. This understatement was 
confirmed by a bivariate analysis, from which it could be concluded that organisational 
barriers are often the triggers for complex networks of ERP barriers, including the 
system ones. In fact, the understatement of cultural and organisational barriers may be 
attributed to many potential reasons. It is possible that some of these factors may 
actually not be an issue in SOEs, or they may not be perceived by respondents as an 
issue in their firms due to a lack of understanding. It is also possible that Chinese 
managers participated in the survey may not be willing to disclose these internal 
problems to the researcher. These issues are further discussed in chapter nine. 
On the other hand, the findings on ERP risks confirmed that all of the 40 predefined risk 
events were perceived by the majority of respondents as risks to ERP exploitation in 
their firms. Among the list of risks, the top 15 risks were identified as the most crucial 
to SOEs. These top 15 risks were distributed across organisational processes and 
operation. Therefore, the survey study seemed to confirm that potential failure of ERP 
systems cannot be conveniently attributed to technical aspects, such as the software 
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package and the ICT infrastructure. In fact, the findings of the study showed that it was 
in organisation processes and procedures that the more dangerous and difficult to 
manage risks can be found. This conclusion was further supported by a bivariate 
analysis, which confirmed that analytical and organisation-wide risks, rather than 
technical risks, seemed to be interwoven and closely related with other similar risks. 
Consequently, the occurrence of these risks is much more difficult to manage, mitigate 
and contain. 
Moreover, by using the bivariate analysis to explore potential correlations between the 
ERP barriers and risks, it was identified that organisational barriers were often the 
triggers of various types of ERP risks. In contrast, cultural and system barriers seemed 
to be important, but they did not prove to be the main triggers of ERP risks. 
Consequently, it was concluded that organisational barriers are the most crucial type of 
ERP barrier that needed to be carefully handled in order to prevent the occurrence of 
potential ERP risks. This finding therefore further confirmed the importance of 
organisational barriers to potential ERP exploitation failure in the context of Chinese 
SOEs and the underestimation ofthis type of barrier in the questionnaire. 
Additionally, as argued by Chung and Smith (2007), Ma (2003:29-35) and Wang 
(1993:937-938), Chinese in mainland China differ with overseas Chinese (e.g. in USA 
and Europe) in cultural, political and economic values. The gap between overseas and 
mainland Chinese was further widened after China's Cultural Revolution in the 1970s 
(Wang, 1993:937-938). As discussed above, the majority ofERP exploitation problems 
identified were related to cultural and organisational aspects of user companies. 
Therefore, after analysing the questionnaire results, a further question that occurred to 
the researcher was: would contextual and value differences between overseas and 
mainland Chinese firms result in different ERP barriers and risks? This question 
emerged as an area for future research work, as discussed further in the conclusion 
chapter of this thesis. 
In addition, based on the findings derived from the questionnaire survey, the researcher 
selected a set ofERP areas to be further explored in the follow-up case study. 
First of all, and as discussed above, among the 25 identified ERP barriers the system 
ones were perceived by respondents as important to SOEs, while the other barriers 
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especially the organisational ones were proved in the bivariate analysis to be 
underestimated by respondents. Therefore, the researcher selected to further explore 
and investigate all of these 25 ERP barriers in the case study. 
On the other hand, among the list of ERP risks, the top 15 risks were identified to be 
particularly crucial to the SOEs studied. It was therefore considered ~ignificant to seek 
in-depth human insights to further investigate the causes and consequence of these top 
15 risks. Moreover, a further set of 9 risks was found to have correlations with other 
ERP barriers and risks. These 9 risks were thus also considered necessary to be further 
investigated in order to verify the correlations that they concerned. As a consequence, a 
total of 24 (i.e. 15 + 9) ERP risks were selected to further explore and study by using 
interviews. 
Finally, the bivariate analysis conducted in this study had identified a set of 35 
correlations, namely 17 correlations between ERP barriers, 1 0 correlations between 
ERP risks, and 8 correlations between ERP barriers and risks. These correlations 
between the identified ERP barriers and risks were certainly the most crucial and 
interesting part of findings derived from this project. Consequently, these 35 identified 
correlations were selected for further verification and exploration in the follow-up case 
study. 
Overall, the follow-up case study aimed at further exploring and validating all of the 25 
identified barriers, 24 shortlisted ERP risks, as well as the 3 5 barrier and risk 
correlations identified. The findings and results of this follow-up case study are 
presented and discussed in the next chapter. The conclusions and key findings reached 
in this chapter are also further explored, discussed and validated in chapter eight and 
nine. 
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